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Abstract 
It is a qualitative study about political socialization of first-generation ethnic Russian 
immigrants in Central and South Florida. The method used is a constructivist grounded theory 
with two-level coding. Based on data collected in forty in-depth interviews, I constructed a 
model of political socialization. It incorporates a starting point (the legal status in the US), 
triggers (English language proficiency, spousal support, and parenting), political socialization 
agencies (English as Second Language classes, a spouse, volunteering, and the church) and 
output structures (bureaucratic institutions). Using respondents’ opinions about American vs. 
Russian political systems and mass media, their political participation, and views about political 
efficacy, I created an original classification of immigrants’ political attitudes and behavior. The 
classification consists of four groups: the Admirers, the Skeptics, the Incurious, and the 
Recluses. This study fills the gap in the literature about Russian-speaking immigrants in the US. 
It also contributes to the cache of micro-theories on immigrant political socialization.  
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Introduction 
“Where are you?” I could hear the urgency in Rina’s voice1 over the phone. I looked at 
my watch, put down my coffee and said: “I am already here, waiting for you.” She went quiet for 
a second and then reported: “I just looked everywhere and I do not see you!” “Well, this is 
strange – I did the same, and you are not here either,” I replied. It took me a minute to realize 
that Rina and I were waiting for each other at different Panera Bread locations. “Stay where you 
are, and I will be right there!” I rushed out of the store and into my car to drive to another 
location. Fifteen minutes later I was sitting in front of Rina. She drank her coffee and smiled. She 
always smiles.  
I met Rina at one of the Russian-speaking Women club’s meeting. She was quite a 
spectacle: dressed in the 19th-century attire, she led the group of Russian-speaking women 
through a museum exhibition where she volunteered. Rina was very excited about the museum 
and knew a lot of interesting information about 19th century Florida living. Somewhere between 
candle-making and thread-weaving, I managed to introduce myself. I told her about my 
dissertation project and asked if she would like to participate. She was excited and promised to 
talk my ears off.  
Rina is from Rostov-on-Don, one of the largest cities in the Russian South. She was a 
young mother of two when the Soviet Union collapsed and, like most Russians, had to quickly 
adapt to new capitalistic realities. By the time she turned forty-five, she was a newly divorced 
                                                          
1 All names have been changed to protect the identities of the research participants 
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successful businesswoman. As her children grew up and started their own families, Rina focused 
on her future. She met an American man on an international dating website, and in 2012 moved 
to the United States. As I sat in front of Rina, I couldn’t help but notice how confident she was. 
When she emigrated from Russia, her English was very elementary, but it did not stop her from 
exploring her new country and adopting the new and exciting lifestyle. After five years in 
America, Rina learned English, received a life coach license, and became a realtor. She also 
maintained a part-time position at a retailing store and still had time to volunteer at the museum. 
Rina respects the US history and admires American political system. “Russian government 
always made me so mad: people are powerless and have no mechanisms to change the system. I 
know that life in the US is not easy, but you can always negotiate and compromise. I do not feel 
scared in the US.”   
According to the Department of Homeland Security2 the total number of Russian citizens 
who applied for legal permanent resident status during the period between 2004 and 2014 was 
122,223. In the same period, 92,876 former Russian citizens were naturalized and became 
Americans.  Between 2009 and 2013, Russian was the 9th most common language spoken in the 
United States. The estimated number of Russian speakers is 879.434.3 How many of them are 
like Rina? How many ethnic-Russians immigrate to the United States and successfully integrated 
into American society? How many of them study the American political system and find it to be 
better and more stable compared to the one in Russia? 
 When it comes to studies on political attitudes and political socialization of Russian-
speaking immigrants in the United States, most of the attention had always been paid to Russian-
                                                          
2 https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2016/table11  
3 http://www.census.gov/data/tables/2013/demo/2009-2013-lang-
tables.html?eml=gd&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery  
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speaking Jews. This dissertation calls for exploring immigration experiences and political 
attitudes of all ethnic Russians in the United States. The main goal is to determine whether 
exposure to American society and its political values encourage any changes in attitudes toward 
politics and political participation of recent immigrants from authoritarian states (using ethnic 
Russians as a sample group). 
This study looks at first-generation ethnic Russian immigrants who emigrated from 
Russia between 2004 and 2014. The study’s main questions are: 
1. What are the most common agencies of political socialization? 
2. How do the American political system and society affect Russia’s expatriates?  
3. Does proficiency in English language increase the likelihood of successful 
political socialization into American society? 
This study employs concepts of political culture, political socialization, and theories of 
political resocialization. Larry Diamond defined political culture as “people’s predominant 
beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of their 
country and the role of the self in that system” (Diamond, 1999, p. 163). Political socialization is 
defined as a type of learning “characterized by the development, aggregation, and manipulation 
of symbolic forms and representations. It is at this stage that knowledge is codified and passed 
on; the foundation of culture itself is laid down” (Riccards, 1973, p. 7). Adult political 
resocialization is the process of adaptation to a political culture and system of a host society.   
I conducted interviews with forty ethnic Russian immigrants in four metro areas of 
Central and South Florida. The sample was divided into four groups for easy comparison: by 
gender and English language proficiency. To determine if political resocialization had occurred, I 
4 
 
asked respondents to share their knowledge about American political system and ways how they 
obtained that knowledge. Respondents were also asked to share their opinions on political 
participation and political efficacy and how these opinions had changed after immigrating from 
Russian to the United States. In addition to interviews, I asked all participants to complete a 
survey that determined their political type (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 37).  
For the data analysis, I used constructivist grounded theory with two-level qualitative 
coding. Based on my analysis, political socialization of the first-generation ethnic Russian 
immigrants starts after receiving legal status (i.e. a lawful permanent resident/citizen); it is 
further triggered by interaction with American bureaucratic institutions and enhanced by English 
language proficiency, spousal support, and parenting. The most effective political socialization 
agencies include English as a Second Language (ESOL) classes, a spouse, volunteering, and 
English-speaking churches.  
Despite the exposure to multiple agencies of political socialization, most respondents 
(65%) remained either skeptical or uninterested in politics and political participation. Only six 
people, or 15% of respondents, became more politically active after immigration. These six 
individuals are very optimistic about their political efficacy and believe that the US has more 
freedoms and liberties compared to Russia. Eight people, or 20% of respondents, admitted they 
became less politically active after they left Russia. The main contributor to the decrease in 
political participation is low proficiency in English language. Inability to communicate with 
American society turned eight respondents into recluses. Ultimately, issues concerning 
immigrant political socialization led to a bigger question about differences in political cultures 
and their abilities to change.  
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The chapters will proceed in the following order: Chapters 1 and 2 address theoretical 
concepts of political culture and political socialization respectively. Chapter 3 reviews existing 
literature on the economic, social, and political integration of Russian, Russian-speaking, and 
other groups of immigrants in the US. Chapter 4 describes the methodology and introduces 
initial data. Chapter 5 talks about economic and social integrations of study participants. Chapter 
6 presents a theoretical model of political socialization of first-generation ethnic-Russian 
immigrants while chapter 7 analyses their political participation and efficacy. Chapter 8 presents 
a discussion of findings, theoretical inferences, study limitations, and some ideas for future 
research.   
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Chapter 1 Theoretical Framework: Political Culture 
This chapter concentrates on the concept of political culture and examines political 
cultures of Russia (home society) and the United States (host society). The first part analyses the 
concept of political culture and its development over time.  The second part focuses on American 
and Russian political cultures. It is important to explore the similarities and differences in 
political cultures of the two countries because it can help to identify any challenges ethnic-
Russian immigrants might face while adjusting to their new surroundings in the United States.  
 1.1. Political culture: a theoretical overview 
 Studies of political culture became popular in the second half of the 20th century and can 
be linked to the behavioral revolution in social sciences. The modern political tradition 
emphasized particular attitudes, values, and beliefs that can be identified within a specific 
political culture (Gibbins, 1989, p. 14). The development of the political culture concept is 
usually associated with Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, and Lucian Pye.4  
In 1956 Gabriel Almond proposed a fourfold political system classification: the Anglo-
American; the Continental European; the pre-industrial or partially industrial political systems 
outside of the Europe and America; and the totalitarian (Almond, 1956, pp. 392-393). Almond 
argued that each political system follows particular patterns of orientations toward political 
actions, which he defined as political culture. Furthermore, he suggested that political culture 
relates to the general culture of a country (Ibid., p. 396). Anglo-American political systems 
                                                          
4 It is important to note, however, that later they were criticized for their euro-centric approach. 
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possess a homogenous or secular (multi-valued) political culture with highly differentiated, 
organized, and stable role structures, which diffuse power within the political system. A 
totalitarian political system, such as a communist regime, may seem homogenous, but is a 
combination of conformity and apathy. It is imposed without considering alternatives. “This type 
of political system has become possible only in modern times, since it depends on the modern 
technology of communication, on modern types of organization, and on the modern technology 
of violence” (Ibid., p. 403). The totalitarian structure does not delegate power to elements of the 
political system. The two distinctive characteristics of a totalitarian political cutlure are the 
dominance of the coercive roles and a functional instability of the delegation of power.  
Democratic political culture is a culture of participation. Aside from universal suffrage, 
diverse political parties, and an elected legislature, democratic political participation requires 
civic culture. Originating in Western Europe, it combines modernity and tradition. Civic culture 
is “a particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among members of 
the nation” (Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 13). There are three types of political culture: parochial 
(a society with no specialized political roles); subject (subjects are aware of specialized 
government authority and can form a political attitude, but relations are passive); and participant 
(individuals orient toward the system and play an active role in the political process). The three 
types of political culture are not mutually exclusive and may exist in a mix. The mixed civic 
culture concept has the ability “to establish what propensities for political behavior exist in the 
political system as a whole, and its various parts, among special orientation groupings 
(subcultures), or at key points of initiative or decision in the political structure (role culture)” 
(Ibid., p. 31). By focusing on political culture, one can compare structural and functional 
characteristics and also cultural, subcultural, and role-structural characteristics of different states.  
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No society has a single political culture, and there is a clear division between urban 
(modern) and rural (traditional) political cultures. The proportion of the two affects the course 
and speed of national development (Pye & Verba, 1965, pp. 22-23).  
According to Almond and Powell (1966), political culture affects the structure and 
quality of a political system. The main function of the latter is to constantly recruit individuals to 
perform political roles or the basic units of a given political system. In traditional societies with 
primitive political cultures, the roles of the polity are not differentiated from other social roles. 
As a political culture develops, “men become increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in 
their political action” (Almond & Powell, 1966, p. 24). As follows, the political system benefits 
from a fully developed political culture where political roles are distributed among rational 
individuals.  
The development of political culture can be achieved through the secularization of 
culture. It is a process of replacing traditional attitudes and orientations with “more dynamic 
decision-making processes involving the gathering of information, the evaluation of information, 
the laying out of alternative courses of action” (Ibid.). According to these authors, secularization 
of political culture leads toward the emergence of pragmatic and empirical orientation. A 
political system, in turn, becomes more differentiated, complex, and able to respond better to 
societal needs. They also argue that the movement from primitive political society to a more 
progressive one can be achieved by shifting from one pattern of secularization to another. “It is 
in the secularization process that bargaining and accommodative political action becomes a 
common feature of the society and that the development of special features such as interest 
groups and parties become meaningful” (Ibid., p. 60). In other words, the parochial, subject, and 
9 
 
participant political cultures are pathways (from parochial to participant) for countries to 
improve their political cultures.   
In the 1970s, Ronald Inglehart introduced the notion of post-materialism (Inglehart, 
1971). After conducting his study of the six European industrial nations and assessing their 
values, he concluded that many aspects of life in industrial nations, including physical and 
economic security, are taken for granted. As opposed to political culture theorists before him 
(Almond, Verba, and Pye), Inglehart characterized post-materialism as a feature of developed 
industrial nations of the West. He identified ‘acquisitive’ (traditional) and post-bourgeois values. 
Acquisitive values include economic and social order, while post-bourgeois values consist of 
freedoms, liberties and active political participation. People born before 1945 are in favor of 
traditional values, while people born after 1945 prefer a post-bourgeois set of values. Values, 
skills, and structure are three types of variables that determine the pace of generational political 
changes (Inglehart, 1977, p. 11). If older generations are more conservative and individualistic, 
the younger ones prefer universal values and human rights. Post WWII generations were less 
materialistic and more oriented toward post-materialist values which include social and self-
actualization needs: aesthetic (beautiful cities, preserved nature); intellectual (appreciation for 
new ideas); and needs for belonging and self-esteem (humane society, open and receptive 
communities and governments) (Inglehart, 1977, p. 42).  
Post-materialism had offered entirely new venues in political culture studies, especially in 
comparison with the Almond-Verba-Pye framework which focused on allegiant citizenship. 
Inglehart developed an assertive citizenship model (Dalton & Welzel, 2014, p. 13). In the 
assertive model, the lines between elites and masses are blurred. It allows for more fluid 
communication between the two. It also makes governments more attentive and responsive to 
10 
 
public demands since the public became politically active and less trustful of political 
institutions. In Almond and Verba’s terms, stable industrial nations climbed the Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs and acquired a participant political culture. Throughout Inglehart’s long and 
prolific career, the materialism/post-materialism dichotomy resulted in the development of the 
World Values Survey (WVS) project5. It serves as a great source of information on people’s 
values around the globe. In this study, I rely on the WVS data to highlight the main differences 
in political cultures of Russia and the United States.  
The 1980s discussions of political culture were about postmaterialism and 
postmodernism. Postmodernism bases its understanding of political culture on dissatisfactions 
and disenchantments with modernity. “A postmodernist politics and political culture would 
highlight dissatisfaction with modern politics, its sameness, customary allegiances, its 
predictability, bureaucracy, discipline, authority and mechanical operation, and would stress the 
emergence of politics featuring difference, dealignment and realignment, unpredictability, 
freedom, delegitimization and distrust, power and spontaneity” (Gibbins, 1989, p. 14). There is a 
strong connection between political culture and people’s political preferences. Aaron Wildavsky 
divided cultures into two groups with two types in each group (Wildavsky, 1987, p. 7): 
1. Strong: collectivism and egalitarianism. Collectivism promotes hierarchy as an 
institutionalized authority where inequality is justified by specialization and division 
of labor. Egalitarian cultures reject authority altogether. They envision achievement 
of greater equality through the reduction of differences. 
                                                          
5 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp  
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2. Weak: individualism and fatalism. Individualistic cultures rely on self-regulation 
where bargaining reduces the need for authority. Fatalistic cultures are characterized 
by the inability of people to control what happens to them.  
The formation of political preferences, in theory, depends on a type of political culture. In 
practice, however, more often it reacts to the opposing forces due to conflicts among cultures. 
The possibility of conflict arises from having two or more political cultures within one state. The 
conflict can exist between the main political culture and one or more subcultures (Thompson, 
Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990) or coexistence of several political cultures within one state  (Putnam, 
Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). The collapse of the Soviet Union revealed an additional 
phenomenon – an alternative political culture that existed parallel to the main or official political 
culture (Petro, 1995).  
Political culture concept was used in democratization studies of the “Third Wave” 
democratic transitions (Gaman-Golutvina, 2015, p. 123). Larry Diamond conceptually connected 
political culture to democracy development. He argued that participant political culture, 
especially a belief in democratic legitimacy, is a central factor in the consolidation of democracy 
(Diamond, 1999).  
Each political culture is unique and exists in its distinctive system of coordinates. 
People’s attitudes and political beliefs are shaped by their personal experiences and by the agents 
of political socialization. At the same time, each historical period has common outside trends that 
affect political cultures. Contemporary trends include democratization, marketization, and 
globalization (Powell, Dalton, & Strøm, 2012, p. 57).  
12 
 
A variety of factors can alter political culture such as historical experiences, institutional 
changes, political socialization, as well as economic, social, and international factors. The re-
evaluation of political culture in the 21st century led scholars to pay attention to how culture 
influences politics. The culture of power has two forms: an official truth and a common sense. 
The power of culture, however, has a variety of forms: from creative, autonomous practices and 
trade unions to writings, speeches, and interpretive arts.  (Goldfarb, 2013).  
Throughout the decades, scholars of political culture attempted to refine the concept, but 
it had always been associated with democracy and political participation. The concept of a civic 
culture coined by Almond and Verba in the 1960s is firmly attached to active citizenship. In the 
next subsection, I will discuss political cultures of the United States and Russia. I will 
concentrate on two things in particular: the participation aspect and the people’s preferences for 
the governing regime.  
I chose to use Larry Diamond’s definition of political culture: “people’s predominant 
beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of their 
country and the role of the self in that system” (Diamond, 1999, p. 163). In my opinion, it is the 
most encompassing explanation of political culture because it incorporates not only people’s 
mentality but also their actions within their political system.  
 1.2. Political culture in the United States of America 
In Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville had famously asked: “How does it 
happen that the United States, where the inhabitants have only recently immigrated to the land 
which they now occupy…where they met one another for the first time…where, in short, the 
instinctive love of country can scarcely exist; how does it happen that everyone takes as zealous 
interest in the affairs of his township, his country, and the whole state as if they were his own?” 
13 
 
(Tocqueville, 1945b, p. 243). According to Tocqueville, the answer is simple: active political and 
civic participation in the United States occurs in the form of associations. “Americans of all ages, 
all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations…wherever at the head of some 
new undertaking you see the government of France, or a man of rank in England, in the United 
States you will be sure to find an association” (Tocqueville, 1945a, p. 106). In the US, there is 
unlimited freedom to form political and civic associations.  
Tocqueville had also noticed that Americans are very independent and learn early in life 
to rely on themselves (Tocqueville, 1945b, p. 192). Max Weber picked up on this contradiction 
as well: Americans are devoted equally to two opposite values: individualism and civic 
engagement. Weber traced it back to the first European settlers: “Puritanism’s world-mastery 
individualism…implied a strong orientation to the believer’s salvation. It also called forth an 
equally strong orientation to a community” (Kalberg, 2016, p. 26). A ‘community-forming 
energy,’ as Weber put it, came from the ascetic Protestant practices of communal worship that 
were very exclusive. Honesty, goodwill, and openness prevailed in such communities and 
eventually traveled to their commercial relations. “…these extensions of trust and ethical 
conduct in the 17th and 18th centuries laid the groundwork for the formation of a demarcated – 
and secular – civic sphere in the United States in the 19th century” (Ibid., p. 29). As follows, 
American political culture is deeply rooted in its history. 
In The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba had classified the US political culture as a 
participant type. The role of the American people, or participants, is developed and widespread 
because people are frequently exposed to politics. Americans possess “a sense of obligation to 
take an active part in a community, and a sense of competence to influence the government” 
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(Almond & Verba, 1963, p. 440). People’s ability to cooperate is a result of the high level of 
social trust that is present in the US political culture.  
The US is ethnically and religiously diverse. As follows, American political culture 
emphasizes values like social tolerance, equality of opportunity, and political freedom. For the 
same reason, the dominant techniques in American politics are bargaining, compromise, and 
competition. Since numerous groups seek to maximize their political influence, they form highly 
organized interest groups with extensive lobbying as their most distinctive activity. American 
social diversity is responsible for the existence of many subcultures, which are “especially likely 
to conflict with the dominant culture when social groups have been the object of political 
discrimination” (Rosenbaum, 1975, p. 76). As the most prosperous economy in the world, the 
US was able to solve its various social problems by making social mobility possible and sharing 
a proverbial ‘piece of its economic pie’ with relatively disadvantaged groups (Ibid., p. 77). These 
methods helped the US to lessen any political or social dissatisfactions of political subcultures. 
Like Almond and Verba, Walter Rosenbaum noted high levels of political trust. Americans tend 
to be open and optimistic; they had earned a reputation as ‘a nation of joiners’ due to their 
interest in social collaborations and a widespread belief of their high effectiveness (Ibid., p. 81). 
American democratic ideals emphasize four procedural norms: equality, freedom, political 
participation, and the rule of law. Equality is associated with equal protection under the law. 
Freedom relates to expressive freedoms like voting, the right of petition, peaceful assembly, and 
publication of political opinion. According to Rosenbaum, all these actions are very dear to 
Americans, especially when it comes to voting which they regard as the most effective way to 
influence the government. “Americans have made popular elections almost a fetish” (Ibid., 85). 
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Most Americans assert that civic activism is an obligation of every good citizen. But in reality, 
American are not as active as they declare: they tend to limit their civic actions to voting alone. 
Robert Putnam confirmed Rosenbaum’s assessment of American civic activities. He 
noted a gradual decline in the voter’s turnout and engagement with public institutions. As the 
levels of education rose, Americans became less trusting. Trust strongly correlates with the civic 
engagement – they both act as building blocks of the social capital. Putnam offered several 
explanations for the erosion of American social capital that included increased women 
participation in the labor force, increased mobility, changes in the family structure, and the 
patterns of individualization (Putnam, 1995, p. 233). Americans do participate, but the nature of 
organizations they chose have changed. Instead of traditional associations like churches or labor 
unions, Americans now prefer not-for-profit organizations. As for the leisure activities, 
Americans previously enjoyed public gatherings, but modern technology today allows for home 
entertainment. Overall, Putnam spoke about redistribution of social capital.  In my opinion, 
participation did not go anywhere: it only changed venues. Individualistic tendencies and 
preference for non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations do not change the fact that 
Americans still participate. American participation serves as an example of Inglehart’s theory of 
post-materialism (Inglehart, 1971) coupled with technological advances. Putnam’s observation 
proves Inglehart’s point. The transformation of American political culture and participation 
patterns are just the next step of political culture development. 
J. Harry Wray identified five features of the US political culture he called American 
‘political curiosities’ (Wray, 2001, p. 20):  
16 
 
• Political participation: in the US, political participation is unequally distributed across 
social classes. The working class participates less than both the wealthy class and the 
working class in Europe (Ibid., p. 27); 
• Foreign aid: the US does not give nearly as much as Americans think (Ibid., p. 28); 
• Social welfare: the US social welfare expenditures are high, but provide for fewer people. 
The United States is the only industrial nation without a comprehensive national healthcare 
program. There is a lack of national commitment to assist the poorest members of society. 
While Americans agree that it is important to have welfare programs, they are suspicious of 
both programs and people who apply for them.  
• Income inequality: the regressive tax system and the prevalence of service jobs as opposed 
to industrial jobs are the two causes of income inequality in America (Ibid., p. 32).  
• Crime and punishment: 25 to 35% of the world’s lawyers’ practice in the US where legal 
assistance is required for almost every activity. At the same time, the US is a country with a 
high crime rate and the highest prison population in the world (Ibid., p. 37). 
In combination with individualism, a taste for competition, and materialism, these 
‘political curiosities’ fill in the blanks in an intricate portrait of American political culture. 
Lane Crothers summarized the main attributes of American civic culture (Crothers, 2013, 
pp. 15-16). Her list includes the following: 
• Negative liberty (minimum of government involvement); 
• Political equality; 
• Individualism; 
• Democracy;  
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• Tolerance;  
• Exceptionalism (the US is destined to be the leader); 
• Capitalism.  
Finally, Stephen Kalberg emphasized a post-materialistic, in Inglehart’s terms, nature of 
American people: “we volunteer far more frequently than do citizens of other nations, and we 
speak of a ‘dedication’ to improve our communities” (Kalberg, 2016, p. 2). Like Putnam, he 
acknowledged that American participation becomes less and less visible, but American altruism 
is still there. In contrast, Russian political culture only recently started to show post-materialist 
features. The Russian Federation is a young nation, if we consider the 1991 collapse of the 
Soviet Union as its inception. At the same time, some of its cultural baggage can be traced back 
to the Russian Empire.  
 1.3. Political culture in Russian Federation 
The literature on Russian political culture identifies three general historical periods with 
different political regimes and distinct political and social features: Imperial Russia which ended 
in 1917; the Soviet Union (1922-1991), and the post-communist transitional period (1991-
present). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced two very different regimes. 
The first occurred under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999) and the second continues 
under the leadership of Vladimir Putin (2000-present). The concept of democracy in these two 
periods had different interpretations as well. If during the 1990s democracy was associated with 
freedom, westernization, and economic liberalization, after Putin came to power, democracy was 
understood as a summation of people’s aspirations based on common culture and history. In 
essence, democracy had stopped being universal and became a reflection of the culture and 
historical experiences of one given nation (Surkov, 2008; Tsygankov, 2014).   
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 There is a consensus among scholars that pre-revolutionary Russia was a very 
communitarian society. Traditional values included collectivism, community, spiritual unity 
(соборность), solidarity, equality, and justice. A strong paternal state was the direct result of 
these communitarian values. Russian thought, according to Russian philosopher Nikolai 
Berdyaev, is eschatological in its messianic ideas about Russia’s destiny (Gaman-Golutvina, 
2015, p. 387). Another historical feature of Russian culture is its antinomy: Russia incorporates 
initially opposing ideas and phenomena. Berdyaev pointed out that such duality might be the 
result of Russia’s location between two very different worlds – the East and the West. Russia 
combines their features, and at the same time, differs from both (Ibid.).  
Stephen White outlined the dominant features of the Soviet political culture as follows: 
• Homogeneity (which has a strong increasing tendency); 
• Building communism is the society’s main aim; 
• The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is the only political force; 
• The superiority of the socio-political system of socialism; 
• Internationalism; 
• Collective style problem-solving; 
• High levels of psychological and behavioral involvement in politics (White, 1985, p. 79). 
Oxana Gaman-Golutvina added a few more characteristics to the list: low levels of 
political activity; egalitarian values; conformism; absence of a plural political system, and, as a 
consequence, a lack of civic identification with the CPSU (Gaman-Golutvina, 2015, p. 393). 
In the Soviet Union, national identity was constructed and reinforced by mechanisms that 
transmitted information across generations. There is evidence of continuity to many pre-
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revolutionary cultural elements despite the restrictive political ideology: family as an 
autonomous unit within a society,  19th-century literature, religion, oral tradition and social 
custom, art, music, and folk heritage (White, 1985, p. 80).   
The central feature of the Soviet political culture, according to White, was patriotism. 
Institutions like the Red Army had always been respected by the Soviet society (Ibid.). Archie 
Brown had also argued that pride in the victory over Nazi Germany took a special place in the 
‘official political culture.' It was a political memory that brought every member of the Soviet 
society together. “Party leaders and propagandists lay such constant stress on the ‘Great Patriotic 
War’ in their conscious political socialization efforts since there is no other shared experience 
with which they can so instantly achieve a rapport with their listeners or readers” (Brown, 1985, 
p. 103). Brown had also pointed out that the actual term ‘political culture’ was used in official 
Soviet discourse starting in 1974. Leonid Brezhnev described a ‘Soviet Man’ to be ‘a person of 
high political culture.' From the context, it was clear that a low political culture was associated 
with the “problem of egoism, philistinism, avarice and heavy drinking” (Ibid., p. 105). Both 
Brezhnev and his successor, Yuri Andropov, used the term ‘political culture’ and ‘high political 
culture’ to describe personal qualities everyone should possess in an ideal socialist society. The 
intent was to shift attention from the Soviet political system to Soviet people.  
As argued by Natalia Kovalyova, despite the symbolic powers vested in the working 
class, “[p]olitics was something that they at the top did and that we at the bottom did not and 
could not comprehend. In an hour-glass society, the elite managed the regime from above, while 
at the bottom the subjects sought to minimize contact with rulers, worked around politics, 
limiting their involvement, for the most part, with matters of household interest” (Kovalyova, 
2014, p. 31). Mass participation in the Soviet Union was not a political act, but an act of social 
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belonging where people concentrated on complying with the rules and celebrating imposed 
symbols. Those who questioned the established order were quickly identified and labeled as anti-
Soviet elements (Ibid.).  
Peter Ester, Loek Halman, and Vladimir Rukavishnikov described the Soviet political 
culture as a ‘belief culture’: “Russia had always been a society of believers. So it was with old 
Orthodox Russia, and so again with Soviet Russia under Lenin” (Ester, Halman, & 
Rukavishnikov, 1997, p. 43).  
The Soviet collapse brought questions about the new Russia’s political culture into focus. 
As early as 1990, scholars performed studies to evaluate the results of political and social 
reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, the last General Secretary of CPSU. Jeffrey W. Hahn 
conducted a pioneering qualitative study on political attitudes in Russia. With the help of local 
sociologists, he interviewed 960 individuals in the Russian city of Yaroslavl’. His goal was to 
determine if Russia had the potential to transform into a typical western democracy. The study 
showed not only high levels of trust in their government, but also high levels of political 
alienation and political cynicism, indicating that the potential for political participation was low 
(Hahn, 1991, pp. 407-409). 
On the other hand, Hahn’s study revealed high levels of political interest. He concluded 
that younger generations possessed considerable political knowledge and a strong preference for 
competitive elections. These findings let Hahn express a careful optimism about Russia’s 
political culture’s ability to transform into a participant political culture (Ibid, p. 416).    
In the aftermath of Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost reforms, the first major change 
in political culture came with the ubiquitous support for market reforms coupled with a gradual 
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revision of Soviet history. Russian post-Soviet society looked up to western countries in search 
of new economic and political models. By 1991, Perestroika failed, and the dismay of the 
Communist party became inevitable.  
Before addressing any post-Soviet political culture transformations, it is important to look 
at economic and political changes performed by Russia’s First President, Boris Yeltsin, and his 
team. First, Yeltsin ‘westernized’ the new Russian government: he reduced the number of 
deputies and abolished most of the Soviet industrial ministries. He also put economists in charge 
of transition reforms which started in 1992 (Åslund, 2007, p. 92). The Soviet Union was 
notorious for ration coupons distribution and long waiting lines to get anything from groceries to 
furniture. Radical price liberalization and market reforms gradually diminished shortages of 
goods and services, even though the process took longer than in other former socialist countries 
like Czechoslovakia and Poland (Ibid., p. 97). Another successful reform was privatization, 
which Timothy Colton characterized as “the largest divestiture of state resources in history” 
(Colton, 2016, p. 102). The main goals were to form a broad class of private owners, improve 
industrial efficiency, and create a competitive market. Privatization was so massive and quick 
that “in late 1994, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development assessed that half of 
Russia’s GDP originated in the private sector” (Åslund, 2007, p. 111).  
In addition to economic reforms, Russia of the 90s enjoyed an unprecedented amount of 
freedoms and liberties including freedom of speech, assembly, and petition. Mass media were 
mostly independent while the political system was competitive but inclusive. “The costs of entry 
into the political electoral ring were low to nonexistent – 239 parties and political movements 
were registered in 1999, and State Duma candidates in local districts could sign up as non-
partisans” (Colton, 2016, p. 110).  
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Fundamental economic and political transformations came at a steep price. Despite the 
initial optimism, the 1992-1993 economic and political reforms in Russia resulted in a 
psychological atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity. Drastic economic reforms caused retail 
prices’ increase by 2,520 percent in 1992 which wiped out all people’s savings. The rule of law 
was weak, governmental institutions drowned in corruption, and private business developed 
vicious habits such as tax evasions, rackets, and bribes (Ibid., p. 103-111). The moral crisis 
coupled with an unprecedented increase in criminal activities was an unexpected outcome of the 
Russian transition to a bright capitalistic future. Income inequality, which was never significant 
in the Soviet Union, “became one of the decisive factors of social stratification in Russia…the 
ideology of egalitarianism of the former communist regime has been replaced by a situation in 
which income differences are growing, and social inequality is on the rise” (Ester et al., 1997, p. 
17). The 1990s are strongly associated with inflation and salary delays.  
Notwithstanding the negative aspects of transition, throughout the 1990s, Russia was not 
abnormal when compared to countries with similar income levels. “Both in 1990 and 2003, 
Russia was a middle-income country, with GDP per capita around $8,000 at purchasing power 
parity…, a level compatible to that of Argentina in 1991 and Mexico in 1999. Countries in this 
income range have democracies that are rough around the edges, if they are democratic at all” 
(Shleifer & Treisman, 2005, p. 152). In other words, there was nothing abnormal about Russia’s 
struggles, especially considering just how fast the transition progressed.  
Toward the end of the 1990s the main characteristics of Russian political culture included 
the following: 
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• Low levels of public trust: Russians did not believe in media, trade unions, the legislature, 
military, and police. The most trusted public institution was the Russian Orthodox Church 
(Ibid., pp. 90-100).  
• Low political efficacy: Russians did not believe they could influence public policy. As a 
result, the Kremlin was not too concerned with public opinion (Ibid., p. 61).  
• Russia’s civil society was weak.  Ester et al. argued that the western concept of civil 
society should be either modified to apply to post-communist societies or not used at all 
(Ibid., p. 63).  
• In the 1990s political participation in Russia was limited to elites. Also, Russians were less 
likely to participate in political protests (Ibid., p. 65); 
• Russians differed from the West in their understanding of human rights. Americans 
emphasize freedoms and liberties (first generation human rights). Russians preferred socio-
economic rights (second generation human rights). Hence, Russians instinctively rely on 
their government more than any western society (Ibid., p. 69).  
• Favoring equality is a deeply-rooted element of Russian political culture and can be traced 
back to Tsarist Russia (Gaman-Golutvina, 2015, p. 387).  
By the end of the 1990s, it was evident that the Russian public did not accept market 
democracy as a value and refused to appreciate Western ideology. Yeltsin’s approval rating had 
dropped from 81 percent in 1991 to 8 percent in 1999 (Morozov, 2008, p. 158). 
Under Vladimir Putin’s leadership (2000-present), Russia was slowly losing its fresh 
democratic flair. “Authoritarian regime in Russia under Putin was institutionalized with the 
reformation of major institutions such as separation of powers, electoral and party systems, and 
center-regional relationships” (Gelʹman, 2015, p. 75). Putin’s closest friends and followers 
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occupied key positions in government and business. The main priority was to institute the power 
hierarchy. In 2000, Putin limited influence of regional elites by establishing regional districts 
with appointed envoys (Ibid., p. 78). United Russia political party (Putin’s legislative project) 
was created in 2001 and by 2007 had 315 out of 450 seats in the lower house of Russian 
Parliament – the State Duma. It became ubiquitous throughout federal and regional 
administrations and got into a habit of disabling any attempts to challenge Putin’s authority in 
the legislative branch (Colton, 2016, p. 148). As a result, the State Duma, once a patchy and 
colorful cornucopia of political parties and regional representatives became much more 
homogenous. While its law-making activities had increased, its political representation 
performance became limited due to the loss of political autonomy (Gelʹman, 2015, p. 78).       
By 2005, according to Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Neil Munro, Russia 
developed into a plebiscitary autocracy where “there are elections with mass participation and a 
degree of competition, but governors are not accountable to the rule of law. Nor the governors 
accountable to the electorate, for a lawless regime can organize elections that are unfree and 
unfair” (Rose, Mishler, & Munro, 2006, p. 34). The New Russia Barometer surveys6 showed that 
in 13 years (from 1992 to 2005), Russian public opinion had moved from being negative toward 
the new regime to neutral. Only in 2003, it became slightly positive (Ibid., p. 91). As of 2006, 80 
percent of Russians had accepted the new Russian regime (Ibid., p. 201). According to Paul 
Starobin, Russians are not interested in freedoms and other democratic values if their economic 
needs are not satisfied. “It is not that Russians are uninterested in the pursuit of happiness – it is 
just they tend to have a collective concern about where this road can lead” (Starobin, 2009, p. 
124). It seems that Russians are more interested in their economic stability and, to have it, they 
                                                          
6 http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog1_0.html  
25 
 
are willing to sacrifice freedoms of press and other democratic ideals. Putin’s authoritarianism 
did not invade people’s private lives. “Russians were at liberty to think, pray, spend, read, and 
pass their spare time as they pleased. Relative prosperity left them freer than before to soak up 
property and goods, and to see the world…Like it or not; the modern creative class made its 
entrance in Russia during the Putin years” (Colton, 2016, pp. 150-151).  
One of the key developments during Putin’s presidency was the concept of ‘sovereign 
democracy.’ It was authored by Vladislav Surkov, the Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential 
Administration (1999-2011), who argued that Russia needed to establish its place in the 
community of nations. Vladimir Putin was portrayed as a strong leader who promoted Russian 
identity and opposed the spread of Western pressure. After the turmoil of the 1990s, Russians 
become more pragmatic in their view of democracy. They also viewed political instability as the 
main threat to the Russian state. Among Russians, there is a widespread belief that political order 
is fragile and an authoritarian approach might be the only way to keep it stable (Powell et al., 
2012, p. 352).  
‘Sovereign democracy’ offered a more rigid understanding of a stable political order. The 
core of the new strategy was developed around the idea of sovereignty rather than democracy. If 
the classical notion of democracy is based on the sovereign autonomy of people, Russian 
policymakers had envisioned the form of democracy that supports the sovereignty of the state. 
Russia’s role did not have to be dominant or leading, but it had to reflect the national character 
and people’s political and social aspirations (Surkov, 2008, p. 14). The three characteristics of 
Russian political culture are centralization, personification, and idealization. Surkov strongly 
discouraged implementation of political features of other states, even if these features were 
proclaimed to be truly liberal, democratic and rational: “in choosing paths for the development of 
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our democracy and economy, we must ponder which of these paths best suits the special traits of 
our national character and culture” (Ibid., p. 18). As a result, he proposed the concept of 
sovereign democracy that responds to Russia’s realities and needs (Ibid., p. 21): 
• It justifies centralization; 
• Makes Russian democracy more flexible and promotes the wholeness of Russia as a nation; 
• It is personified “as it interprets the course set by Putin”;  
• It is idealistic.  
In February 2019, Surkov argued that the contemporary Russian state had transformed 
into a new system led by historical processes and the art of possible. Russian government created 
its sovereign version of democratic development when it rejected the contemporary global state-
building trends in favor of realism and determinism. Russia’s state system is not elegant, but 
honest. There is no point of hiding authoritarian mechanisms under a misleading ‘an illusion of 
choice’ façade. Surkov claimed that there is no ‘deep state’ in Russia. Instead, there is a 
phenomenon he called ‘deep narod’ (deep people/folks).  ‘Deep narod’ is an enigma – it lives by 
its own logic, unattainable and impossible to study or predict by sociological surveys, 
propaganda, and other means. In fact, it is very difficult to even describe ‘deep narod’ – history 
knows attempts to define it as a group of peasants; later, workers, people without political party 
preferences, hipsters, or office workers (white collar). The state created by Putin seem to hear 
and respond to the ‘deep narod’ better than any other system. As a result, the “Long state of 
Putin,” will continue to thrive long after Vladimir Putin is gone (Surkov, 2019).    
According to Timothy Colton, the ‘sovereign democracy’ concept did not revive a 
monarchy or totalitarianism, but it did recreate a ‘vintage personal dictatorship’ or Putinism. 
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Colton argued that Putinism is a mix of political and cultural ingredients including “the 
attachment to order and past achievements, reflexive nationalism, casting aspersions on alien 
influences, and neopatrimonial reverence for the state as a provider and regulator” (Colton, 2016, 
p. 149)  
Andrei Tsygankov and others have referred to Putin’s Russia as a ‘managed democracy.’ 
“The Russian view of democracy is not fundamentally opposed to that of Western nations, yet it 
is distinct. As in the West, many Russians define democracy in terms of civil liberties and 
political freedoms. However, Russians predominantly associate the success of democracy with a 
strong state. They do not think in terms of oppositions between ‘order’ and ‘rights’ but instead, 
tend to favor their combination…When asked whether it is possible for Russia to be both 
democratic and have a strong state, more than 50% believe that they can have both” (Tsygankov, 
2014, p. 130). The order is as important as an idea of democracy. The widespread belief in a 
strong state is the main inspiration behind Russia’s traditional authoritarian style of government, 
a so-called managed democracy. “Such an understanding of democracy as linked to the state has 
roots in Russia’s premodern and contemporary history...when not receiving the desired 
protections, peasants could rebel, but their anger was commonly directed at the nobles and not 
the tsar, who was viewed as the ultimate protector. Members of the Russian intelligentsia, 
beginning with Nikolai Karamzin and Alexander Pushkin, also expected freedom and progress to 
come from the monarch, rather than society” (Ibid., p. 131).  
Since Russia is an authoritarian state, why call it democracy? If we were to define 
democracy simply as people’s will, then Russia’s ‘sovereign’ system is democratic. According to 
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the Levada Center7, the simple majority of Russians consider an authoritarian leader to be 
necessary for their country. Please refer to Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1 Opinions on Russia's authoritarian leadership (The Levada Center, 2018, p. 31) 
 
Sovereign or ‘managed’ democracy has its setbacks. For example, by attempting to 
control and anticipate certain political and social developments, the political system undermines 
the whole idea of democracy. It was the case with Kremlin’s attempt to create a civil society 
from above and limit external influences (Primakov, 2008, p. 101). Other than that, a ‘sovereign 
democracy’ is the product of a long history of Russian political culture that originated in 
Imperial Russia, survived through the Soviet experiment, and continued in Russia as we know it 
today.  
 1.4. American and Russian political cultures compared 
The best way to compare the two is to look at people’s responses to surveys about their 
political preferences and participation. The most recent survey Americans and Russians both 
participated was World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6 in 20118. I picked several questions from 
the survey to illustrate the key values that respond to the definition of political culture adopted 
for this study: “people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and 
                                                          
7 https://www.levada.ru/cp/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/2017Eng.pdf  
8 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp  
1989 1994 1995 1996 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Our people need a 'strong hand' at 
all times 25 35 33 37 42 45 43 40 44 42 43 41 31 32 35 40
There can be situation (like now) 
where it is necessary to give full 
power to one person 16 23 27 32 31 29 29 31 33 29 31 31 46 39 37 38
It should never be possible for one 
person to have full power 44 23 24 18 20 18 18 25 19 22 17 20 15 21 21 17
Difficult to answer 16 18 15 13 8 8 10 5 5 8 9 8 7 9 7 5
Number of respondents 
(hundreds) 15 30 30 25 16 16 15 16 16 8 16 16 16 16 16 16
Are there situation where the presence of a strong and authoritative leader, a 'strong hand', is necessary for the people?
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evaluations about the political system of their country and the role of the self in that system” 
(Diamond, 1999, p. 163). 
Table 1.2 Interest in politics (WVS – V84) 
How interested would you say you are in politics? 
 Americans, % Russians, % 
Very interested 17.6 4.7 
Somewhat interested 41.3 27.9 
Not very interested 25.6 45.0 
Not at all interested 14.7 20.4 
On average, Americans are more interested in politics compared to Russians. From Table 
1.2 it is evident that 58.9 percent of Americans are interested in politics. In Russia, the number of 
respondents interested in politics is only 32.6 percent. 
 
Table 1.3 Political participation (WVS – V84, 86, 87, 88) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Americans are more willing to engage in political action whether it is a petition signing, 
joining a boycott, attending the peaceful demonstration, or strike. The overwhelming majority of 
Russians, however, would never participate in any of these actions. It can be an indication of 
Political action: signing petition 
 Americans, % Russians, % 
Have done 60.1 11.1 
Might do 30.7 24.6 
Would never do 8.0 62.8 
Political action: joining in boycotts 
Have done 15.5 2.1 
Might do 51.1 17.2 
Would never do 32.0 78.5 
Political action: attending a peaceful demonstration 
Have done 13.7 12.1 
Might do 54.8 22.1 
Would never do 30.0 63.5 
Political action: joining strikes 
Have done 7.4 2.3 
Might do 41.7 17.2 
Would never do 49.5 76.3 
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political cynicism and low levels of political trust. At the same time, since 65.4 percent of 
Russians are not interested in politics (Table 1.2), they might not find participation in political 
action to be an appealing or useful activity.  
Table 1.4 Government responsibility (WVS – V98) 
Who should have more responsibility? 
 Americans, % Russians, % 
The government should take more responsibility to 
ensure that everyone is provided for 8.5 41.9 
People should take more responsibility to provide for 
themselves 18.2 4.0 
When it comes to responsibilities, there is a big difference between Americans and 
Russians. While less than 10 percent of Americans rely on their government for services, 42 
percent of Russians think the government should be the main provider of services. It is very 
common for Russians to rely on a government’s assistance and compensation in case of a natural 
disaster, fire, or a terrorist attack. Not many Russians insure their property. In the United States, 
insurance is one of the main priorities for any property owner. American citizens themselves are 
largely responsible for the safety of their property in case of any natural or human-made disaster.  
Table 1.5 Confidence in the government (WVS – V115) 
How much confidence do you have in the government? 
 Americans, % Russians, % 
A great deal 3.7 7.0 
Quite a lot 28.9 40.4 
Not very much 51.2 30.6 
Not at all 14.1 16.6 
65.3 percent of Americans do not have confidence in their government. It is a trait of an 
individualist society where people tend to rely on themselves and, as follows, has less trust in the 
system. In Russia, there is almost an even split between those who have confidence in their 
government (47.4 percent) and those who do not (47.2 percent). Russia is traditionally a 
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communitarian society which explains the high percentage of those who has confidence in the 
government. At the same time, the economic and political turmoil of the 1990s and several 
financial crises (1998 and 2008) probably affected levels of confidence in the government and 
resulted in a high percentage of those who do not trust the government as much. Since the WVS 
survey took place in 2011, the memories of the 2008 financial crises were still fresh. 
Table 1.6  A strong leadership (WVS – V127) 
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections is 
 Americans, % Russians, % 
Very good 6.1 26.0 
Fairly good 28.0 41.0 
Bad  26.2 16.1 
Very bad 37.2 5.4 
63.4 percent of Americans think that it is not a good idea to have a strong leader with 
many unchecked powers. On the other hand, 67 percent of Russians prefer strong leadership. 
Russians historically inclined to favor a traditionally paternalistic state which implies having a 
powerful and charismatic leader.  
Table 1.7 Democratic political system (WVS – V130) 
Having a democratic political system is 
 Americans, % Russians, % 
Very good 37.8 20.8 
Fairly good 41.9 46.5 
Bad 12.2 12.6 
Very bad 4.9 4.6 
Both Americans (79.7 percent) and Russians (67.3 percent) prefer a democratic system of 
government. In my opinion, ‘democracy’ is one of the most popular words in the world, but there 
are many interpretations of the term. These percentages are misleading because World Values 
Survey did not define democracy before asking questions about it.   
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Table 1.8 Voting levels (WVS – V226 & 227) 
Do you vote in national elections? 
 Americans, % Russians, % 
Always  57.8 41.8 
Usually  20.6 39.4 
Never  19.8 15.6 
Do you vote in local elections? 
 Americans, % Russians, % 
Always  37.8 37.5 
Usually  36.5 41.1 
Never  24.0 17.7 
Table 1.8 shows respondents’ voting activity. Overall, the combined number of those 
who vote ‘always’ and ‘usually’ is greater among Russian respondents: 81.2 percent vote in 
national elections and 78.6 percent vote in local elections. Americans are less active but also 
show high numbers of voters: 78.6 percent in national and 74.3 percent in local elections.  
Table 1.9 National pride and willingness to serve (WVS – V211 & V66) 
How proud are you to be American/Russian? 
 Americans, % Russians, % 
Very proud 56.1 28.6 
Quite proud 30.6 47.5 
Not very proud 6.8 14.7 
Not at all proud 1.4 3.8 
Would you be willing to fight for your country? 
 Americans, % Russians, % 
Yes  57.7 52.7 
No  40.6 21.5 
Don’t know, unsure  1.7 17.8 
Lastly, table 1.9 addresses respondents’ patriotic feelings. Over a half of American 
respondents are very proud of their country. The combined number of Americans who are ‘very 
proud’ and ‘quite proud’ is 86.7 percent. A little less than a half of Russian respondents are 
‘quite proud’ of their country, and the combined number of all the proud respondents is 76.1 
percent. It is worth noting that the number of Americans who are not proud of their country is 
less than 10 percent, while the number of Russians who are not proud of Russia is close to 20 
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percent (18.5). The majority of respondents in both countries are willing to fight for their 
country. In the United States, 40.6 percent are not willing to protect their country, and 1.7 
percent provided no answer. In Russia, only 21.5 percent are not ready to fight for their country, 
and 17.8 percent were not sure. Overall, both countries show high levels of patriotism. 
Americans are much more proud of their country, and a larger number of them is willing to 
protect the United States.  
In sum, there is an evident difference between Americans and Russians about their 
political preferences and activities. Americans show more interest in politics and are more 
willing to participate in a variety of political activities, while Russians prefer to limit their 
participation to voting and avoid other forms of political participation. Russians tend to trust 
their government more than Americans. They also appreciate having a strong executive that can 
make decisions without cooperating with the legislature. In other words, they do not see value in 
checks and balances. Respondents in both countries are proud of their countries and willing to 
fight for it which shows that both Americans and Russians are very patriotic.  
1.5. A closer look at Russia 
In the case of Russia, a country that went through many regime changes throughout its 
modern history, it is not enough to present data for just one year. Wave Six of the World Value 
Survey was conducted in 2011, and it is possible that Russian data on political opinions and 
participation were influenced by eleven years of authoritarian oppression, or Putinism, which 
started in 2000. Also, toward the end of 2011, Russia witnessed massive protests following 
Parliamentary Elections in December of 2011. As follows, a closer look is needed. The Levada 
Center had recently published a report on public opinion in Russia. It shows data for multiple 
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years and includes several decades, from the 1990s up to 2017 (The Levada Center, 2018). Table 
1.10 shows the distribution of responses about interest in politics, in percentages.  
Table 1.10 Interest in politics (The Levada Center, 2018, p. 37) 
  
The number of those who are interested in politics (to a very large extent and a large 
extent) had been slowly decreasing over the years. The highest number was 15% in 1990 and 
1991, the lowest number of people interested in politics was in 2011 (2% and 6%). Throughout 
the whole period, most people were either moderately interested in politics or interested to a 
small extent. The number of those who are not at all interested in politics was slowly increasing 
from 12% in 1990 to 22% in 2017, picking at 24% in 2011. Table 1.11 displays data on 
respondents’ evaluation of their involvement in politics: 
Table 1.11 Involvement in political life (The Levada Center, 2018, p. 23). 
  
1990 1991 1992 1997 2006 2010 2011 2012 2016 2017
To a very large extent 6 1 5 2 5 1 2 2 2 2
To a large extent 15 15 10 9 10 8 6 8 8 8
In moderate 44 40 33 36 37 39 34 36 37 37
To a small extent 23 23 32 32 27 32 34 31 29 29
Not interested at all 12 13 20 17 20 19 24 21 22 22
Difficult to answer - 8 <1 4 1 1 <1 2 2 2
Number of respondents 
(hundreds) 10 15 15 17 16 16 16 16 16 16
To what extent are you interested in politics?
1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 2015 2016 2017
Politics doesn't interest me, I am not knowledgeble in politics 14 11 20 26 27 34 38 31
I think that I still have no ability to influence political events 19 21 18 18 23 32 27 32
I've become disappointed in politics lately 11 14 16 16 16 16 15 14
What matters most for me is the fate of my people 31 25* 27* 24* 17 6 8 12
I've always taken and will take part in social life 13 7 3 3 4 5 6 4
I feel that a possibility to really take part in politics has opened 
up for me now 4 1 1 1 2 4 4 2
Difficult to answer 19 20 15 12 12 3 3 6
Number of respondetns (hundreds) 16 24.6 28 18 39.6 16 16 16
How would you describe your involvement in political life?
* Not really interested in politics, but still am prepared to defend the interests of    my people
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Over the years, the number of people who are not interested in politics had increased 
from 14% in 1989 to 31% in 2017, which could be attributed to the 17 years of Putinism. 
However, the percentage of uninterested started to grow in the 1990s, peaking in 2016 at 38%. 
Similar tendency is seen in the next category as well: the number of people who believe they 
have no ability to influence politics vacillated between 19% in 1989 and 23% in 1994. In the 
recent years (2015-2017), the average percentage of people who think they have no ability to 
influence political events was at 30.3%.  
Another interesting tendency is decreasing numbers of people who care about the fate of 
their people (a collective): this number was high in the 1990s (31% in 1989), and low in the 
2015-2017 period, plummeting to 6% in 2015 and reaching 12% in 2017. It could be a sign that 
Russian society slowly becomes more individualistic and moving away from the communal 
frame of mind. 
Table 1.12 lists respondents’ political activities within a given year: 
Table 1.12 Participation in political activities (The Levada Center, 2018, p. 39). 
 
1995 2014 2015 2016 2017
Voted 29 30 22 35 33
Discussed politics with my friends 45 21 19 15 14
Was at the meeting with a politician or a candidate 8 5 6 4 3
Signed a petition or address 6 5 3 3 3
Was at a meeting with government officials 4 2 3 3 2
Took part in demonstration or rally 5 2 2 4 4
Sent a letter to editor's office or TV, or some government office 2 3 2 3 2
Took part in a strike 2 2 2 1 1
Made a donation to support polit. Party, movement or a candidate 1 2 1 1 1
Spoke at a meeting or rally 2 1 1 <1 1
Took part in political party activities 1 3 1 1 1
Took part in protest activities or insubordination to authority 1 1 <1 1 2
Did nothing of the kind 34 46 50 49 52
Difficult to answer 7 3 5 3 3
Number of respondents (hundreds) 30 8 16 16 16
Which of the activities listed below have you participated in the past year?
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Compare to the first decade of the post-Soviet period (1995), in the third decade (2015-
17), Russians do not discuss politics with their friends as much (there is a drop from 45% in 
1995 to 14% in 2017). They are considerably less active politically: an increase from 34% in 
1995 to 52% in 2017. It could also be attributed to the fact that Russia is managed by the same 
person for the last 18 years. At the same time, the percentages of other forms of political activity, 
like attending a meeting with a candidate or signing a petition, were never high.  
There was a period of political enthusiasm at the beginning of the post-Soviet period in 
Russia’s history. It was the time of hope. However, the political activity started to tone down in 
the mid-1990s, before Putin came to power. People express their interest in politics for different 
reasons. In my opinion, in the 1990s, Russians were interested in politics due to all the changes 
Russia had to go through as the result of the Soviet collapse. The transition to democracy and 
market economy created an aura of uncertainty, and people paid more attention to their political 
environment. When Putin came to power, the political situation in Russia became more stable 
and predictable, and for this reason, Russians decreased both their interest and participation in 
politics.   
1.6. Summary 
In this chapter, I traced the development of political culture concept from its origins in 
the 1950s to the 21st-century. There are many definitions of political culture. For this study, I 
used Larry Diamond’s definition: “people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, 
sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of their country and the role of the self in 
that system” (Diamond, 1999, p. 163).  
I also analyzed and compared political cultures in the United States and Russia. Political 
cultures of both countries showed continuity with some features easily traceable through the 
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centuries. For the United States, individualism and a tendency to form associations are deeply-
rooted cultural features that go back to the first European settlers. In Russia, people historically 
lived in a strong paternalistic state. A short-lived multi-party political system of the 1990s was 
replaced with authoritarian ‘sovereign democracy’ in 2000s. Families and collectives are 
traditionally important elements of Russian society. Russian collectives can be described as 
communes where people either live or work together. It is different from voluntary ‘associations’ 
that are created by people with similar interests or to achieve a certain goal.  
When it comes to political participation, Americans are more active. Their levels of 
political efficacy are high – they are confident they can make a difference in politics. Russians 
do not display such confidence, they are not interested in politics as much and do not want to 
participate in the political process.  
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework: Political Socialization 
The study of political culture leads to the study of political socialization, and ultimately, 
to the learning experiences that are passed from generation to generation in any society. Political 
socialization serves as a mechanism for understanding and practice of political culture. In this 
chapter, I examine comparative politics literature on political socialization. Next, I discuss 
political re-learning that occurs after a drastic political, social, and economic change in a society. 
After that, I describe theories of immigrant re-socialization and similar concepts of assimilation, 
acculturation, and integration. Finally, I discuss political, social, and economic socializations. I 
argue that one cannot analyze political socialization separately from social and economic 
socialization.   
2.1. Political socialization concept development 
The origins of political socialization studies can be traced back to Herbert Hyman and his 
1957 book Political Socialization. Hyman defined political socialization an individual’s 
“learning of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions as mediated through various 
agencies of society.” (Hyman, 1959, p. 25). In other words, an individual’s social class – his or 
her family’s economic and societal standing – corresponds with appropriate agencies in a society 
which determine his or her socialization process. Hyman argued that political socialization 
occurs throughout an individual’s life, starting at an early age. Political participation can be 
evaluated within four areas: the choice of ego-ideals (the role model); media exposure; levels of 
political knowledge; and responses to direct questions on political involvement and interest. 
Hyman argued that family is the most important socialization agency. Parental influence in 
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things like party affiliation is usually confirmed by a larger environment (community, city, or 
state). As a child matures, parental influence is reduced and replaced by other groups: friends, 
co-workers, and a spouse.  
Political socialization can occur as a result of the intentional teaching of politics and 
political attitudes (manifest political socialization), as well as unintentional or indirect exposure 
to politics through observation of political behaviors of others  (Almond & Verba, 1963). Also, 
some things learned at an early age may affect an individual’s political socialization throughout 
his or her life. For example, not talking to strangers might develop into a hostile attitude toward 
others, i.e., xenophobia (Pye & Verba, 1965). Conventional agencies of political socialization 
include family (immediate and extended); community; peer groups; the church; the school 
system; the workplace; formal organization; mass media; specialized political input structures 
(interest groups and political parties); specialized output structures (legislature, bureaucracy, and 
the court system); and social, economic, and political outcomes (Almond & Powell, 1978). Upon 
reaching adulthood, children can influence their parent’s political preferences. There is some 
evidence that young adults are highly likely to influence their mothers even if they do not affect 
fathers (Zuckerman, Dasovic, & Fitzgerald, 2007, p. 92).  
Terry S. Weiner argued that marriage is a powerful political socialization agency. 
Husbands and wives tend to have homogenous party preferences. There are two possible 
explanations for it. First is ‘assortative mating’: people with similar political preferences are 
attracted to one another. The second explanation states that political homogeneity among spouses 
is a result of the resocialization process after marriage. If a husband and a wife have different 
political views, it is usually a wife that changes political preferences toward those of her husband 
(Weiner, 1978, pp. 209-211).  
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Scholarly interest in political socialization had decreased toward the end of the 1970s. It 
was revived in the 1990s for several reasons. Richard Niemi and Mary Hepburn had called for a 
re-evaluation of previous assumptions by moving the focus to young adulthood as opposed to 
pre-adolescence (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). There were two faulty assumptions about early 
political socialization theory:  
1. What was learned in early childhood remained unchanged in adulthood.  
2. Early learning is important and has a significant influence throughout an adult’s 
life.  
Niemi and Hepburn disputed both statements claiming that political learning does not end 
at a certain age.  
Another reason for the revival of political socialization scholarship was due to drastic 
changes in geopolitical realities. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a huge geographical 
segment of Eurasia demanded social, economic, and political renovation. Orit Ichilov was one of 
the most prominent scholars to tie together concepts of political socialization and 
democratization (Ichilov, 1990). She argued that the study of citizens as ‘active’ socialization 
recipients could provide a better understanding “of the diffusion and persistence of democracy” 
because both ‘political participation’ and ‘civic engagement’ are active components of 
democratic citizenship (Ichilov, 2013, p. 110). The goals of socialization agents in a democratic 
state are to encourage political participation and to assist in forming stable opinions. Most 
importantly, any democratic system should encourage respect for any outcomes of the political 
process, “especially when those outcomes may not be in one’s personal interest” (Gimpel, Lay, 
& Schuknecht, 2003, p. 13).  
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2.2. Political re-learning 
How does a drastic regime change affect political learning? This question had also 
became prominent in the 1990s. The total of 28 countries needed to transition from a command-
style to a market economy and from one-party authoritarian regimes to democratic governmental 
systems. Rose, Mishler, and Munro argued that the majority of socialization literature does not 
account for a drastic societal change similar to the experiences of the post-socialist bloc in 1989. 
In an attempt to determine how such an experience affects political learning and re-learning in 
Russia, authors came up with the lifetime-learning model which accounts for multiple influences 
(Rose et al., 2006, p. 103). “While Russians would prefer to live in a democratic regime, they 
appear resigned to accepting the real existing regime of plebiscitarian autocracy supplied by the 
country’s political elites” (Ibid., p. 201). 
Later, Rose, Mishler, and Matukhno hypothesized that the shock of regime discontinuity 
forced the rejection of attitudes and values learned early in life. Authors placed emphasis on 
post-disruption learning. Newer generations who received minimal to no exposure to an old 
regime should not have any socialization conflict. For older generations, the initial conflict 
between the old and the new realities should dissipate over time (Mishler, Rose, & Matukhno, 
2016, p. 126). Authors confirmed their hypothesis in Eastern European states, but not in Russia 
where economic and political transitions were particularly painful. Eastern European countries 
had an easier time transitioning because they had always viewed their communist regimes as 
forcefully imposed by the USSR. As for Russia, the communist ideology was indigenous and 
harder to leave behind.  
Citizens of Eastern European states went through a relatively smooth ideological 
transition to democratic values and became active participants of political processes. With some 
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moderate variations, support for democracy grew consistently throughout the region while 
attitudes toward old regimes remained negative in both older and younger generations (Ibid., pp. 
131-134). Transitional experiences of Eastern Europeans serve as evidence that political re-
learning after a sudden regime change is possible and can be successful. Early childhood 
socialization is not as decisive as was previously considered, which is consistent with the critique 
of political socialization literature expressed by Niemi and Hepburn (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995).  
Despite the liberalization progress made in the East European region, it is still a region 
where democracy is perceived differently. East Europeans prefer larger governments with 
expanded social roles. For example, they are more likely to rely on their governments for the 
provision of basic services to ensure public welfare (Powell et al., 2012, pp. 48-49). Even though 
all post-socialist countries craved democracy and market economy after the end of Cold War, 
today “citizens in post-communist countries on average have lower levels of support for 
democracy than citizens from the rest of the countries included in the World Values Survey” 
(Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017, p. 100). The problem with democracy and capitalism is that they 
create undesirable, but unavoidable consequences such as unemployment, poverty, and 
inequality. Western nations are accustomed to these side effects, but for post-socialist countries, 
they are very difficult to understand and accept. As follows, Grigore Pop-Elechers and Joshua 
Tucker attributed social orientations to the communist legacy. They hypothesized that 
differences in perception of democracy between the post-socialist region and the rest of the 
world could be due to either living through communism or living in post-communist societies. 
Their analysis confirmed that living through communism resulted in lesser support for 
democracy. There is a “very strong evidence that additional years of exposure to communist rule 
were correlated with greater support for state responsibility for social welfare…it appears that 
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the attitudinal imprint of communism affects not only individuals with long personal exposures 
to communism but also post-communist citizens with very limited personal exposures to 
communist regimes (and welfare states)” (Ibid., p. 126). Pop-Elechers and Tucker argued that 
East Europeans’ perceptions of liberal values, inclusion, and protections of civil rights are not 
different from the West. But they “were significantly more likely to consider state aid for the 
unemployed and a prospering economy as an essential component of democracy” (Ibid., p. 128).   
When people are faced with fast and drastic political change, regardless of their age and 
attachment to old values, over time, they change perceptions. If this is true for populations who 
face changes in their countries, it should equally stand for immigrants whose home and host 
countries have different political structures. They also, no matter how slowly, should adapt to 
their new political surroundings. The next subsection talks about theories of political 
resocialization of immigrants. It is followed by the discussion of different concepts that are used 
by political scientists and sociologists to analyze immigrant adaptations in a host society.  
2.3. Immigrant political resocialization 
Marylin Hoskin identified three theoretical approaches to immigrant socialization 
(Hoskin, 1989, p. 342): 
1. Macro-theories concentrate on economic migration driven by market forces and labor 
flows. 
2. Micro-theories are about group adaptations or conflicts with the host. They seek to 
understand how a particular immigrant group socializes in a host society. The standard 
initial assumption for this group of theories is the inevitability and desirability of eventual 
assimilation into a host society. The good example is Milton Gordon’s six-stage integration 
theory (Gordon, 1964). 
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3. Sub-micro theories focus on an individual socialization response. It is the most precise way 
of studying immigrant political resocialization, but it requires synthesis of many factors 
including not only individual responses to the host system but also the analysis of the host 
and its public mechanisms, socioeconomic conditions, churches, ethnic associations, etc. 
(Hoskin, 1989, p. 347).  
Hoskin had also identified five behavioral traits exhibited by immigrants to cope with 
their adaptations: motivation to emigrate; initial socio-economic position in a host society; 
immigrant group activity; access to political information; and political behavior (Ibid., pp. 349-
358).  
According to Zvi Gitelman, the process of immigration involves mainly adult 
resocialization. There are two possibilities in immigrant political socialization:  
1. The primary principle states that despite the physical relocation, any changes to a person’s 
political behavior are superficial because he or she maintains political perceptions acquired 
in their home country; 
2. Immigrant uprooting is capable of changing some or all ‘primordial beliefs’ about politics. 
The success of resocialization depends on many factors. The main factor is an 
immigrant’s commitment to renounce the culture of his childhood. Migration is a ‘cataclysmic 
event’ on an individual level. “Social and economic events may change the political 
physiognomy of a generation, so might the experience of uprooting and transplantation bring 
about an individual’s political reorientation” (Gitelman, 1982, p. 173). Adult immigrants are not 
exactly tabula rasa, but drastic (and sometimes unexpected) changes in their lives can bring them 
closer to being ‘a clean slate’. The complex process of political socialization in a host country 
does not occur separately from economic and social contexts of immigration. Social, economic, 
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and political socializations must be considered together. Gitelman argued that desocialization of 
previously learned values and beliefs occurs simultaneously with resocialization which is the 
process of acquiring a new set of values, beliefs, and attitudes. Resocialization is not linear and 
requires adjustments. Desocialization is not a necessary prerequisite to a successful 
resocialization. Studies conducted in different countries concur that resocialization is a spiral 
process with fluid prerequisites and social and economic conditions. “...there is a pattern of 
initial elation, arising from novelty, social freedom, and self-justification, followed by 
depression, due to culture shock, nostalgia and acceptance by the host society, and then followed 
by a return of a moderated favorable evaluation” (Ibid., p. 179).  
The most recent theoretical contribution was done by Stephen White, Neil Nevitte, Andre 
Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil, and Patrick Fournier who pointed out that theories of political 
socialization are pessimistic because “[t]he conventional wisdom is that early political learning 
deeply conditions later political learning and so the expectation is that citizens have difficulty 
adapting to radically different political environments” (White et al., 2008, p. 268). Theories of 
political resocialization, on the other hand, are more optimistic. There are three general theories 
of political resocialization: Exposure, Transferability, and Resistance. Exposure theory states that 
immigrants adapt to the host political system through exposure – “the more exposure they get, 
the more they adopt” (Ibid., p. 269). It means that intense exposure to politics of the host society 
will eventually get immigrants involved. While a plausible theory, it lacks empirical support. 
According to the Transferability theory, immigrants bring previous experiences from their home 
countries and apply them in the host society. “Thus immigrants’ past interest in politics and their 
prior patterns of participation emerge as strong predictors of engagement in the new host country 
regardless of country of origin” (Ibid.). Strong support of this theory comes from studies 
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conducted with immigrants in Canada from other advanced industrial democracies (Ibid., p. 
273). Finally, Resistance theory treats political resocialization as a cumulative mechanism where 
previous experiences serve as filters which are used to process any new knowledge and sort it 
according to existing orientations. “The crucial point is that most political predispositions are 
acquired early in life during the ‘formative years.’ These political predispositions may be shaped 
by such highly salient exogenous political, social, or economic shocks as wars, economic 
depressions, and political crises that occur during the formative years, but the conventional 
wisdom is that these orientations deepen over a relatively short period, they become stable as the 
formative years end, and they are resistant to change” (Ibid., p. 269). In other words, resistance 
theory is grounded in theories of political socialization and claims that resocialization is not 
likely to occur if an immigrant had spent a considerable part of his/her adult life in a home 
society. Authors conducted the study with data about political involvement of Canadian 
immigrant population to test theories of political resocialization but did not come up with 
concrete results. Nevertheless, their research contributed to the field of immigrant political 
resocialization in two ways. First, there is no uniform way of political learning. Second, “when it 
comes to political engagement in the new host country, early learning may not condition later 
learning to the extent that classic socialization theory supposes.” (Ibid., p. 278).   
White et al.’s study did not show definite results because they looked at the Canadian 
immigrant population in general. Research on political resocialization can be more productive 
when it is concentrated on one immigrant group at a time. The main objective of the present 
study is to target the group of recent ethnic Russian immigrants who emigrated from Russia 
between 2004 and 2014. In Hoskin’s terms, it is a micro-theory where complete assimilation, or 
a desire of such, is assumed as a null hypothesis. There are many studies conducted with 
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different groups of immigrants to contribute to micro-theoretical cache about immigrants’ 
political socialization in the United States, but none ever concentrated on ethnic Russians. Before 
I discuss some of the relevant literature, it is important to acknowledge different concepts that 
are used by both political scientists and sociologists to study and analyze immigrant experiences 
in a host land. The next subsection will briefly discuss some of the prominent concepts. 
2.4. Conceptual considerations 
Political socialization is not the only concept used to study migrants’ experiences, but the 
one I use since it is closely connected to political culture concept in comparative politics 
literature. There are several other concepts applied in Immigrant Studies: 
• Assimilation. It was originally defined as “the process or processes by which people of 
diverse racial origins and different cultural heritages, occupying a common territory, 
achieve cultural solidarity sufficient at least to sustain a national existence” (Park, 1930). It 
is an idea that newcomers will eventually assimilate into a host society. There are several 
assimilation possibilities: Anglo-conformity, the melting pot, and cultural pluralism 
(Gordon, 1964, p. 81). There are different theoretical discussions about assimilation 
including a ‘straight-line’ hypothesis (Gans, 1979) and segmented assimilation (Zhou, 
1999). In general, the concept of immigrant assimilation “is primarily concerned about 
individual outcomes such as language acquisition, educational attainment, labor market 
participation, and health behavior” (Ramakrishnan, 2013, p. 31).  
• Acculturation is a cultural assimilation and the initial step in the assimilation process. 
Milton Gordon argued that acculturation is likely to occur first and may also take place 
when no other type of assimilation follows (Gordon, 1964, p. 71). 
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• Political incorporation devotes attention to “how institutional structures and rules get 
constituted and changed and to the interaction of political institutions with interest groups, 
civic organizations, and religious institutions that are constituted of immigrants” 
(Ramakrishnan, 2013, p. 32). Unlike immigrant assimilation, political incorporation may 
look at individuals or groups - members of the formal organization or informal 
associations. 
• Civil-political incorporation emphasizes how people understand certain values and how 
they utilize ideas, rights, and opportunities of a host society. If political incorporation 
concentrates on political participation, civil-political incorporation is a more complex 
model. It consists of four elements: contributing factors, dimensions of immigrants’ civic-
political incorporation (citizenship status, voting, interest and involvement in public 
activities, ideas about democracy); patterns of immigrants’ civic-political incorporation 
(there are three: mainstream, ethnic path, and mixed varieties); and effects of immigrants’ 
civic-political incorporation (E. Morawska, 2013, pp. 139-144). 
• Political socialization, for a comparison, looks at the agencies of socialization and their 
effect on an individual’s perception of the political system and the formation of political 
preferences. In this study, I use Michael Riccards’s definition of political socialization as a 
type of learning “characterized by the development, aggregation, and manipulation of 
symbolic forms and representations. It is at this stage that knowledge is codified and passed 
on; the foundation of culture itself is laid down” (Riccards, 1973, p. 7). 
2.5. How many socializations at once? 
When it comes to immigrant experiences in a host society, one of the most prominent 
questions as to whether we should look at different aspects of socialization separately or analyze 
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them altogether. Should political socialization be separated from its social and economic 
counterparts? Even though there are ways to participate in political life of a state without needing 
any funds; newcomers, to be politically active, must accumulate economic and social resources, 
especially when it comes to organizing or participating in an association of any sort – it requires 
effort and time (Chattopadhyay, Gay, Hochschild, & Jones Correa, 2013, p. 19).  
While studying political socialization of the Soviet and American Jews in Israel, Zvi 
Gitelman noticed that it “does not occur in a vacuum, but in an economic and social context” 
(Gitelman, 1982, p. 127). He highlighted several aspects of social and economic socialization 
that had a direct effect on immigrants’ political socialization: housing, employment, linguistic 
acculturation, interaction with a host population, immigrant satisfaction and identification (Ibid., 
pp. 136-154). As mentioned earlier, the role of political socialization agency is played by many 
entities including family, friends, employers and also, economic and societal outcomes (Almond 
& Powell, 1978). As follows, in this study I do not separate political socialization from economic 
and social experiences because they re-enforce one another.   
2.6. Summary 
In this chapter, I elaborated on the concept of political socialization and possible changes 
that can be brought by either a drastic societal change in the country of residence or a migration 
to a new country. Immigrant resocialization is typically a process of an adult political learning.  
Theoretically, there are different ways an immigrant can resocialize in a new political 
environment. He or she can adopt a new political system through exposure; apply previous 
experiences and learn a new system by comparing it to the old one, or use previously learned 
knowledge as a filter and resist socialization in a new society altogether.  
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There are many concepts used to study immigrant experiences. This study is intended to 
analyze political socialization of first-generation ethnic Russian immigrants in the US through 
the exposure to the most common agencies of political socialization.   
Finally, this study does not address political socialization separate from economic and 
social adaptations of immigrants in their host society.  
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Chapter 3 Previous studies on Soviet/Russian immigrants 
This chapter presents a review of scholarly works and studies about immigration from 
Soviet Union/Russia to the United States. There are no studies dedicated to ethnic-Russian 
immigrants to the US, but there are several very interesting studies of Jewish migrants from the 
Soviet Union. Also, to provide a frame of reference, this review includes studies of immigration 
and political socialization of immigrants from other parts of the world.  
 3.1. Immigration waves 
There were four waves of immigration from Russia to the United States. The first wave 
followed the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Tsarist Russia and consisted mostly of aristocracy. 
Thousands of people fled the new socialist regime and its drastic political and social changes. 
They hoped to return after the revolution was over. The majority of these immigrants settled in 
Europe and, eventually, many returned to Russia only to be either executed or jailed (Isurin, 
2011, p. 5). The second wave started in the 1930s and continued through World War II – it 
included those who fought against the Soviet Red Army (the Vlasov army), prisoners of war, and 
displaced people. They faced possible treason charges upon their return to the USSR and that is 
why many preferred to stay away. The third wave started in the 1970s as an aftermath of the 
political period of the Khrushchev Thaw or Ottepel’ (late 1950s – early 1960s) which 
considerably softened the Soviet foreign policy. Most people who left the USSR during that 
period were political and religious dissidents. Finally, the fourth wave occurred after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union (Shasha & Shron, 2002, pp. 31-32). It was estimated that over the past 
decades, about 80 percent of immigrants from the Former Soviet Republics were predominantly 
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Jewish (Lewin Epstein, Ritterband, & Ro'i, 1997, p. 235). Israel, Germany and the United States 
were the primary destinations of these resettlers (Isurin, 2011). 
3.2. Russian-speaking Jews in the US 
Compared to other major immigrant groups (East Asian and Latin American), Russian-
speaking Jews experienced a smooth integration. Their ethnic characteristics regarding 
appearance, national character, food and clothing preferences were very similar to those of North 
Europeans. As pointed out by Portes and Rumbaut, “[a] well established sociological principle 
holds that the more similar new minorities are regarding physical appearance, class background, 
language, and religion to society’s mainstream, the more favorable their reception and the more 
rapid their integration. For this reason, educated immigrants from northwestern Europe face little 
difficulty in gaining access to U.S. middle- and upper-class circles and are readily able to deploy 
their educational and work skills to their advantage” (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, p. 47). The 
Soviet and later Russian immigrants of both genders are highly educated and accustomed to 
employment. High educational levels and work experience resulted in the high human capital 
that was easily absorbed into the American workforce. Similar observations are made in Herbert 
Gans’s discussion of the assimilation of Eastern European Jews (Gans, 1979); Richard Alba and 
Victor Nee’s analysis of European experiences (Alba & Nee, 2003); and Kasinitz et al. study of 
Russian Jews (Kasinitz, Mallenkopf, Waters, & Holdaway, 2008).  
In the US, Soviet Jews usually settled close to each other. The largest Soviet Jewish 
communities are located in Brooklyn, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Chicago. Upon arrival, 
Soviet Jews enjoyed the assistance of multiple agencies like the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 
(HIAS), Council of Jewish Federations (CIF), and the New York Association for New 
Americans (NYANA). The latter assisted over 240,000 Jews from the Soviet Union and Russia 
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over a 30 years period from the 1970s till the early 2000s (Shasha & Shron, 2002, p. 90). Upon 
settlement, Russian-speaking Jewish immigrants expressed interest in the American democracy 
and political system. “Taking their status as refugees seriously, activists hoped to become full 
participants in American democracy. Activists sought to act as intermediaries between the Soviet 
Jewish community and the larger American Jewish community” (Lewin Epstein et al., 1997, p. 
270).  
Some Russian-speaking Jewish immigrants participated in American politics. In 2006, 
Alec Brook-Krasny became the first Soviet-born politician to be elected to the New York State 
Assembly. He emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1989, at the age of 31. Brook-Krasny was a 
member of the Democratic Party and represented a district populated mostly by Russian-
speaking immigrants and African Americans. According to The New York World magazine, 
Russian-speaking Jews were not satisfied with Brook-Krasny. “He’s not representing the Russian 
community because he votes Democratic down the line and the Russian community wants a 
smaller government” (Chavkin & Keller, 2012, p. n.p.). In addition to dissatisfaction with their 
representative, New York’s Russian Jewish community was split among several districts, thus 
weakening their voice. Alec Brook-Krasny resigned in 2015 and was recently accused of a 
painkillers scam.9 Another example is Igor Birman, a Soviet-born attorney, who emigrated from 
Russia in 1994. In 2014 he sought an election to the US House of Representatives from the 7th 
Congressional District in California.10 He is also listed as a former Chief of Staff to 
Congressman Tom McClintock (R-CA). 
                                                          
9 http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ex-brooklyn-pol-busted-medicaid-scam-hit-charges-article-
1.3247579 
10 https://ballotpedia.org/Igor_Birman 
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3.3. Relevant literature 
There were two qualitative studies involving immigrants from the Soviet Union. Both 
relied on interviews of Soviet immigrants to reveal details about the USSR’s highly guarded 
domestic affairs. The first one, The Soviet Citizen (or The Harvard Project) conducted by Alex 
Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, was based on interviews of almost three thousand Soviet 
expatriates. The main objective was to gain information about the daily life in the Soviet Union, 
including relationships between individuals and the state. They found that the majority of 
interviewees favored state ownership of industries and the Soviet welfare system (education, 
healthcare, and workers’ benefits) (Inkeles & Bauer, 1961, p. 244). Based on their data, authors 
defined an ideal Soviet state as “[a] paternalistic state, with extremely wide powers which it 
vigorously exercised to guide and control the nation’s destiny, but which yet served the interests 
of the citizen benignly, which respected his personal dignity and left him with a certain amount 
of individual freedom of desire and a feeling of security from arbitrary interference and 
punishment” (Ibid., pp. 246-247). The main disadvantages of living in the USSR included low 
levels of job satisfaction, conformity, and loyalty enforcement. As the first study of its kind, The 
Soviet Citizen was remarkable but had several major flaws. According to Nicolai Petro, interview 
questions were misleading, and there was an evidence of poor translation and interpretation. The 
study exaggerated levels of social consensus and failed to explain the duality of people’s 
simultaneous support and rejection of the Soviet values (Petro, 1995, pp. 10-12).  
The second study, The Soviet Interview Project (SIP), was done in the 1980s and studied 
generational changes in attitudes of Soviet citizens. After Stalin’s death, there were many 
changes in political realities. Khrushchev’s Ottepel’ put an end to Stalin’s political terrors. SIP 
data revealed that the post-Stalin’s generation “proved to be more active: the most interested in 
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public affairs, the most heavily engaged in ‘mobilized participation,’ but at the same time taking 
a greater part in unsanctioned study groups, protests, strikes, and other unconventional activities” 
(Millar, 1987, p. 76). Nonconformity which, as the SIP researchers determined, was 
predominantly male activity, shows that “for those who came of age after Stalin, the standard for 
judging the regime is how the system currently performs rather than how far it has come. They 
are more critical than their elders and less inclined to be satisfied with a backward look at the 
Soviet past to judge their own well-being” (Ibid., p. 91). Further, the SIP data revealed another 
tendency – people of the post-Stalin era favored individual rights and political freedoms. There is 
also a difference in levels of satisfaction with the regime that vary depending on the place of 
residence. Paradoxically, former Soviets who lived in the largest cities, Moscow and Leningrad, 
tended to be less satisfied with their living conditions, medical and educational services, as well 
as the political regime in general. (Millar, 1987, p. 132).  
Zvi Gitelman’s meticulous analysis of immigrants’ political resocialization in Israel is 
considered to be one of the most substantial contributions to the political resocialization 
scholarship (Hoskin, 1989, p. 346). Becoming Israelis is a longitudinal study of political 
resocialization of two immigrant groups in Israel: American and Soviet Jews. Gitelman 
interviewed his respondents three times over the period of three years. Both groups (American 
and Soviet) consisted of males between the ages of 18 and 60 who came to Israel approximately 
at the same time. Compared to American immigrants, the Soviet group was less homogenous 
since it included people who differed among themselves in language, culture, and social customs. 
As a result, Gitelman made three comparisons: between American and Soviet immigrants; within 
the Soviet immigrant group and between the 1972 and 1975 findings (Gitelman, 1982, p. 187). 
When assessing political resocialization of Soviet immigrants, Gitelman stated: “Zionist activism 
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in the USSR does not predict to successful integration in Israel. Some of the most active fighters 
for Aliyah11 in the Soviet Union became among the most ‘difficult cases’ in Israel, and....some of 
them left Israel altogether. For some, the clash between an ideal formulated in the abstract while 
in the USSR and the realities of daily life in the Jewish state was so sharp that it led to bitter 
disappointment and frustration” (Ibid., p. 204). Moving to Israel had served as the main goal, and 
after it was accomplished, the lack of concrete goals instigated depression and disappointment. 
At the same time, compared to American immigrants, former Soviets were more likely to 
renounce their previous citizenship and lose interest in Soviet domestic affairs altogether. While 
Soviet immigrants preferred Israeli government structure and bureaucratic services, they felt that 
healthcare and education should be administered by the state and provided free of charge, like it 
was practiced in the USSR (Ibid., p. 215). Unlike American Jewish immigrants, the Soviets were 
more willing to regard themselves as Israeli and preferred to have Israeli friends. They also 
expressed an interest in voting, and 58 percent of all Soviet respondents had a political party 
affiliation (Ibid., p. 276). Gitelman noted that Soviet immigrants favored strong leadership, but 
“as the Soviet immigrants spend more time in a democratic system, they become more convinced 
of the possibility of ordinary people influencing political life” (Ibid., p. 310). Their political 
efficacy and trust increased over time. Overall, Gitelman concluded that the process of political 
resocialization is possible, but no single agency works equally well for different groups of 
immigrants. The process is complex and involves many variables. Immigrants are more likely to 
successfully incorporate into social, cultural, and economic life than a political one (Ibid., p. 
344). 
                                                          
11 Is understood as a ‘homecoming’ of Jews to Israel, followed by an immediate citizenship and the initial 
resettlement assistance package (Remennick, 2010, p. 6).  
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Ewa Morawska argued that after immigrating to the United States, Russian Jews 
demonstrated host-country oriented assimilation: they had readily embraced the American way 
of life. Jewish immigrants from the USSR/Russia associated America with freedom and security. 
In the US, they found a new meaning of their Jewishness – in Russia they were Jews on paper, 
but “in America, we attend the synagogue on Holidays and we light candles…, American people 
accept us as Jews” (Morawska, 2004, p. 1388). Russian Jews adapt to American society through 
private rather than public channels. Their social circles remained ethnic – respondents of 
different generations justified it by their shared present (instead of the past). Russian Jews are not 
interested in developments occurring in their homeland (very similar to Gitelman’s findings). If 
they travel back for a visit, it is mostly due to sentimental reasons. Very few of them 
communicate with people back home, and even fewer provide financial support. Morawska’s 
study showed that Russian Jews went through the America-centered ethnic-path adaptation with 
no sense of obligations toward their homeland and no intentions of ever returning. The assistance 
they received from Jewish organizations gave them numerous advantages compared to other 
immigrant groups. On the other hand, due to this assistance, they remained distant from the 
mainstream American society. Moreover, resentment of their homeland and acquired sense of 
freedom, security, and stability in the United States minimized their transnational involvements 
with Russia and Israel.  
Ludmila Isurin conducted a comparative study of ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking 
Jewish immigrants from the Former Soviet Union to the United States, Germany, and Israel. 
Even though she distinguished between the two groups, the study concentrated on the social 
acculturation and linguistic changes occurring among Russian-speaking Jews in all three 
countries. Her main focus was on people who migrated in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. 
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Using the acculturation model, Isurin investigated changes in cultural perceptions, self-
identification, and native-language retention (Isurin, 2011, pp. 20-21). The study had three main 
conclusions. First, Russian-speaking immigrants in all three countries preferred Russian culture 
since it was the most familiar and comforting. Immigrants who live in Germany had the hardest 
time adapting to the local culture. Second, integration into a host society is strongly correlated 
with having a career and displaying professional success. Third, immigrants retain Russian as the 
main language of daily communications. Their knowledge of a host society language varied 
based on necessity and comfort level. Some immigrants knew only basics, but because they 
mainly interacted with fellow Russian-speakers, it was not detrimental to their comfort levels 
(Ibid., pp. 223-224).     
In 2016, The Boris Nemtsov Foundation (Bonn, Germany) conducted a survey of 
Russians in Germany. The study targeted residents with Russian or Soviet background and 
included people between the ages of 18 and 88 (with 51 being an average age). Only 40 percent 
of all respondents came from Russia, and 5 percent were born in Germany (the second-
generation). The majority (65%) of respondents immigrated to Germany in the 1990-1999 
period. The Boris Nemtsov Foundation “supports the development of democracy and freedom in 
Russia” (Koneva & Tikhomirova, 2016, p. 1). As follows, the study’s main objective was to 
analyze attitudes, values, and perceptions about Russia held by Russian-speaking Germans. The 
study showed that only 17 percent of respondents were satisfied with democracy in Russia. 
Corruption, economic uncertainty, and conflict with western countries were identified as main 
challenges for democracy in Russia. 61 percent of respondents thought that Russia and Europe 
have common cultural roots and should be closer to one another (Ibid., p. 5). Based on the study 
findings, the total of 606 respondents were divided into four groups (Ibid., p. 13):  
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1. New Generation (34%). This group has the biggest share of young people who 
immigrated in the 1990s mostly from Kazakhstan (40%) and Russia (38%). They 
speak German and feel fully integrated. They maintain very few connections in 
Russia; 
2. Middle men (36%). It is the most socially stable group and consist of middle-aged 
immigrants mainly from Russia (42%) and Kazakhstan (39%). They also immigrated 
in the 1990s, and 59 percent of them speak German. 
3. Burgers (14%) is a skeptical and conservative group where 64 percent are 55 years of 
age and older. 40 percent of this group came from Kazakhstan, and 38 percent were 
from Russia. Most immigrated during the 1990s, they have good language skills, and 
most of their connections are in Germany.  
4. Imported parents (16%) – is also an older group. 48 percent emigrated from Russia, 
and 20 percent are from Ukraine. They are the least integrated since only 23 percent 
of them speak German. They also the most recent immigrant group – 43 percent 
immigrated between 2000 and 2009. 
Russians in Germany is an interesting study aimed at evaluating attitudes of Russian-
speaking German residents toward the EU, Germany, Russia, and their respective foreign 
policies. The sample includes individuals from the former Soviet republics as well as a small 
percentage of second-generation immigrants. The study admits that Germany’s Russian-speaking 
population is very heterogeneous where the two largest groups, repatriated ethnic Germans and 
Russian-speaking Jews, are considered in the same category as other immigrants from the former 
USSR (Ibid., p. 42). In a way, the study tested the influence of Russian media on Russian-
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speakers in Germany because not all of the respondents came from Russia and could only know 
about its domestic affairs through the media and third sources.   
In 2009, Saltanat Liebert conducted 48 interviews with migrants from Central Asia and 
South Caucasus to learn about irregular migration (which implies that, at some point, migrants 
either came or stayed in the US illegally) and migrants’ interactions with formal and informal 
institutions in the US (Liebert, 2009, p. 9). Liebert analyzed the whole immigration process 
starting with initial stages of making a decision, obtaining travel documents, the US visa, and 
airfare tickets. He went to Kyrgyzstan and interviewed key customs officials and one of the 
American consulate employees to get the whole picture. Some of his interviewees came to the 
US with tourist visas and overstayed, and some were smuggled through Mexico (Ibid., pp. 69-
70). The main goal was to determine the way migrants familiarized themselves with life in the 
US. Almost all study participants had communications with informal institutions through 
referrals and ‘word of mouth.’ Migrants’ unofficial networks proved to be vital in obtaining 
documents, a place to live, and employment. Liebert used the theory of formal-informal 
institutional interactions with four possible types of interaction: competing, complementary, 
substitutive, and accommodating. His study reveals how illegal migrants from the Former Soviet 
republics live and work in the US relying exclusively on informal eastern-European and Russian 
networks which are, apparently, abundant in all spheres of life, especially in places like 
Philadelphia and New York.  
Nina Michalikova’s book New Eastern European Immigrants in the United States is a 
quantitative analysis of cultural, socioeconomic, structural, and political adaptation of post-1991 
East European immigrants in the US. She relied on data accumulated by the Department of 
Homeland Security and several surveys conducted between 2006 and 2010 by the U.S. Census 
61 
 
Bureau (Michalikova, 2017, p. 10). Mikhalikova expressed the need to emphasize the plethora of 
Eastern European nationalities in immigration, but due to limited data, the major accent of the 
study was on Polish, Ukrainian, and Russians immigrants who came to the US as adults from 
their respective countries of origin in or after 1991. Unlike immigrants from other parts of the 
world, Eastern European do not move to the US to escape poverty, war, or persecution. They 
seek to improve their living standards and the US is strongly associated with high quality of life. 
Post-1991 immigrants come from urban areas and tend to be highly educated. In this regard they 
are different not only from immigrants elsewhere in the world but also from early East European 
immigrants who were mostly peasants from rural areas (Ibid., p. 32). Michalikova defined 
immigrant adaptation as “the adjustment of immigrants to their life in the host country” (Ibid., p. 
6). She analyzed different aspects of adaptation, including political which she described as “the 
extent to which immigrants participate in the political process of the host society” (Ibid., p. 7). 
Political adaptation was analyzed based on number of citizenship acquisitions and voter 
registrations. Mikhalikova concluded that East European immigrants are more likely to 
naturalize in the United States compare to other immigrant groups. 67 percent of post-1991 
Ukrainian immigrants became American passport holders, making them the largest group of 
naturalized immigrants among East Europeans in the US (Ibid., p. 181). When it comes to 
voting, East European immigrants, “were not much different in their likelihood to vote from 
Hispanic, Asian, and all foreign-born immigrants, whose voter turnout was 37, 40, and 41 
percent respectively” (Ibid., p. 198). Mikhalikova’s book is a great quantitative analysis of 
immigrant experiences that aimed at generalization of adaptation among immigrants from the 
same region. I use her findings in comparison to my own to provide a perspective and elaborate 
on commonalities and occasional discrepancies in immigrant experiences.      
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Extending the review to Asia, in 2011, a group of political scientists conducted a study 
about political participation, political attitudes, and behaviors of Asian Americans (Wong, 
Ramakrishnan, Lee, & Junn, 2011). The Asian American population constitutes about 5 percent 
of the US population and is considered to be one of the fastest-growing populations over the last 
several decades (Ibid., p. 3). Authors developed the National Asian American Survey and 
conducted 5,519 interviews with representatives of six Asian nationalities that together account 
for 85% of the Asian American population in three major cities: Los Angeles, New York, and 
Boston. It is a pan-ethnic study of six major groups: Asian Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, 
Korean, and Vietnamese (Ibid., p. 14). Authors concentrated on five key participatory acts as 
dependent variables: voting, political donations, contacting government officials, group problem-
solving, and protest. Their sample includes first- and second-generation immigrants. The list of 
independent variables included: nativity; immigrant generation; length of stay in the US; 
English-language skills; and citizenship status (Ibid., p. 28). Based on survey data, authors ran a 
multivariate analysis. Their findings regarding political socialization were as follows: migrants 
that were socialized outside of the United States display lower rates of political participation 
compared to native-born Americans. Also, foreign-born participants show lower rates for most 
political activities. Immigrants who received education at their home country and followed 
ethnic news tend to participate even less than their more acculturated counterparts (Ibid., p. 212).  
3.4. A comparison with the experiences of Cuban immigrants to the US 
There are many similarities between Russian-speaking and Cuban immigrants. Cubans 
too migrated to the US in waves, enjoyed certain government and local support, and escaped 
from the USSR’s main ally – Fidel Castro’s Communist Cuba.  
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The first wave of immigration from Cuba occurred in 1959-62, following the Castro’s 
revolution. It consisted of Cuban business elite. The second wave started in 1965 and was 
composed of the working class immigrants. This group benefited the most from the Cuban 
Refugee Program which ended in 1974. The third wave was labeled the Marielitos and started in 
1980 when Fidel Castro allowed people to leave if they so desired. Artists, intellectuals, and 
minorities populated this wave. Finally, the fourth wave or Cuba’s Balseros gained momentum 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This time around, people ran from an acute economic 
crisis (Pedraza, 2007, pp. 3-9). 
The four waves of Cuban outmigration are very compatible to those out of Russia. First 
waves from both countries occurred as a reaction to socialist revolutions and consisted mostly of 
nobility. In both cases, they hoped to return after the revolutionary turmoil was over. Third 
waves are also very compatible since both consisted of intellectuals and dissidents. Finally, 
fourth waves occurred for the same reason – the collapse of the Soviet Union and the crisis of 
communist ideology in both Cuba and Russia.  
Another commonality between the two immigrants groups is they both enjoyed generous 
support from the US government and ethnic organizations. Cuban immigrants received aid from 
the Cuban Refugee Program as well as a plethora of federal initiatives like direct loans, 
subsidies, healthcare, and career assistance (E. Morawska, 2013, p. 151). Soviet and Russian 
Jews benefited from assistance provided by numerous organizations (as mentioned earlier).  
Susan Eckstein compared assimilation and acculturation experiences of the two groups 
of Cuban migrants: the very first (the Exiles) and the very last (the New Cubans). “The different 
emigre's views and involvements reflect, in turn, contrasting conceptions of self. Whereas most 
of the first who fled the revolution perceived themselves as exiles and exiled, deprived of their 
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homeland because of their political convictions, recent arrivals tend to view themselves as 
economic immigrants or merely as ‘having gone abroad’” (Eckstein, 2009, p. 4). Cuban 
Americans are, arguably, the most successful immigrant group in the US. In Miami, with every 
passing decade, more and more Cubans attain top-level positions in different professional fields. 
They’ve done very well compared to other Latin American immigrants and even average 
Americans. Cuban immigrants showed an economic ‘assimilation effect’ (Ibid., p. 72).  
When it comes to political efficacy, there is a drastic difference between the first and last 
waves of Cuban immigration. The Exiles did not socialize into American political system. 
Instead, they used it for their purposes. Damian Fernandez described their political activities as 
the politics of passion where ends always justify means. Starting in 1959 Cubans in exile were 
passionate about the collapse of the Castro regime. An active political position allowed Cuban-
Americans, by the early 1980s, to achieve a considerable economic effect, gather critical 
electoral mass in southern Florida, and even found the Cuban American National Foundation 
(CANF) under the leadership of Jorge Mas Canosa. He “exercised considerable influence in 
Congress and the White House, specifically on the U.S. policy toward Cuba. CAHF’s efforts 
resulted in several policies, including the establishment of Radio and TV Marti to broadcast to 
the island, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, and the Helms-Burton Act that tightened the U.S. 
embargo in 1996” (Fernández, 2000, pp. 143-144). The Exiles had also positioned themselves as 
political and cultural gatekeepers as they wanted to keep Miami free of ‘Castro sympathizers.’ 
They also actively participated in altering Miami’s appearance by installing museums and 
naming streets and parks (Eckstein, 2009, p. 59).  
The reason for outstanding political efficacy is a tradition of civic engagement in the 
pre-Castro Cuba. The Exiles’ pre-immigration civic background predisposed them to use politics 
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to promote their anti-Castro agenda. Even “in the post-Cold War world, their mission centered 
on maintaining the embargo, to debilitate the Cuban government to the point of collapse. Their 
pre-immigration background also led many in their ranks to have a low tolerance for political 
compromise” (Ibid., p. 88).  
In contrast, the New Cubans remain on political sidelines. They do not belong to 
politically influential groups. They came from a transformed Cuba, and they have “no familiarity 
with a political life independent of the state, and many disliked the state-directed political life 
they knew” (Ibid.). Because they have no organized political agenda of their own, they naturally 
came under the political influence of the Exiles. At the same time, unlike the Exiles, the New 
Cubans bond with friends and family in the homeland much eagerly (Ibid., p. 128). Even though 
the Exiles cherished a dream to transform post-Castro Cuba, it is the New Cubans who are 
actually helping to transform the Cuban socialist regime.   
Regardless of the time of arrival to the US, all Cuban immigrants insist on remembering 
where they came from. Cuba is always at the center of any political activity, even though several 
generations of Cuban Americans were born and raised without setting a foot on the island. This 
passion about the place of origin sets Cuban and Russian immigrants apart. As it was pointed out 
by several scholars (Gitelman, 1982; Morawska, 2004), Soviet and Russian Jews tend to lose 
interest in their homeland’s affairs quickly, wipe the slate clean, and embrace their new state and 
its political system as soon as possible.    
3.5. Summary 
Since there are no studies about political socialization of ethnic Russian immigrants, this 
literature review included studies about political socialization of Russian-speaking Jews and 
other ethnic groups in the United States, Israel, and Germany. Russian-speaking immigrants have 
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a lot in common with Cuban expatriates. Namely, they immigrated to the United States due to 
similar circumstances. At the same time, their patterns of socialization are quite different: Cuban 
Americans concentrated their political effort on their homeland, while former Soviet/Russian 
Jews were likely to put thoughts of motherland behind and start over with a clean slate.   
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Chapter 4 Method and Description of the Sample Group 
In this chapter, I ask research questions, describe my methodology, and present initial 
data analysis. Since there are no studies about political socialization of ethnic Russian 
immigrants, this study will fill the gap in academic literature about Russian-speakers in the US, 
and contribute to the cache of micro-theories on immigrant political resocialization as described 
by Marilyn Hoskin (Hoskin, 1989). This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board 
of the University of South Florida (IRB Study Number: Pro00027010). In Appendix A you can 
find the following study documents: an Advertisement (Flyer), a Verbal consent form, an 
Interview Questionnaire, and a Survey Form. All documents have two copies: one in English and 
one in Russian. For the recruitment on Facebook and in Russian-speaking businesses, I used the 
Russian version of the study advertisement.  
For data analysis, I followed a grounded theory approach because it allowed me to  
generate a theory or a codified set of propositions relying solely on collected data (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967, pp. 31-32). I will briefly discuss grounded theory in more details in subsection 
4.4.  
4.1. Research Questions 
This study calls for exploring socialization experiences and political attitudes of first-
generation ethnic Russian immigrants in the United States. There are two main goals: 
1. Identify what agencies of political socialization are used by first-generation ethnic 
Russian immigrants in their familiarization with American political system. Research 
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question #1: What political socialization agencies are the most popular and most 
effective with ethnic Russian immigrants? 
2. Determine if the exposure to American society and its political values resulted in any 
changes of political preferences, attitudes, and opinions. Research question #2: How 
and why do Russians, who permanently reside in the United States, perceive 
American democracy? Do they see the differences between political systems in 
Russia and the US? How do ethnic Russian immigrants view Russia? Do English 
language proficiency and exposure to multiple socialization agencies make a 
difference? 
4.2. Initial assumptions 
I interviewed forty first-generation ethnic Russian immigrants, who moved to the US 
from Russia between the years of 2004 and 2014. I looked for two general types of immigrants – 
those who speak English well and use it in their daily communications, and those who speak 
English poorly or not at all. I assume that people who do not speak English, interact mostly 
within their linguistic diaspora. For ethnic Russians, a diaspora consists of an amalgamation of 
people from the former Soviet republics. My interactions and observations allowed me to 
conclude that Russian-speakers in Central and South Florida do not differentiate among 
themselves based on countries of origin.  
My initial hypothesis about political socialization of first-generation ethnic Russian 
immigrants is that English language proficiency ensures successful socialization in the American 
society. Also, exposure to multiple socialization agencies results in faster and more effective 
political socialization.  
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4.3. Study criteria 
4.3.1. Who is eligible? 
A successful candidate for this study is an ethnic-Russian individual who emigrated from 
the Russian Federation. Another important criterion was the immigration year. I only interviewed 
people who came to the US between 2004 and 2014. I created this time parameter because of the 
political and societal changes that occurred in Russia in the 21st century. In the 1990s Russia was 
under the rule of Boris Yeltsin who applied a liberal approach to the state economy and politics. 
He resigned on December 31st, 1999 and named Vladimir Putin as his successor. Putin was the 
President of Russia from 2000 until 2008 and from 2012 till present. From 2008 until 2012, he 
served as the Prime Minister, but, de-facto, was the most influential figure in Russia’s domestic 
and foreign politics. Putin’s policies differ from those of Yeltsin, and his governing style is more 
authoritarian. Thus, people who emigrated from Russia before the year of 2000, left a more 
liberal state.  
The early 2000s is a good starting point because it ensures that an individual lived in 
Putin’s Russia for at least several years. 2014 is the cutoff year because I wanted to make sure 
respondents had been living in the US for at least three years. It would not make sense to 
interview a newcomer because he or she would not have enough exposure to American 
socialization agencies to judge their effectiveness.    
There are two main clusters of interviewees:  
• Ethnic Russians who obtained or are currently obtaining an education from a US 
college or university, have an American partner and friends, and work or worked for 
an American company. These criteria confirm that an immigrant is exposed to 
American culture and speaks English. There are 20 respondents in this group. 
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•  Ethnic Russians who do not speak English and did not attend any American college 
or university, have their own business or work for/with other Russian-speaking 
people, and are either single or married to a fellow Russian. In other words, people 
who reside in the United States but get little to no exposure to American political 
socialization agencies. This group also consists of 20 respondents. 
The sample was divided further to see if socialization varied based on gender. There are 
24 female and 16 male respondents.  
I recruited participants through several Facebook groups created by and for Russian-
speakers in Central and South Florida. All of them are private, and to gain access, I had to join 
first. Some of them were gender specific and created by and for Russian-speaking women only. 
Gaining membership in these groups was my strategy to reach a very specific group – female 
non-speakers who use Facebook to socialize with other Russian-speaking women in their areas. 
Most of identified Facebook groups were territory specific. I found and joined groups in Tampa 
Bay, Sarasota, Orlando, and Miami. I used the IRB approved study flyer for recruitment. I 
recruited three respondents (John, Stephanie, and Elena) while participating in the events 
organized for Russian-speakers; five people (Margarita, Korina, Bill, Nikita, and Vladislav) I 
recruited by referrals; thirty-five respondents contacted me or were contacted by me through 
Facebook. There are three people I invited to participate. In addition to Facebook advertising, I 
went to several Russian-speaking businesses and community centers to pin my flyers to their 
announcement boards, but I did not recruit anyone this way. 
4.3.2. What makes Florida a good place to conduct this study? 
The state of Florida is considered a ‘swing state’ with no clear preference between the 
Republican and the Democratic political parties. It means that political attitudes in Florida vary 
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and recent immigrants are not necessarily exposed to a one-party preference setting. Florida is 
also a place of diversity. As of 2012, only 36 percent of Florida residents were born in Florida12. 
For the remaining 64 percent, the breakdown was as follows: 23 percent came from outside of 
the United States; less than 3 percent came from the Western region of the US; approximately 10 
percent were from the Midwest; around 20 percent – from the Northeast; and 10 percent – from 
Southern states. Such diversity makes Florida a good place to study immigrants’ political views 
due to the exposure to a variety of political attitudes and beliefs.  
The US Census Bureau estimated there are close to 36 thousand Russian speakers (age 5 
and over) residing in Florida. Nearly half of them, or 16,148 individuals, speak English poorly or 
not at all13.  For this study I recruited my participants from four Metropolitan areas of Central 
and South Florida:  
• Miami-Ft. Lauderdale-West Palm Beach;  
• North Port-Sarasota-Bradenton;  
• Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford;  
• Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater.  
Together these geographic areas are home to a little over 25 thousand (25.048) Russian 
speakers14 and six Russian Orthodox churches15 (as of 2010). Also, there are three Russian-
American Cultural Centers located in St. Petersburg and Winter Park (Central Florida) and 
Sunny Isles Beach (South Florida).   
                                                          
12 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/16/upshot/mapping-migration-in-the-united-states-since-
1900.html?_r=1&abt=0002&abg=0  
13 http://www.census.gov/data/tables/2013/demo/2009-2013-lang-
tables.html?eml=gd&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery  
14 Ibid. 
15 www.usreligioncensus.org  
72 
 
4.3.3. Protecting respondents’ identities 
To protect my respondents, I used pseudonyms instead of real names. Every time I 
mention or quote a respondent, I list his or her pseudonym and, in parentheses, I indicate a 
gender group and the language group. For example: Aristarch (m/ne). Aristarch is a male 
respondent (‘m’ for male), and he either does not speak English or speaks it poorly (‘ne’ for no 
English). Yana (f/e) is a woman (‘f’ for female), and she speaks English well (‘e’ for English 
proficiency). 
To protect my respondents even further, I do not specify their metro areas of residence. 
Instead, I simply indicated a general area (Central or South Florida). 
A more specific information about data in Appendix B. I divided the respondents into 
four clusters: M/E, M/NE; F/E; and F/NE. All data in Appendix B are sorted this way. 
4.4. Grounded Theory method of data collection and analysis 
Grounded theory is a qualitative method introduced by Barney Glaser and Anselm 
Strauss in 1967. Unlike other methods, grounded theory relies on data and has two main criteria: 
constant comparison and category saturation. Coding and data interpretation are used to ensure  
systematic theory generation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 102). Grounded theory opposes the use 
of any previously developed theories, it is always traceable to data, and it is ‘fluid’ because it 
embraces interaction, temporality, and process (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, p. 279). At the same 
time, it could be used to test or expand an existing theory (Strauss & Corbin, 2015, p. 53).  
The original approach to grounded theory suggests the use of constant comparison to 
break data into manageable pieces based on their similarities and differences. Similar data are to 
be grouped into categories where the core category incorporates the major theme of a study. 
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Kathy Charmaz proposed a constructivist grounded theory method. It prioritizes data 
interpretation over data verification. Constructivist grounded theory adopts inductive, 
comparative, emergent, and open-ended approach to the original theory. It emphases different 
values, views, beliefs, and feelings. Charmaz argued that one constructs grounded theory through 
his or her past and present experiences. As follows, her version of grounded theory offers an 
interpretation of a studied phenomenon and not its exact picture (Charmaz, 2014, p. 17). 
I consider constructivist grounded theory to be more fitting for my research. The 
blueprint proposed by Charmaz includes the following steps (Ibid., p. 18):  
1. Research question; 
2. Recruitment and sampling of participants; 
3. Data collection (interviews and a survey); 
4. Initial coding; 
5. Focused coding and categorizing; 
6. Theory building; 
7. Writing up/dissemination. 
4.5. Personal disclaimer and ethical issues 
  Theoretical coding depends on many aspects including disciplinary knowledge and 
professionalism; research and personal experiences; sensitivity to social issues; and relationships 
with participants (Strauss & Corbin, 2015, p. 280). Charmaz emphasized that researchers use 
their past and present experiences to filter and interpret the data (Charmaz, 2014, p. 17). With 
that said, it is necessary to provide some relevant information about myself. I am too a first-
generation ethnic Russian immigrant. I came to the United States in 2004 as a student, at the age 
of 22. My whole family lives in Russia. I experienced exposure to the following political 
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socialization agencies: American education system; an American spouse; American peers and 
employers; the US media and socials networks. I casually communicate with people who live in 
Russia, and I pay attention to Russian cultural media and news agencies.   
There were three people who I knew personally, and invited to participate in my study – 
Rina (f/e), Victoria (f/e), and Pavel (m/ne). I did not know the rest of respondents before 
conducting my interviews. 
There are certain shortcomings when a researcher and respondents belong to the same 
ethnic and/or social group.  Alfred Schuetz argued that the researcher who belongs to the 
researched group does not question ‘normal’ surroundings as he/she takes them for granted. A 
‘stranger,’ on the other hand, might have less biased perspective and might want to go into more 
details about something very obvious to the group but puzzling to an outsider (Schuetz, 1944, p. 
501). As follows, a stranger, due to his/her lack of familiarity with the group, might present a 
more detailed analysis as opposed to an insider who omits many things because they are obvious 
and, hence, do not require additional explanation. I do recognize this shortcoming. Since I am 
aware of this potential problem, I attempted to minimize this bias by not initiating and 
discussions and only asking follow-up questions when I felt a clarification was needed.  
I believe it was easier for me to establish trust with my participants, especially those who 
do not speak English and rarely communicate with Americans or any other group except of their 
own. Patricia Hill Collins argued that providing an inside voice to a group might produce 
distinctive analyses of numerous issues that are not visible to outsiders (Collins, 1986). An 
outsider might not be aware of certain issues and instead, concentrate on obvious things and 
experiences. As a result, he/she can provide a flawless descriptive analysis but has no way to 
channel from within. An outsider is certainly capable of becoming a member of the group, but it 
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takes time and would never be complete because we all carry parts of our history with us no 
matter what we do.  
After completing the process of recruiting and interviewing I can say with confidence 
that my respondents were willing to participate in my study because I was one of them. They 
trusted me with their views and opinions because I was a fellow ethnic Russian immigrant. For 
the convenience of my respondents, I offered a choice between Russian and English language for 
both an interview and a survey. Thirty-nine out of forty preferred Russian.  
4.6. Data collection 
I collected my data in the second half of 2016 and the first half of 2017. It was an 
interesting period because in November 2016, the 45th American president was elected. There 
was a lot of tension and controversy in mass media and the American society in general before 
and after the elections. I included several questions about the elections in the interview 
questionnaire to address current events. However, I did not ask my respondents about their 
personal preference between Donald Trump and Hilary Clinton because such questions may be 
perceived as intrusive.    
I used two methods of data collection: open-ended interviews and a closed-ended survey. 
Interviews were designed to learn about respondents’ individual experiences. A survey was 
added to classify respondents based on their political preferences.      
4.6.1. Interviews 
Charmaz argued in favor of intensive interviewing. This technique allows respondents to 
express their opinions and share personal experiences. An interviewer should ask open-ended 
questions, obtain detailed responses, and try to understand participants’ perspectives (Charmaz, 
2014, p. 56). I also relied on the advice of James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium who 
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developed an active interviewing approach. Active interviewing is storytelling with two main 
participants: a researcher and a respondent. This approach encourages interviewers to “converse 
with respondents in such a way that alternate considerations are brought into play” (Holstein & 
Gubrium, 1995, p. 17). It requires an interviewer to be active and engaged. He or she should try 
to activate a respondent's stock of knowledge but avoid possible contamination.  
I conducted thirty-one face-to-face interviews. Eight people were interviewed through 
Skype and one over the phone. Interview data were later combined with the survey results in a 
separate folder for each respondent. 39 interviews were conducted in Russian and later translated 
into English.  
During all my interviews I took notes and recorded field observations and spontaneous 
thoughts and ideas. While transcribing the data, I incorporated those notes into analytical memos 
for each interview. Memo writing is an essential element of grounded theory. Non-verbal 
behavior, a tone of voice, and a general ethnographic setting are very helpful for data analysis 
and a theory generation (Charmaz, 2014, p. 111). According to Johnny Saldana, a memo is “a 
place to ‘dump your brain’ about the participants, phenomenon, or process under investigation 
by thinking and thus writing and thus thinking even more about them…” (Saldaña, 2016, p. 44). 
4.6.2. Surveys 
I used Political Typology Quiz created by the Pew Research Center (PRC), a nonpartisan 
fact tank16. Their Political Typology Quiz is a part of Political Polarization series. It categorizes 
respondents into eight groups from the Right to the Left  (Pew Research Center, 2014).  Here is 
the groups’ breakdown:  
                                                          
16 http://www.people-press.org/quiz/political-typology/  
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• Strongly ideological: 
o Steadfast Conservatives (Right) 
o Business Conservatives (Right) 
o Solid Liberals (Left) 
• Less opinionated: 
o Young outsiders (more to the Right) 
o Hard-pressed skeptics (dead center) 
o Next Generation Left (more to the Left) 
o Faith and Family Left (more to the Left) 
• Bystanders. 
The PRC survey consists of 23 questions each with two options to choose from. For this 
study, an extra choice (‘no opinion') was added to provide respondents with all the possible 
options (see Appendix A).   
Each respondent was asked to complete the survey. Initially, I intended to email the 
survey to each respondent before the interview, but it was not a successful strategy because 
respondents often forgot about it and I had a hard time obtaining surveys after interviews. I 
changed my strategy and asked respondents to complete the survey right before the interview. 
Appendix C contains the survey results. The political typology quiz was administered forty times 
with answers provided by my respondents to generate results. When a third, a ‘no opinion’, 
option was used, I simply skipped the question. Only one survey did not yield a result – Yana 
(f/e) answered ‘no opinion’ so many times, it made it impossible to identify her political 
typology.  
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4.6.3. Sample size 
The number of interviews depends on many factors including complexity, novelty, and 
controversy of a studied phenomenon. The more controversial the topic, the more interviews it 
requires. The use of interviews as a sole source of data also obliges the researcher to increase the 
number of interviews (Charmaz, 2014, p. 108). For a grounded theory research, John W. 
Creswell recommends conducting between 20 and 60 interviews (Creswell, 2013, p. 89). I 
conducted the total of 45 interviews. Five interviews were not used because they did not fit the 
parameters of the study (it was usually revealed during interviews). The 40 remaining interviews 
are divided into four clusters based on two characteristics: gender and English language 
proficiency (refer to Appendix B). The average age of the sample is 39, with the youngest being 
23 and the oldest – 60. The study respondents are discussed next.  
4.7. Who are they? 
The first cluster is coded ‘m/e’ and consists of seven men (m) who speak English (e) 
well. All of them came to the United States with an average to good knowledge of English. 
Timur and Nick immigrated at the age of 18. Timur, Nick, John, and Bill obtained their highest 
college degrees in the United States. Yuri, Jason, and Valentin did not receive education in the 
US. Instead, they relied on their college degrees earned in Russia. This group has two people 
with doctoral, three people with masters, and two with bachelors degrees.  All of them, except 
Nick who has his own business, work for American companies. Only two members have (had) 
romantic relationships with American partners: Timur is dating an American girl, and John (at 
the time of our interview) was divorcing his American wife. All seven members have American 
friends. Six out of seven have Russian friends both in the US and in Russia. Yuri prefers not to 
communicate with Russian-speaking immigrants in the US but converses with people in Russia.  
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The second cluster (m/ne) consists of nine men (m) who speak poor or no English (ne) 
and do not use it every day. Semion is the only person in this group who obtained some 
education in the US – post-doctorate credits at several universities. The rest did not receive any 
education in the United States. Five members (Ivan, Semion, Aleksandr, Pavel, and Nikita) work 
for American companies. All of them but Aleksandr try to interact with their American co-
workers, but poor language skills is a major limiting factor in both communication and career 
advancements. Three men (Aristarch, Alexey, and Andrei) started their own businesses, and one 
(Vladislav) works for a company created and staffed by Russian-speaking immigrants from 
former Soviet republics. None of the group members have American partners, and some do not 
even have American friends: out of nine people, only three (Semion, Alexey, and Pavel) stated 
they have American friends. All of them have Russian and Russian-speaking friends in the US. 
Within this group, Alexey is the only one who volunteers – it is a large part of his job – he is a 
priest in the Russian Orthodox Church. The rest of the members of this group had never thought 
of volunteering either in Russia or in the US.  
The third cluster – f/e – includes twelve women (f) who speak English (e) and utilize it in 
their daily lives. Most of these women are married to American men except Sessi (single), 
Yaroslava (her Russian spouse does not speak English), and Yana (her Russian spouse speaks 
English). These ladies tend to have both American and Russian friends, except for Sveta who 
prefers to communicate with European immigrants only. Sessi does not have any Russian 
friends. Rina and Victoria do not have any American friends.  
Finally, the fourth cluster (f/ne) are twelve women (f) who do not speak English (ne) or 
know it poorly. Out of this group, only three – Chepe, Olga, and Marianna – work for American 
companies and have American colleagues. Maria, Margarita, and Olga have American spouses, 
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while the rest of them are married to Russian (Anna, Marianna, Tapolina, Marina, Belka, and 
Lukeria) and Ukrainian (Chepe and Korina) immigrants. Alevtina is single.  
4.8. Why did they come to the US? 
Academically, this question was neither asked nor answered. The majority of the research 
on immigrants from the former Soviet Union and the post-Soviet Russia concentrated on the 
Russian-speaking Jews whose main reasons for immigration were to move to the promised land 
(Israel) and escape oppression (Inkeles & Bauer, 1961; Isurin, 2011; Lewin Epstein et al., 1997; 
Morawska, 2004; Shasha & Shron, 2002). 
What about ethnic Russians? What are their reasons to leave Russia? Based on the 
answers, I divided respondents into six groups. 
4.8.1. Group #1 – Better Job Opportunities 
Five people moved to the US to advance their careers. Valentin (m/e), Semion (m/ne), 
Yana (f/e), and Chepe (f/ne) are scientists with advanced academic degrees. Katya (f/e) is an 
athlete. All of them felt that in Russia there were not enough opportunities for them to pursue 
their passions.  As stated by Semion (m/ne),  
“I left Russia because I wanted to pursue a career in academia and it was not 
possible to survive doing only this. My salary at the university was not enough to even 
buy a bus pass. The compensations were so small that we were encouraged to go to 
different countries. Why would I want to stay in Russia, if countries like the US offer me a 
stable salary and research opportunities?”  
According to him, even bureaucratic procedures became easier after he mentioned he was 
going to work in the US: “it was a particular mindset – if you are going to the US, you are not 
considered a traitor. It meant that you'd done something with your life.”  
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Valentin (m/e) mentioned that the collapse of the Soviet Union made it difficult for 
scientists to continue their research:  
“There was a large gap between the Soviet scientists and young aspiring scientists 
who were just starting in the field. Old scientists did not have to start over; they had good 
reputations and social privileges while for younger scientists it was very difficult to enter 
the field. If I wanted to stay in academia and continue my research, I had to look 
elsewhere.”  
Chepe (f/ne) came to the US to gain experience necessary to secure a better job in 
Europe. “After I got my Ph.D., I went to France for a postdoc program. I met a person there who 
told me to look for a job in the US because it is the top country in sciences. After working in the 
US, I was guaranteed to find permanent employment in academia anywhere in Europe.” 
Katya (f/e) came to the US because she wanted to become a professional athlete. “In 
Russia, the government had never supported sports. In Moscow, tennis courts were given away 
to some businessmen instead of supporting local sports initiatives to encourage children to play 
tennis.” Katya was able to secure a full athletic scholarship for both undergraduate and graduate 
studies in one of Florida’s colleges. She admits that none of that would be possible if she stayed 
in Russia.  
This group includes both men and women. Two of them do not speak good English, but it 
did not stop them from pursuing their careers. Semion (m/ne) and Chepe (f/ne) both admitted 
their English is lacking, but their research fields are specific enough to conduct and publish 
research without any difficulties.  
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4.8.2. Group #2 – “I followed my family” 
Nick (m/e), Timur (m/e), Jason (m/e), and Sessi (f/e) came to the US following their 
parents. All of them immigrated at a young age: Nick and Timur were 18, Sessi was 19, and 
Jason was 20. They spoke good English before moving to the US. Their parents spoke English, 
and all of them studied English in Russia before coming to the US. Sessi lived in New Zealand 
for a year before joining her parents and two younger siblings in the US. As Timur (m/e) pointed 
out: “I studied English at school. My mom spoke good English. We had an American teacher at 
my school. I was one of his best students. When I came to the US, I understood America fairly 
well.”   
Upon his arrival to the US, Nick (m/e) did not have any intention to stay for good. 
“Initially, I wanted to enter a university here and see where it will take me. I was expecting to get 
an American education and go back to Russia where I would be in demand as an employee.”  
The oldest cohort, Aleksandr (m/ne), Tapolina (f/ne), and Alevtina (f/ne), came to the US 
to rejoin their children. Aleksandr shared: “I moved here mostly because of my children and 
grandchildren, I wanted to be close to them, so I can see them and help them.” All three speak 
little to no English. Tapolina does not want to learn English at all as she does not need it. They 
are the least opinionated people in the study. All three acknowledged their limitations when 
comparing Russia and the US. Tapolina and Alevtina expressed a desire to learn more about the 
US political system.  
Ivan (m/ne) and Pavel (m/ne) moved to the United States to reunite with their sister and 
mother respectively. They both stated they took advantage of the situation because things were 
bad at home. Ivan said: 
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 “My sister moved here a long time ago, and I finally decided to come here. For 
the past 20 years I worked as a lawyer, and recently, it became very difficult. To win a 
case, you need to negotiate instead of making your case. Also, standards of living were 
deteriorating: everything was fake – especially medications.” 
Finally, Lukeria (f/ne) followed her husband to the United States. If not for him, she 
would’ve never even thought about emigrating from Russia.  
4.8.3. Group #3 – “I got married!!!” 
Thirteen respondents (all women) moved to the United States because they got married. 
Elena (f/e) and Victoria (f/e) came to the United States for the ‘Work and Travel’ summer 
student exchange program.17 As Elena put it: “I came here through the Work & Travel program. 
I’ve met my husband on the second day I was here. After that summer I went back home, finished 
my college studies and came back on a bride’s visa – my husband does everything by the law.” 
Victoria had a very similar experience.  
Korina (f/ne), Maria (f/ne), Marianna (f/ne), Anna (f/ne), and Belka (f/ne) immigrated to 
the US after marrying former compatriots – long-term Russian-speaking immigrants.  Here are 
some of their recollections: “My first love invited me for a visit. I came on a New Year’s Eve, we 
hadn’t seen each other for 10 years, and we fell in love again. I went back to finish all my 
business in Russia and came to the US for good - we got married right away” (Marianna). “I 
came here on a fiancé visa. My husband and I knew each other for over 20 years. We went to the 
same high school. We met again online and later decided to get married” (Belka). “I met my 
husband in Russia; he was there for some personal business. I went back and forth as a tourist. 
                                                          
17 https://www.interexchange.org/travel-abroad/work-travel-year-usa/  
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On my last trip, I got pregnant and stayed. We got married, and I applied for a green card” 
(Anna). All four of these women do not speak English. There is no need to speak the language to 
immigrate. Marianna and Belka picked up some English language skills: Marianna works for the 
same company as her husband and Belka studies in college. Anna and Korina are both stay-at-
home moms and do not have many opportunities to socialize outside of their families.   
Finally, six women met their husbands, American men, online: Abigail (f/e), Alisa (f/e), 
Rina (f/e), Stephanie (f/e), Margarita (f/ne), and Olga (f/ne). Rina shared her experiences:  
“When I celebrated my 47th birthday, I realized that I had nothing holding me in 
Russia – I raised my children and had a good job as a freelancer. I decided to test myself 
– I went on a trip to Europe to see if I can find my way in a foreign country. My trip was 
a success, and I went even further: I joined several online dating groups and started 
talking to American men. It was fun! I was interested in everything and asked many 
questions. Once I was even labeled a spammer, but I used it to my advantage. That is how 
I met my husband.”  
Stephanie explained: “My husband and I met online and traveled to see each other 
several times. Before my move, we met in Europe, rented a car, and spent 21 days together to see 
if we were a good match.” Olga shared: “My husband and I got married in Russia. After that, I 
waited for two years before coming here. When I finally arrived, I received my social security 
number and my green card right away – we did it the smart way.” Margarita told me that she 
hesitated at first:  
“My close friend found a website where we could meet people from the US. I did 
not have an aim to find someone – my friend encouraged me. When I met my husband, I 
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did not want to move here, but I did it for my children. Otherwise, I would probably be 
very happy with long distance relations.”  
All the ladies who came here after meeting their husbands online are still happily 
married, except for Maria – after two years of marriage, Maria and her husband decided to part 
ways. 
4.8.4. Group #4 – “I won a Green Card!!!” 
Five people came to the United States after winning in the Green Card lottery: Yuri 
(m/e), Nikita (m/ne); Marina (f/ne), and a married couple - Yaroslava (f/e) and Aristarch (m/ne). 
Yuri heard about the lottery from an acquaintance:  
“I had thought about moving, but we did not have a good opportunity. An 
acquaintance during a business trip to enter the Green Card lottery. We did, and my wife 
won.”  
Nikita came to the US because of his wife: “It was not my decision. My wife went to the 
US in 2008, and she liked it a lot. She decided to apply for the Green Card lottery, and I 
supported her decision. We won and decided to move.” Aristarch and Yaroslava had a different 
reason:  
“We won our Green Card, but we had never been here before. We took it as our 
chance to try something new and test ourselves in a new place. We won in 2009, and at 
that time, there was a crisis and no job stability in Russia. If not for that economic crisis, 
we would remain in Russia.”  
Marina won her Green Card while she was in the US:  
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“My boyfriend and I came here as students on J-1 visas. We wanted to work, 
make some money, then go back home, finish our universities, and get married. Our 
contact in America scammed us by providing fake job contracts. We decided to stay 
illegally for some time. After one year, we found ourselves surrounded by people who 
lived in the US illegally for ten-fifteen years. I was afraid to get stuck among those 
people. We applied for a Green Card, and I won.”   
4.8.5. Group #5 – “Let’s come for a visit and stay forever!” 
Father Alexey (m/ne) and Vladislav (m/ne) admitted that they had never planned to 
emigrate from Russia. They both decided to come to the US out of curiosity. “I did not expect to 
stay. I came to talk to a bishop in New York. After that, I started to think about moving here. It 
was a difficult choice because I served in a good church in Moscow” (Father Alexey). “I studied 
in a university and had an older friend who went to the US every summer. He persuaded me to 
go with him the next time, but he warned me that we are going for a long period, not just for one 
summer” (Vladislav). 
John (m/e) and Bill (m/e) came to the US to receive an education and later decided to 
stay. As John put it: “in Russia, I worked in a bank for nine years, and I had a very good 
position. But then my boss told me that I would not get a promotion because I did not have good 
connections. I started looking elsewhere and realized that I need to learn English, get an MBA, 
and all the doors will open for me.” Bill went through a similar thinking process before obtaining 
his Master’s degree in the US.  
Sveta (f/e) intentionally stayed in the US after she participated in the ‘Work and Travel’ 
program. “I came here for the first time in 2007, and I was under the impression that everything 
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is easy in the US. I came again in 2009 on J-1 visa, then I got a tourist visa, and later I got my 
Green Card.”  
Andrei (m/ne) came to the US specifically to make some money and found a way to stay 
here. Later his wife, Lukeria (f/ne), joined him.  
4.8.6. Group #6 – “Economic crises had affected our business” 
Finally, Kristina (f/e) and her American husband met and got married in Russia. Together 
they started their business in Kristina’s hometown. “We decided to move because we felt the 
economic crises [the result of sanctions imposed in 2014] was affecting our business. When it 
started, we did not think it will last. So our reason to move was purely economic.” If not for 
sanctions, Kristina and her husband would have remained in Russia.  
4.9. Exposure to American political socialization agencies 
Table 2 in Appendix B summarizes the respondents’ experiences with political 
socialization agencies in the US. In some cases, it also indicates an on-going exposure to Russian 
agencies (mainly the church and mass media). Overall, there are four most exposed respondents: 
Yuri (m/e), Nick (m/e), Rina (f/e), and Katya (f/e). The respondents with the least exposure to 
the US socialization agencies were: Andrei (m/ne), Vladislav (m/ne), Tapolina (f/ne), Alevtina 
(f/ne), and Lukeria (f/ne). 
The general tendency is consistent with one of the initial hypotheses: English language 
proficiency is a very influential factor in the process of political socialization in a host society.   
Based on data, the church is an effective political socialization agency. While many 
participants declared they go to a church, only five people preferred English-speaking churches: 
Yuri (m/e), Victoria (f/e) and Yaroslava (f/e) regularly attend Baptist churches; Sveta (f/e) and 
Ivan (m/ne) prefer Roman Catholic churches. The rest of the churchgoers attend Russian 
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Orthodox Churches with services performed in Russian. One respondent – Father Alexey (m/ne) 
started a Russian Orthodox church in South Florida.   
Another important agency is marriage. Twelve women in the sample have American 
spouses and consider them to be the most influential agency of their political socialization. No 
men in the sample are married to American women: Timur (m/e) is dating one, and John (m/e) is 
divorcing one. 
All respondents in my sample communicate with people in Russia. With contemporary 
technological advances in communication, it is almost unavoidable. Communication with family 
and friends occurs on a regular basis. Nine people (Timur (m/e), Nick (m/e), John (m/e), Semion 
(m/ne), Pavel (m/ne), Andrei (m/ne), Stephanie (f/e), Anna (f/ne), and Lukeria (f/ne)) stated they 
still care about politics in Russia. Constant communications with the home state could suggest a 
transnational immigrant behavior due to simultaneous attachments and active participation in 
both a home and a host state (Basch, Schiller, & Szanton Blanc, 1994). 
4.10. Data Coding 
Grounded theory coding process is used to identify the main themes and generalizable 
statements. Coding should be simple, direct, and spontaneous. Unlike other qualitative methods,  
grounded theory does not use preconceived codes to categorize data (Charmaz, 2014, p. 113). 
There are two cycles of coding. Johnny Saldana specified three types for each of the 
cycles in grounded theory applications (Saldaña, 2016, p. 55): 
• First cycle: In Vivo, Process, and Initial (or Open) coding;  
• Second cycle: Focused, Axial, and Theoretical (or Selective).  
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For the first coding cycle, I used the combination of In Vivo and Process coding. In Vivo 
coding refers to a word or a short phrase that is repeated many times within a sample. “Folk or 
indigenous terms indicate the existence of the group’s cultural categories” (Ibid., p. 105). As for 
the Process coding, it is more suited for studies that “search for the routines and rituals of human 
life” (Ibid., p. 111). The Process coding is also appropriate for movement and changes that occur 
over time. Political socialization is a ritual of adjustment to a new environment. It takes time and 
depends on many factors.  
All respondents have different interpretations of the United States based on exposure to 
different agencies of socialization. They came to the US at different stages of their lives with 
different amounts of human capital and experience. Their impressions of the US as a country and 
as a political system were very different, but all of them are important to acknowledge. The 
combination of In Vivo and Process coding is perfect for capturing a wide variety of codes and 
themes.   
I created a color-coding system to mark similar responses and ideas. There was a total of 
23 different colors marking similar responses. I also filled 40 pages of notes and 17 flash cards 
with codes. The first cycle coding was very helpful to organize my thought process. Some of my 
interviews were over three hours long, and transcripts had an overwhelming amount of 
information, facts, emotions, etc. Coding helped to weed out secondary things and highlight 
interesting responses, commonalities, and differences.  
For the second cycle, I used focused coding which consists of the initial codes’ 
assessment through comparison. Charmaz advised developing categories and subcategories to 
make sense of all the data. Analytic strategies usually emerge during the categorizing (Charmaz, 
2014, p. 148). In my case, in the second coding cycle, I identified the most used codes first and 
90 
 
listed quotes relevant to each code. It helped to organize opinions on different issues. The second 
cycle coding resulted in a 60-page document.  
  Since this study is about political socialization, interviews were specifically made to ask 
questions about different socialization agencies. Political socialization involves the following 
agencies: a family; a community; peer groups; the church; school systems; a workplace; formal 
organizations; mass media; specialized political input structures (interest groups and political 
parties); specialized output structures (a legislature, bureaucracy, and court systems); and social, 
economic, and political outcomes (Almond & Powell, 1978, p. 79). Because I used the political 
socialization concept as a framework, most of the general themes (but not categories) were 
predetermined: education, marriage, family and friends, a place of work, a place of leisure, mass 
media, and a place of worship. During my coding cycles, I was able to gather enough codes for 
additional categories that became very important. I will discuss my findings about relevant and 
unexpected political socialization agencies in chapter six where I develop a model of political 
socialization of ethnic-Russian immigrants based on the experiences of those respondents who 
successfully socialized into American society and its political environment. 
4.11. Summary 
There are two research questions in this study:  
1. What are the most effective political socialization agencies with ethnic Russian 
immigrants?  
2. How do Russians who permanently reside in the United States perceive American 
democracy and why do they have the views they do? Do English language 
proficiency and exposure to multiple socialization agencies make a difference?  
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To answer these questions, I conducted forty interviews accompanied by surveys and 
divided my sample into clusters, based on English language proficiency and gender; and groups, 
based on their reasons to immigrate to the US. Constructivist grounded theory was chosen as the 
data analysis method. It is grounded in data and emphasizes data interpretation. Since the main 
concept of the study is an immigrant political socialization, general themes were predetermined, 
but categories were developed after the data analysis.    
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Chapter 5 Economic and Social Adaptation 
An Immigrant political socialization into a host society, does not happen in isolation but 
together with an economic and social integration. After all, immigrants’ economic and social 
adjustments affect their perception of the host government and its political system overall. In this 
chapter, I address how ethnic Russian immigrants adapted to their new economic and social 
environments in the US. As Gitelman eloquently put it, the main objective of this chapter “is to 
describe the road and the scenery around it…when we take up political integration and 
absorption, we will be concerned with ‘final destination,’ but here we shall try to describe the 
social and economic experiences of the immigrants, without making judgments about final 
outcomes” (Gitelman, 1982, p. 128). The process of economic and social adaptation can be 
defined in many ways. To narrow the scope, I will use the following definition: immigrants’ 
integration is “primarily concerned about individual outcomes such as language acquisition, 
educational attainment, labor market participation, and health behavior” (Ramakrishnan, 2013, p. 
31). 
There are objective and subjective measures of immigrant integration. From the 
government’s perspective, the integration success can be measured by immigrants’ satisfaction 
with their physical needs. There are several questions to consider: Are you satisfied with your 
life in the US? Are you proud of your job, achievements, and material possessions?  
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From the societal perspective, an integration can be measured by the degree and nature of 
immigrants’ contacts with Americans. Do you have any American friends? Is your spouse an 
American? How often do you communicate with Americans?  
As for subjective measures of assimilation, there is an absorption of the host’s values, 
norms, and behavior patterns by immigrants themselves (Gitelman, 1982, p. 135). Did you find 
your place in American society? Do you think you’ve Americanized?   
The following subsections address immigrants’ economic and social adaptation as well as 
their satisfaction rates. More specifically, an economic integration includes employment, 
education, healthcare, welfare, and dealing with infrastructure and services. A social integration 
occurs through developing different kinds of relationships. The overall satisfaction rate is based 
on immigrants’ subjective opinions about their lives in the US. 
5.1. Economic integration 
An economic activity is an important component of a person’s wellbeing. For many 
people, economic security is a primary reason for immigration. When asked about their pre-
emigration image of America, all forty respondents mentioned things like great opportunities, 
prosperity, financial might, and economic security. When talking about economic opportunities, 
respondents emphasized employment prospects and good quality education.  
5.1.1. Employment 
Out of forty respondents, only four are not employed: Maria (f/e) was looking for a job at 
the time of the interview, Anna (f/ne) is a stay-at-home mom, Tapolina (f/ne) and Alevtina (f/ne) 
are retired. The rest of the respondents’ employment is listed in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Employment status 
Type of employment 
An American 
Company 
A Russian-speaking 
company/employer 
Self-employment Part-time 
employment 
Timur (m/e) 
Yuri (m/e) 
John (m/e) 
Bill (m/e) 
Jason (m/e) 
Valentin (m/e) 
Ivan (m/ne) 
Semion (m/ne) 
Aleksandr (m/ne) 
Nikita (m/ne) 
Sessi (f/e) 
Rina (f/e) 
Katya (f/e) 
Sveta (f/e) 
Victoria (f/e) 
Stephanie (f/e) 
Elena (f/e) 
Yana (f/e) 
Chepe (f/ne) 
Olga (f/ne) 
Marianna (f/ne) 
Pavel (m/ne) 
Vladislav (m/ne) 
Korina (f/ne) 
Belka (f/ne) 
Nick (m/e) 
Aristarch (m/ne) 
Alexey (m/ne) 
Andrei (m/ne) 
Abigail (f/e) 
Alisa (f/e) 
Yaroslava (f/e) 
Kristina* (f/e) 
Margarita (f/ne) 
Lukeria (f/ne) 
Marina (f/ne) 
Total: 21 Total: 4 Total: 10 Total: 1 
* Owns business in Russia 
Respondents who work in American companies talked about both the advantages and 
disadvantages of their employment. The most common approvals of American companies 
include high salaries and good work ethics. Jason (m/e) does not like the benefits his company 
provides but he is satisfied with his earnings: “I like the size of my salary. It is very competitive 
compared to Russia. I can afford to buy health insurance of my choice as opposed to relying on 
my company’s coverage.” Katya’s (f/e) starting salary was higher than her mother’s earnings in 
Russia. Even though her mother has 30 years of experience, Katya’s first job paid considerably 
more. The general impression of the US labor compensation is very positive among respondents. 
Marianna (f/e) summarized it as follows: “the US is ahead of Russia by about 50 years when it 
comes to people’s earnings.”  
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Rina (f/e), who works at a retail store, is very appreciative of managers’ approach to 
workers: “Our managers will never remind us of their superiority. They know all our names and 
always show respect. If something needs to be done, they will do it instead of ordering us 
around. One of our managers cleaned the toilets when we were understaffed.” In Rina’s opinion, 
managers in Russia are less personable. Elena (f/e), who works for a large financial company, 
feels secure to work in the US because of employees’ rights and a great support system (unions 
and associations). Sveta (f/e) talked about merit systems: “In Russia, your job is as good as your 
social connections and networking abilities. Even though there is some nepotism in the US, it is 
possible to make a great career based on merit alone, especially if you are willing to work for 
less money.”  
Alexey (m/ne), Yaroslava (f/e), and Marianna (f/ne) are very appreciative of American 
employment programs for people with disabilities. As Alexey put it: “my youngest son has Down 
syndrome. In Russia, his prospects are very glum. In the US, however, there is hope for people 
like him. I see people with Down syndrome working in supermarkets. The US society is more 
accepting and the American government pays a lot of attention to people with disabilities.” 
The main disadvantage of working in the US is a lack of benefits. Both men and women 
in the sample criticized the absence of maternity programs and benefits. Yaroslava (f/e) and 
Chepe (f/ne) are both mothers. Yaroslava’s oldest son was born in Russia, and the youngest 
daughter was born in the US. All three of Chepe’s children were born in the US. The two 
mothers related to the absence of maternity benefits to bigger societal issues.  
“In the US, there is no maternal leave and no guaranteed return to employment 
after it is over. There are no public daycare centers, and private ones are very expensive. 
There is no preventive medical attention for pregnant women in case of pathology. Thus, 
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there is no culture of mothering - the system is created to separate mothers and children 
as early as possible. As a result, children are growing up without developing a close 
connection to and appreciation of their parents - that is why too many people end up in 
retirement homes” (Yaroslava).  “Mothers have to leave their children to the care of 
strangers at a very young age. Some children cannot develop properly because they do 
not receive necessary attention in daycare centers” (Chepe). 
Olga (f/ne) was sure that aside from the US, no other developed country deprives young 
mothers of time to spend with their children. In her opinion, women should have an opportunity 
to devote attention to their newborns without being threatened to lose their jobs or run out of 
money. Maternity leave and a culture of mothering both benefit a society by preventing any 
possible developmental concerns and strengthening connections among different generations 
within families.  
Another issue raised by respondents was a small number of vacations days. Timur (m/e) 
mentioned: “I would’ve been better off working in Russia because there is more vacation time, 
healthcare and maternity benefits, especially for government employees.” Sveta (f/e) shared that 
in the past she worked for a European company: “I worked in their American branch, and our 
benefits were very different from the headquarters: in Italy, they have 28 days of paid vacation 
time, but we did not have it here. My present job provides no benefits at all.”   Most respondents 
agree that the lack of benefits is a systemic issue. The US is behind Russia and the European 
Union because it does not guarantee adequate benefits to American employees.  
Aside from the advantages and disadvantages of the US employment, respondents talked 
about challenges they faced while job hunting. Six people, or 15% of the sample, admitted their 
economic and social status diminished in the US. The two main reasons include a poor 
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knowledge of English (Nikita, Margarita, Maria) and a non-citizen status (Chepe, Ivan, 
Aristarch). Nikita (m/ne) moved to the US because his wife won a Green Card. They immigrated 
shortly after their daughter was born and his wife is now a stay-at-home mother. Because Nikita 
does not speak English, his employment choices are very limited: 
“I work as a delivery guy in the US, and I would never work in a restaurant in 
Russia. I had a much better job there; I am not used to this type of work. It was the main 
reason I did not want to emigrate in the first place - I do not know the language, and I 
knew it would be impossible to find a decent job. Maybe down the road, when I learn the 
language, it will get better. They say it is easier here, but I did not notice it yet.” 
Nikita’s wife dreamt of living in America and Nikita wanted her dream to come true. 
However, the economic burden rests on his shoulders, and his main objective is to learn English 
as fast as possible so he can find a better job. He splits his time between his work and his family, 
so the only way he can learn English is through interaction with his co-workers. At the same 
time, Nikita admits that his dream job is to work for an American company in Russia. That way 
he can enjoy both an American salary and Russian benefits.  
Margarita (f/ne) had always been very independent. In Russia, she had her own business 
and raised two children as a single mother. Even though she was very successful, she decided to 
move to the US after she met an American man online. She does not like a lot of things about her 
life in the US, mostly because she lost her independence due to the language barrier. 
Nonetheless, she decided to stay. Her husband owns a landscaping company and she works as an 
accountant for the family business: “I had a lot of things in Russia including my apartment and a 
car. This move was mostly for my children. They were 16 and 20 at that time and if I waited for 
several more years, they would establish their lives in Russia and would not want to move.”  
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Another obstacle to acquiring the desired job is citizenship status. Green card 
holders/residents cannot pursue careers in civil service. Aristarch (m/ne) worked as a fire-fighter 
in Russia. He planned to find a similar job in the US but realized he needed to be a citizen. 
Similarly, Ivan (m/ne) has an advanced degree in natural sciences, but he must obtain the US 
citizenship to be considered for a job in his field. He also feels the difficulties would not stop 
there: “there is an attitude toward immigrants, especially Russians. With everything else equal, 
an average American company will hire an American and not an immigrant. To be fair, I think it 
is a worldwide trend.” There are only two people in the sample, Ivan (m/ne) and John (m/e), who 
experienced employment discrimination. The rest of the respondents did not mention the issue. 
For Maria (f/e) it proves to be very difficult to compensate for the loss of the economic 
and social status she once enjoyed: “in Russia, I was a medical doctor. I cannot set my practice 
here because I need to go through complete recertification. It will take years and will be very 
expensive. Even if I wanted to go to school, I have difficulties gathering all the necessary 
documents. For example, they want my high school diploma, and I do not have it, so everything 
stops there.” 
While both expected and unforeseen challenges make their job-search difficult, many 
immigrants are optimistic and continue searching for their place in America. None of the 
respondents was disappointed or discouraged by their often bitter experiences including Abigail 
(f/e), who is self-employed. She applied many times for different jobs but was never invited even 
for an initial interview. Nevertheless, she is optimistic: “I still believe in the American dream: if I 
get my education and work hard, I will be a millionaire.” 
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 5.1.2. Education 
Twelve out of forty, or 30% of respondents, acquired their high education in the United 
States. Timur (m/e), Nick (m/e), and Katya (f/e) received their undergraduate and graduate 
degrees in different Florida universities. Marina (f/ne) got her Bachelor’s, while John (m/e) and 
Bill (m/e) Master’s degrees in the US. Semion (m/ne) and Chepe (f/ne) came to the United States 
for post-doctoral opportunities. Sessi (f/e) and Belka (f/ne) are currently in school. Finally, Rina 
(f/e), Yaroslava (f/e), and Yuri (m/e) received various educational certificates and licenses. 
Opinions about American education are divided between the two extremes: some 
respondents praised it, while others criticized. Even those who did not experience an educational 
system first-hand had something to say about it. Yaroslava (f/e), Sessi (f/e), Belka (f/ne), and 
John (m/e) agreed that the US educational system is much better than the Russian one. 
According to Yaroslava (f/e): 
“There is an assistance for those who want to do something with their lives. I 
attended a cosmetology school, and they paid additional attention to international 
students. The school assigned an American student to make me comfortable and answer 
any question I might have during my program.”  
Yaroslava was sure that such a ‘companion’ program is wide-spread throughout all 
American secondary education establishments. Belka (f/ne) gained a lot of respect for the 
educational system because “if you want to study in the US, you can certainly find the right way 
to do it. There are many resources to help students in any way possible.”  
John (m/e) is very proud of his graduate degree. There is a very small percentage of 
immigrants who receive graduate degrees in the US, and he is one of them: “In the US, education 
opens doors, and everything becomes possible. People talk to you differently, they respect you 
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more. Respect is everything.” Tapolina (f/ne) also thinks that when it comes to education in the 
US “there are opportunities for everyone, if you have a desire to learn, you will achieve it.” 
Tapolina’s oldest daughter is in a nursing school. Based solely on her daughter’s experiences, 
Tapolina is sure that education in America is much better than in Russia.   
  On the other hand, some respondents consider American education to be inaccessible, 
expensive and, at the same time, insufficient and even mediocre. As Stephanie (f/e) put it: 
“I do not like that education is so expensive here. Not everyone, who deserves it, 
can afford it. People with potential might not have access to high education. The main 
reason for it is the fact that schools in different areas receive different funding. I do not 
think it is fair. All schools should receive the same funding and equal government 
attention, so all children receive the same education and a chance to go to college.” 
Sveta (f/e) thinks that Americans are only interested in majors that guarantee them high 
salaries after graduation. They follow the money and not their passions. At the same time, 
according to Maria (f/e): “there is no education cult in the US. A lot of people are happy with 
vocational school education or an associate degree. Americans are not ambitious; they are not 
encouraged to push themselves and achieve more.”  
Jason (m/e), Semion (m/ne), and Pavel (m/ne) argued that curriculums in American 
schools and college are weak. During his post-doctoral studies, Semion (m/ne) felt superior to his 
American counterparts. Pavel (m/ne) pointed out that “education in the US is very egocentric 
and weak. They teach only American history and only American geography. There is a periodic 
table of elements, but no one knows that it was named after its inventor – Dmitri Mendeleev.”  
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When it comes to K-12 education, Korina (f/ne) likes school buses that pick up children 
in the morning and bring them back after their classes are over. She also appreciates safety in 
schools. At the same time: “the school program is way too easy, I wish it was more challenging 
for children. Also, the US is not a good place to teach discipline – they give too many choices to 
little kids who are too young to have a good sense of judgment.”  
Kristina (f/e) does not have children yet, but she and her American husband agreed that 
their future children should go to elementary and middle school in Russia, because it is more 
structured, and come to the US for a high school and college education because they provide 
more choices and opportunities. 
Overall, opinions about an American education are split. It is very interesting that people 
who did not receive any education in the US consider it to be, by a default, much better than the 
Russian alternative. Only one person – Stephanie (f/e) – criticized the cost of education. As for 
the rest of the respondents, who commented on the topic, they mostly addressed education 
quality and accessibility.  
5.1.3. Healthcare  
Every respondent in this study had something negative to say about the US healthcare 
system. The three most mentioned issues were the cost of healthcare, over-medication, and the 
lack of preventive medicine:  
• Some respondents complained about the high costs of medical care and its accessibility. 
“Healthcare in the US is the most pressing issue. It should be more affordable. It is 
inaccessible and expensive. We did not expect to come here and face our healthcare 
needs without an insurance” (Nikita (m/ne)); “Healthcare insurance is very expensive, 
and it is not clear what you are paying for” (Chepe (f/ne)); “the US healthcare is 
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expensive and less accessible than in Russia and Europe. People are afraid to go to a 
doctor and sometimes neglect first signs of illness” (Nick (m/e)). High healthcare bills 
were one of the most popular answers on the question about difficulties and challenges 
immigrants faced after they moved to the US. 
• On the issue of overmedication: “I realized that people in America use lots of 
medications. They never get better, they just get addicted to more pills” (Korina (f/ne)); 
“Americans use too many medications which is both a cause and the effect of an 
aggressive marketing by pharmaceutical companies” (Margarita (f/ne)). “The average 
American is very sick. It is due to the poor diets and overmedication” (Katya (f/e)). 
Respondents also pointed out that many kinds of medications are not accessible without a 
doctor’s prescription and you end up paying twice: for a doctor’s visit and your 
prescription medication. 
• Several respondents commented on the lack of preventive care in the US. “For some 
reason, there is no preventive medical care here. It is a cheaper and more effective 
option as opposed to treating a disease when it is already developed and has 
consequences” (Margarita (f/ne)). “In Russia healthcare is cheap because it is preventive 
before anything else. I am grateful I grew up in a country where preventive care was a 
staple” (Maria (f/e)). 
While the majority of respondents admits that American hospitals are equipped better, 
they are not more efficient compared to hospitals in Russia. In sum, healthcare issues was the 
most popular topic when asked about negative experiences. It is the most pressing for families 
with small children and the elderly. Marianna’s (f/ne) husband wanted to bring his grandmother 
to live with them, but they decided against it because she has type II diabetes and it would be 
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very expensive to care of her in the US. As she put it: “you need to be very healthy to live in the 
US.” 
5.1.4. The Welfare State 
 There is only one person in the sample who took advantage of the American welfare 
system. Sessi (f/e), who is a single mom, receives food stamps. She goes to college and works at 
a bar at night but does not earn enough to take care of her little son. Aleksandr (m/ne) plans to 
become a citizen to retire in the US. “In Russia, my retirement would be too small, and in the US 
it will be much bigger, you can survive on it.” Jason (m/e) pointed out that he feels more secure 
about his retirement in the US: “Russian salaries are not stable and it is not clear what size 
retirement you will get, it was always one thing that bothered me when I lived in Russia.” 
Eight people, or 20% of respondents, criticized the American welfare system for being 
too generous. In Marianna’s (f/ne) opinion, the welfare system is very unbalanced: working 
people pay unfairly high taxes so the poor can live well. Andrei (m/ne), Chepe (f/ne), Lukeria 
(f/ne), Mariana (f/ne), and Elena (f/e) all agreed that American unemployment benefits are too 
significant and last for a long time. It discourages people to go back to work. Americans are not 
motivated to work because they can comfortably live on a welfare without lifting a finger.     
Sveta (f/e) and Yaroslava (f/e) both argued that free healthcare and expansive welfare 
programs are detrimental to any state. Healthcare should not be free, but it has to be accessible 
and reasonably priced. The welfare state should exist to sustain people only for short periods of 
time like immediately after a job loss but limited to several months as opposed to several years. 
5.1.5. Infrastructure and services 
“One of the first things every immigrant has to deal with in America is to learn how to 
drive a car. I had never driven a vehicle before, so I had to learn very fast if I wanted to be self-
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sufficient” (Abigail (f/e)). The lack of public transportation was an initial temporary downturn 
for many respondents in the study: they did not expect to see so many cars and very few people 
walking on the streets. An average American city spans across a large geographical territory. 
One cannot simply walk to work or to a store from home. Having a mode of transportation is a 
must. With that said, most respondents appreciate the American transportation system for wide 
roads and a well-planned infrastructure. Traveling from city to city and state to state is fast, easy, 
and safe. Many respondents also commented on streets and public amenities in the US: “I was 
impressed by everything: good roads and clean streets. Everything here is well-organized and 
comfortable. I like clean public toilets which are a big problem in Russia” (Belka (f/ne)). “In the 
US, infrastructure is very accommodating to people with disabilities and families with small 
children. There are toilets in every store and large parks with many attractions. You pay up front 
and do whatever you want all day. There is nothing like that in Russia” (Marianna (f/ne)). 
At first, Margarita (f/ne) could not understand many things about driving and parking in 
the US: 
 “Americans stay in traffic even if they can use different ways through 
neighborhoods to save time. Also, we live next to the beach, and I usually leave my car in 
the grocery store parking lot and walk to the beach. Why would I pay $8 for a beach 
parking if I can walk there? Americans pay without even considering other options. After 
living here for two years, however, I realized that if you follow the rules you have more 
order. If you pay for a beach parking, you will get clean functioning amenities on the 
beach. In Russia, people always look for ways to make things easier and cheaper. But 
when you follow the rules and pay small convenience fees, there are more opportunities 
for the state to provide services and to ensure order.” 
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Such realizations make immigrants appreciate infrastructure and services provided for the 
American public. It also allows them to see how the system works and that the general public 
plays an important role. Several people had also commented on the American banking system. 
Sveta (f/e/) was very impressed with banking and insurance services in the US: “If you get into 
an accident here, insurance will take care of it. Banking services are very convenient and stable; 
there are no banks that exist today and disappear tomorrow. They are way more developed 
compared to banks in Russia." 
On the other hand, Stephanie (f/e) and Alisa (f/e) criticized American credit card system 
and usage: 
“The banking system is not logical here. For you to have a good credit score, you 
actually need to have a debt. If you have a debt and make minimum payments, they charge you 
some crazy interest. Either way, you pay more than you owe - I do not understand it” Alisa (f/e). 
“Here people rely on credit cards, and it is not wise. If you lose your job, you still have to make 
payments. In Russia, I never used credit cards. I simply did not buy things I could not afford” 
Stephanie (f/e). 
Overall, the American infrastructure was praised by everyone in the study for being 
convenient, user-friendly, and clean. With that said, many respondents clarified they talked 
specifically about Florida’s infrastructure. Some had never been outside of Florida and cannot 
speak of the US as a whole.  
5.1.6. How do they compare to other immigrants? 
Economic integration of Russians in the sample is consistent with a general trend of 
recent Eastern European immigrants in the US. They tend to be very well educated: 69 percent of 
Eastern Europeans in the US have a college education and 22 percent possess advanced degrees 
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(Michalikova, 2017, p. 100). Among Eastern Europeans, there is another trend: females are 
better educated and more economically active than males. This particular gender gap is prevalent 
among Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian immigrant groups (Ibid., p. 105). In my sample, there are 
several female respondents who are or were breadwinners in their families (Yaroslava (f/e), 
Stephanie (f/e), Chepe (f/ne), Rina (f/e), Maria (f/e), and Margarita (f/ne)). All Eastern European 
immigrants have a hard time successfully transferring their skills and experiences into the 
American labor market (Ibid., p. 118). This is also true with the Soviet and post-Soviet Jewish 
immigrants in Israel (Gitelman, 1982; Isurin, 2011). Eastern Europeans often opt out for a low-
pay physical labor in both the US and Western Europe despite having high education and 
professional credentials that could qualify them for white collar well-paid jobs (Michalikova, 
2017, p. 120). As an example of this trend, Ivan (m/ne) joked about his job: “I am a taxi driver 
with two Masters Degrees.”  At the same time, among Eastern Europeans, Russians have higher 
educational attainment and a higher likelihood of professionalization in the US, followed by 
Ukrainians and then Polish (Ibid., p. 110).  
There is a certain continuity of expectations when it comes to the economic and social 
welfare systems in a host country. Respondents were very critical of American privatized and 
inaccessible healthcare. Similarly, Soviet immigrants to Israel disapproved of its state-sponsored 
healthcare system (Gitelman, 1982, p. 132). It could be an indicator that even after the collapse 
of the socialist system, Russians expect the state to provide healthcare services for them. 
Privatized medicine is not uncommon in contemporary Russia, but the majority of services can 
be received through state-funded clinics and hospitals. 
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5.2. Social integration 
In this study, social integration is understood as interactions with American people in the 
following capacities: friends, colleagues, and romantic partners. The overall impression about 
Americans is very uniform: they are friendly, kind, attentive and always ready to help. At the 
same time, they lack substance and keep their distance.  
5.2.1. American friends 
Very few respondents have American friends. Bill (m/e) made some American friends in 
graduate school, but he does not keep in touch with them. He socializes mostly with Americans 
at work. He prefers to communicate with Americans as opposed to Russians because “Americans 
are more rational and I feel more comfortable with them compared to my emotional Russian 
friends.” Yuri (m/e) likes Americans because “they respect others and do not try to force their 
opinions on you.” Yana (f/e) argued that Americans are “open-hearted and good” and they are 
much kinder to each other than Russians.  
On the other hand, nine people, or 22.5% of the study, insisted that there is no such thing 
as friendship in the US. At least not in a way it is perceived in Russia. For Russians, a friend is a 
part of the family. Americans distinguish between family and friends and prefer to socialize with 
two groups separately. Victoria (f/e), who is married to an American, admitted she has no 
American friends and here is why:  
 “Americans are talkative and superficial. Slavic people are much deeper. 
Americans are open and ready to help. They are unrestrained and aren’t afraid to do 
what they think is right. They are ready to defend their points of view. At the same time, 
they are very presumptuous and prefer to rely only on themselves. It is very challenging 
to befriend an American. I do not have American friends, only acquaintances.”  
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Sessi (f/e) and Elena (f/e) argued that Americans have a different mentality: “in Russia, 
we have a different understanding of friendship. In the US, if someone tells you: ‘we need to 
catch up soon,’ and then you never do, it is normal. It would not be normal in Russia” (Elena); 
“Americans are not bad. I just do not like when they promise something and never follow 
through. There were several people who promised to help me to find a job, but nothing ever 
came out of it” (Sessi). Valentin (m/e) described Americans as mundane and unmotivated: “They 
are not interested in anything outside of their routines. Work, family, and religion are all they 
think about. Russians are very different - they are interested in all things tangible, intangible, 
and everything beyond this universe.” 
5.2.2. American colleagues 
Ethnic Russian immigrants perceive their American colleagues in different ways. When 
asked about his interactions at work, John (m/e) immediately stated: “there are five topics you 
are not supposed to discuss with your officemates: politics, religion, personal health, sexual 
relations and I forgot the fifth.” Expressing your opinions on different issues might be 
detrimental to your career. John does not share his personal opinions at work and tries to keep his 
distance in the office and occasional social gatherings. Marianna (f/ne) also tries to separate her 
work and social environments.  
Just the opposite, Yuri (m/e), Yaroslava (f/e), and Nikita (m/ne) use work as a socializing 
agency. All three ask co-workers about different things including political preferences and 
opinions. All three find such interaction to be very educational. They learn a lot about the US 
through their colleagues. Olga (f/ne) and Marina (f/ne) do the same thing, but both make sure to 
agree with their American co-workers’ opinions for different reasons. Olga is afraid to lose her 
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job, and Marina does not want to stick out like a sore thumb – she tries to become an American 
and perceives her workplace as a learning environment.     
5.2.3. American spouses 
In my sample, there are eleven women married to American men and only one man who 
is dating an American woman – Timur (m/e). At the time of our interview, John (m/e) was 
divorcing his American wife. Table 5.2 summarizes respondents’ romantic relationships. 
Table 5.2 Relationship status 
Relationship type 
Married to an 
American 
Married to a long-term 
Russian-speaking immigrant 
Married to a Russian, emigrated 
together 
Single  
Abigail (f/e) 
Alisa (f/e) 
Rina (f/e) 
Katya (f/e) 
Sveta (f/e) 
Victoria (f/e) 
Stephanie (f/e) 
Kristina (f/e) 
Elena (f/e) 
Margarita (f/e) 
Olga (f/ne) 
Jason (m/e)&Marianna 
(f/ne) 
Ivan (m/ne) 
Vladislav (m/ne) 
Anna (f/ne) 
Belka (f/ne) 
Yuri (m/e) 
Valentin (m/e)&Yana (f/e) 
Semion (m/ne) 
Aristarch (m/ne)&Yaroslava (f/e) 
Alexey (m/ne) 
Aleksandr (m/ne)&Tapolina (f/ne) 
Nikita (m/ne) 
Andrei (m/ne)&Lukeria (f/ne) 
Marina (f/ne) 
Chepe** (f/ne) 
Korina**(f/ne) 
Nick*(m/e) 
Bill (m/e) 
Pavel (m/ne) 
Sessi (f/e) 
Maria (f/e) 
Alevtina (f/ne) 
 
* dating a Russian-speaking immigrant  
** married to a Ukrainian immigrant 
When talking about their American husbands, all eleven women agreed that there are 
some cultural differences. Russians and Americans are raised in different cultural settings, and it 
is particularly visible when they live under one roof and raise children together. Victoria (f/e) 
met her husband in 2005 when she came to the US for a summer exchange program. She came 
back in 2007, and they got married. Today they are a happy family of five. Having a solid 
marriage and raising three children does not mean they had overcame their differences. 
According to Victoria:  
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“I tend to save more, and he is a spender; I am more thoughtful and sensitive, and 
he is superficial. I am hard-working, and he is a slacker sometimes. Those are the 
differences due to different upbringings, not cultures as much. My husband is a 
Republican, and we had similar religious views. For the most part, it was like I found my 
soulmate.” 
Abigail (f/e) met her husband online, they dated for three years before getting married in 
2013: “Except for the money questions, my husband and I do not have any differences. He views 
the family budget as a sum of equal inputs from a husband and a wife. I still expect him to make 
the majority of our payments like mortgage and the utilities. In Russia men usually pay for things 
like that.” 
Stephanie’s (f/e) husband expects her to do as much as he does. It bothers her sometimes 
because she does not mind him stepping in to help her: “Russian men are more attentive 
compared to American men. For example, last time we were in Moscow, my husband and I both 
carried heavy bags. He was waiting for me down the stairs to a metro station when a young man 
stopped and offered to help me with my luggage while my husband just stood there waiting. He 
did not think about helping me to carry my luggage downstairs. It is a different mentality.” 
Alisa (f/e) shared that she is more straightforward compared to her husband and 
sometimes he perceives it as arrogance. According to Elena (f/e), her husband is individualistic 
and keeps it to himself while she is more communicable and makes friends easily. For Margarita 
(f/ne), in the beginning, it was difficult to understand her husband’s reasoning:   
“For my husband, it is important to follow the rules while I sometimes find them 
unnecessary and easy to avoid. In general, we were raised in different conditions, so we 
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are different. At the same time, we have some things in common. Otherwise, we would not 
be married.”   
Sveta (f/e), whose husband is Hispanic, is a responsible one in their marriage:  
“If I cannot afford something, I will not get it even if I really want it while he has 
no problem with having debt. Unlike him, I cannot come to a birthday party without a 
gift, and I cannot invite people over and ask them to bring their own drinks. Nevertheless, 
I chose to marry a Hispanic guy because I feel their family values are closer to ours.” 
Kristina (f/e) met her husband in Russia: “before we met, my husband lived in Russia for 
seven years. He is very ‘Russified.’ He thinks that there are more freedoms in Russia because 
you can go outside and do what you want at any time. He likes BBQing, and he likes that in 
Russia you can go to a park and cook your meal. In the US you can do it only in certain areas. 
Since we came to the US, I started to see differences in our opinions; it was not like that when we 
were in Russia.” 
Russian men do not seem to be as open to cross-cultural marriages. This tendency is not 
unique to my sample. There are many Russian men (and some are very famous) who live in the 
US but have Russian spouses. The most famous examples include hockey players Pavel Bure 
(The New York Rangers, retired) and Alexander Ovechkin (Washington Capitals). The former 
married a Russian model Alina Khasanova in 2009, and the latter married the daughter of a 
famous Russian actress, Vera Glagoleva, in July 2017. Furthermore, Tampa’s very own Tampa 
Bay Lightning players Andrei Vasilevsky and Nikita Kucherov are both married to fellow 
Russians.    
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Why do Russian men prefer to marry Russian or Russian-speaking women? I received a 
variety of explanations from my male respondents. For example, John (m/e), who is divorcing 
his American wife, argued that American women act like consumers when they are in romantic 
relations:  
“They think a man has to provide for them. My wife did not want to do anything. 
She wanted to sit at home and do nothing but shopping. She did not even want to have 
children. Russian women are loyal - they would never betray. American women are 
individualistic and look out only for themselves.” 
Bill (m/e), who is currently single, admits he would not mind dating an American girl, 
but “it would be easier to date a Russian because we have the same mentality. I think it is about 
cartoons you are watching while growing up. Our cartoons are like social codes; they are part 
of our upbringing. It is easier to get along with someone who grew up watching the same 
cartoons.” While this is an interesting theory, it is not plausible since Russian women often 
marry American men despite their exposure to different types of cartoons.   
Timur (m/e) is dating an American woman but admits he would probably understand a 
Russian girl better. “Russian guys tend to marry either Russian or foreign girls, but not 
American. One possible reason is that there is a selection bias, partly it is cultural: they have 
different priorities.” 
Andrei (m/ne) who emigrated from Russia together with his wife, Lukeria (f/ne), was 
very categorical about cross-cultural marriages:  
“In any case, a marriage between a Russian and an American would not work. 
Even if there are a lot of Russian women who are married to Americans, their marriages 
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will not last: sooner or later they will end up in a divorce. You cannot escape differences 
in mentalities. They will bury any marriage, no matter how strong it might seem!” 
Overall, Russian women acknowledge there are some cultural differences between them 
and their American husbands, but it does not stop them from having good marriages. They tend 
to overlook the differences and concentrate on something they have in common. Men seem to be 
more intolerant of the idea and unwilling to look past cultural differences. 
5.2.4. How do they compare to other immigrants? 
There isn’t a lot of information about the social interactions of recent Eastern European 
immigrants. Michalikova mentioned relations with neighbors which are typically weak between 
Eastern Europeans and Americans. “Immigrants from Poland, Russia, and Ukraine tended to talk 
to their neighbors ‘few times a week,’ but they were unlikely to do favors for neighbors” 
(Michalikova, 2017, p. 161). Eastern European males are less likely to interact with their 
American neighbors than females. Married couples tend to interact more often with their 
immediate surroundings (Ibid., pp. 162-165). Gitelman talked about social experiences of Soviet 
Jews in Israel where they struggled to befriend locals claiming that Israelis do not like close 
contacts or friendships (Gitelman, 1982, p. 141). Gitelman theorized that compared to American 
Jewish immigrants, their Soviet counterparts were not as affluent in Hebrew and had lower social 
statuses. These characteristics in addition to having higher expectations of their social lives in 
immigration prevented Soviet immigrants from developing stronger social bonds with the natives 
(Ibid., p. 152). Russian Jewish immigrants in the US, according to Morawska, were absorbed 
into local American Jewish communities. Their settlements patterns and socialization processes 
were predetermined by the assisting ethnic agencies. Recognizing themselves as members of 
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American Jewish ethnic groups was a matter of prestige since those are highly successful and 
recognizable social groups (Morawska, 2004, p. 1389; E. T. Morawska, 2009, p. 132).   
The overall impression is that immigrants from Eastern Europe (present and past) have 
limited social circles that include either their own group or larger ethnic community (American 
Jews). In the case of ethnic-Russians in Central and South Florida, their social circles 
predominantly consist of Russian-speaking immigrants from former Soviet republics. Few of 
them had mentioned difficulties befriending Americans due to cultural differences and interests. 
Inability to venture outside of ethnic social circles might indicate a certain inferiority complex 
typical for immigrant groups. In case of Eastern Europeans, they were economically and 
culturally isolated by the Iron Curtain for 70 years. For generations, they existed in their own 
social and economic realities which affected their perceptions of societal norms. This same 
isolation led to weak or nonexistent social capital in the US compared to other immigrants 
groups. Also, they tend to be too humble and lack self-confidence (Michalikova, 2017, p. 120).   
5.3. Immigrants’ identification and satisfaction 
Immigrant identification can be analyzed from different angles. For example, Ludmila 
Isurin addressed immigrants’ identification through their sense of belonging and the way they 
talked about home and which country they called ‘home’ (Isurin, 2011, p. 168). In my study, 
each respondent was asked to identify as a Russian or an American. Table 5.3 shows the 
summary of their replies. 
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Table 5.3 Immigrants Identification 
What is your identity? Respondents 
I will always be Russian John (m/e) 
Bill (m/e) 
Valentin (m/e) 
Ivan (m/e) 
Semion (m/ne) 
Aristarch (m/ne) 
Alexey (m/ne) 
Vlad (m/ne) 
Aleksandr (m/ne) 
Pavel (m/ne) 
Nikita (m/ne) 
Yaroslava (f/e) 
Sveta (f/e) 
Katya (f/e) 
Victoria (f/e) 
Maria (f/e) 
Belka (f/ne) 
Marianna (f/ne) 
Chepe (f/ne) 
Lukeria (f/ne) 
Olga (f/ne) 
Tapolina (f/ne) 
Margarita (f/ne) 
I am an American Yuri (m/e) 
I am both a Russian and an American Jason (m/e) 
Andrei (m/ne) 
Stephanie (f/e) 
Rina (f/e) 
Anna (f/ne) 
Already not a Russian, but not yet an American Abigail (f/e) 
Alisa (f/e) 
Kristina (f/e) 
Sessi (f/e) 
Marina (f/ne) 
Alevtina (f/ne) 
I am cosmopolitan 
 
I am just a human 
I am a child of God 
Timur (m/e) 
Nick (m/e) 
Yana (f/e) 
Elena (f/e) 
I consider myself a Ukrainian Korina (f/ne) 
Twenty-three respondents (eleven men and twelve women), or 57.5 percent of the 
sample, identify themselves as Russians. Yuri (m/e) is the only respondent who identified 
116 
 
himself as an American. Identifying as both or neither depends on citizenship status. The most 
original group consists of respondents who identify with either a global society (Timur and 
Nick), a biological species (Yana), or a religious belief (Elena). All four are fully integrated into 
American society and, as all of them admitted, had never experienced difficulties fitting in. They 
speak English and work for American companies. Timur and Nick received their college 
education in the US. Nevertheless, they do not attach themselves to a particular country. It could 
be the evidence of globalization that makes borders transparent and blurs cultural and social 
differences among people from different continents.      
While identifying as Russians, John (m/e), Yaroslava (f/e), and Sveta (f/e) admitted they 
had Americanized in some aspects:  
“After 12 years in America, I feel partially Americanized. Just like Americans, I 
do not like to listen to people’s problems, and I like to interact with people of my level” 
(John); “I am Americanized in some aspects: I do not put on heels and makeup for a 
shopping trip to Walmart. When I visited my mom in Russia, she refused to go to a 
market with me unless I apply some mascara and put on a nice dress” (Sveta); “I am 
Americanized. I will not be able to live in Russia anymore. I like my lifestyle here” 
(Yaroslava).  
For Abigail (f/e), who identified as neither Russian nor American, Americanization is a 
path that leads to a new identity: “Americans smile and have small talk with strangers. It was 
something I had to get used to, but now I do the same thing.” 
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According to the overall responses, nineteen respondents, or 47.5 percent of the sample, 
are satisfied with their lives in the United States. Table 5.4 breaks down the group of satisfied 
immigrants by gender and language skills. 
Table 5.4 Satisfied immigrants by groups 
Respondents with a high satisfaction level 
Males, speak English Males, no English Females, speak English Females, no English 
Timur  
Yuri 
Nick 
John 
Bill 
Jason 
Valentin 
Aleksandr Abigail 
Alisa 
Sessi 
Rina 
Victoria 
Elena 
Yana  
Katya 
Margarita 
Anna 
Marina  
All men who speak English are satisfied with their lives in the US. In comparison, only 
one out of nine men who do not speak English is satisfied. A similar tendency can be seen with 
the ladies: over half of those who speak English are happy. Three out of eleven women who do 
not speak English are glad they moved to the US. Those who speak English are more 
comfortable and feel more accomplished in their new country.    
5.4. Summary 
This chapter covered economic and social aspects of immigration. Respondents identified 
both strengths and weaknesses of employment, education, healthcare, and welfare in the United 
States. They also talked about the challenges every immigrant faces after coming to America. 
The most common problems were to find employment and get used to expensive healthcare. 
While talking about shortcomings of life in the US, respondents did not make any parallels 
between their criticisms and those of any American political institution such as political parties. 
On a positive note, the American infrastructure and the service sector is much more developed 
(compare to the one in Russia) and designed with people’s comfort in mind. Russian immigrants 
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are very appreciative of it. Only few respondents have American friends, and many agree that 
Russians and Americans perceive friendship differently: Russians consider friends as parts of 
their families, while Americans separate friends and family members. Russian women are more 
open to marrying Americans. Russian men prefer to marry Russian or Russian-speaking women 
only.  
Despite living in the US, most of the sample (57.5%) identifies as Russians with a small 
number of respondents admitting to their Americanization. The overall immigration satisfaction 
rate is 47.5%. Respondents who speak English tend to be more satisfied with their lives in the 
US.       
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Chapter 6 Theoretical Modeling  
This chapter answers the research question #1: What political socialization agencies are 
the most popular and the most effective with Russian immigrants? Based on my data, I 
developed a model of political resocialization which consists of general factors (legal status and 
output structures), triggers (language proficiency, spousal support, and parenting), and main 
political socialization agencies (ESOL classes, a spouse, volunteering, and the church). Each of 
the components plays a certain role in the process of political socialization. The model 
incorporates the most common triggers and agencies mentioned by respondents.  
6.1. A brief note on a Grounded Theory-building 
A qualitative inquiry, while it deals with a small number of cases, attempts to shed the 
light on big social phenomena. The main priority of a qualitative approach is to understand in 
detail unique social patterns as opposed to generalizable ones. Qualitative “theories do not 
suggest how to explain this or that phenomenon, but they provide different viewpoints to social 
reality” (Alasuutari, 1996, p. 372). The constructivist grounded theory analyzes data through 
interaction. It is a process were all the generalizations are partial, conditional, and situated in 
time and space. It acknowledges the subjective nature of interaction and data analysis. “The 
theory depends on the researcher’s view; it does not and cannot stand outside of it” (Charmaz, 
2014, p. 239). Constructivist grounded theories serve as frames to look at the reality but do not 
claim to have a power of generalization. “We build from specifics and move to general 
statements while situating them in the context of their construction” (Ibid., p. 232). Such an 
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approach leaves some room for interpretation and considers researcher's involvement and 
judgment.  
6.2. A theoretical model of the political re-socialization process 
According to Michael Riccards, there are three kinds of learning: situational, social, and 
symbolic. The latter one is exclusive to humans and “characterized by the development, 
aggregation, and manipulation of symbolic forms and representations. It is at this stage that 
knowledge is codified and passed on; the foundation of culture itself is laid down”. (Riccards, 
1973, p. 7). Political socialization is an example of a symbolic learning. For this study, I used 
Riccards’s definition of political socialization: “the inculcation in the uninitiated of those 
attitudes, beliefs, and values which explain the political world” (Ibid., p. 8).  
Based on the obtained data, I developed the following theoretical model (see Figure 6.1.). 
It consists of a starting point, output structures, triggers, and agencies of political socialization 
experienced by the respondents.  
 
Figure 6.1 A visual model of political resocialization of first-generation ethnic Russian immigrants 
in the United States. 
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It is a process model. For everyone in my sample, permanent legal status in the US was 
the initial step of their political socialization. It does not mean that other forms of adaptation 
were stalled while securing a permanent residence. Just the reverse: an economic and social 
integration came first as looking for a job and making necessary connections were prioritized 
over developing political opinions.  
Establishing a permanent legal status does not automatically lead to the development of 
political interests either. Data shows that certain triggers can ignite an interest in politics. I have 
identified three such triggers: language proficiency (makes it more likely to get exposure to a 
political discourse), spousal support (discussions with and encouragements from a spouse), and 
parenting (the desire to learn as much as possible about the host country for their children’s 
sake). These triggers encourage immigrants to search for sources and outlets of knowledge 
which, in turn, serve as political socialization agencies.  
The most popular and effective political socialization agencies identified in this study are 
ESOL classes, a spouse, volunteering opportunities, and churches. Finally, there is an additional 
process of political socialization – exposure to bureaucratic institutions and political system 
(output structures). It starts upon arrival to the United States and never stops. Every respondent is 
familiar with a variety of output structures regardless of their exposure to other socialization 
agencies. In this theoretical model, I propose it as a parallel process. Also, political socialization 
does not occur in isolation from other forms of immigrant adaptation. Some or all of the 
mentioned agencies are simultaneously used for cultural, social, and economic adaptations. 
In the following subsections, I will elaborate on the elements of the proposed theoretical 
model, starting with the legal status.  
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6.3. Legal status 
A legal permanent status in the United States serves as the starting point of an immigrant 
political socialization process. In chapter 4 I classified respondents based on their modes of entry 
to the US. Those who arrived to rejoin their families or after winning a Green Card did not have 
to worry about the legality and duration of their stay. Their adaptation and integration went 
smoothly because permanent status makes them feel secure about their future. As for the rest of 
the respondents, obtaining a legal status became one of the main priorities.  The sense of 
uncertainty that accompanies the process prevents immigrants from political socialization 
because, compared to economic and social adaptations, it is not an immediate need. Only after 
gaining all appropriate documents, respondents felt they could expand their knowledge about the 
US political system and develop their own political opinions. With that said, all respondents in 
this study entered the United States legally. Some overstayed their visas but, eventually, all of 
them acquired a legal status (Green Card and, eventually, citizenship).  
Consider the following responses. John (m/e) came to the US as a tourist but intended to 
stay:  
“I arrived in New York, and my friend took me to a Russian diner where she 
worked. It was a shock! It was located on a dark street with broken cars on sidewalks and 
no street lights. Some houses had no doors and others had nailed windows and doors. 
The neighborhood looked rough. The diner itself was dirty and foggy. My friend was in 
the US illegally, and it was good enough for her. That day I realized my dire situation – I 
was in a foreign country with no language and no prospects. I started panicking and 
thinking about what to do next.”  
John later was admitted to a college but had to work hard to keep his grades up as it was 
the only way to maintain a legal status. He was under constant pressure and had no time to think 
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about anything else. John received his Master’s in Finance and is now a respected specialist in 
his field. He is very proud of his achievements. It also seems that he spent a lot of effort to 
reassure himself he deserves to be in the US and that he belongs here. After he obtained his 
permanent resident status, he relaxed and started paying more attention to his environment 
including a political discourse.  
Sveta (f/e) and Anna (f/ne) both admitted being afraid to do simple things after they 
overstayed their non-immigrant visas. Sveta came to the US on a J-1 visa for the Work and 
Travel program and stayed after her visa expired: “I was afraid of many things, some of them 
were ordinary: calling an insurance company or going to a bank. Thinking about it now: what 
was I afraid of?” Anna had a tourist visa which she used to visit her boyfriend in the US. When 
she got pregnant, she stayed, got married, and eventually applied for a Green Card. She had a 
feeling she did not do it the right way: “I was afraid of everything for six months. I was afraid to 
ask things in stores, getting lost and needing to ask someone for directions.” Fear of being 
caught after they overstayed their visas prevented Sveta and Anna from learning about their new 
economic, social, and political surroundings. Both admitted they did not feel it was their place to 
seek information and form opinions about American politics.  
Katya (f/e) spent a lot of time and effort acquiring her working visa after she graduated 
from college: “I wanted to stay in the US. I took OPT [Optional Training year] twice. I tried to 
get an H1-B visa, but it is very difficult to apply for a work visa. Moreover, my position was not 
specialized enough. Later I received a P1 visa, which was easier to get.” She was so busy with 
visa applications that she did not pay any attention to the 2012 US Presidential elections.   
Marina (f/ne) stayed in the country illegally for over a year:  
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“My boyfriend and I came here as students on J-1 visas… We decided to stay for 
one year. After a year had passed, we were surrounded by people who lived in the US 
illegally for ten-fifteen years. I was afraid we would get stuck among those people. We 
applied for a Green Card, and I won. We had to go back to Russia to claim it. We were 
terrified to leave our house and a car. The trip was unavoidable, and we spent seven 
grueling months not knowing what was going to happen to us.”  
Sveta, Anna, Katya, and Marina all mentioned that they did not think about anything 
long-term before becoming permanent residents. They tried not to make plans or get attached to 
anything. To politically socialize in a host society, they needed to belong. These respondents did 
not feel it was their place to get involved in the American political process.  
On the other hand, people who came to the US as permanent residents did not experience 
such insecurities. Nick (m/e) had no difficulties and felt at home right away: “I followed my 
parents here. Initially, I wanted to go to college in the US, get my degree, and return to Russia. I 
was able to blend in right away. I quickly made friends and even became a math tutor during my 
first year of college.” Pavel (m/ne) speaks very poor English, but it was never a concern. Pavel is 
very critical of the US and, based on my observations during the interview; he does not see a 
point in compromising his principles to fit in. Pavel received his Green Card at the airport upon 
arrival to the US and had never experienced any insecurities. He critically assesses the US and its 
political system and shares his opinions without feeling inadequate. Alisa (f/e) came to the US 
after she got married to an American man and she feels the same way. She did not know English 
very well but felt no pressure to study it: “I am still working on it, but not obsessing.” She feels 
secure and free to do things that interest her. Almost immediately, Alisa developed a wide 
network of friends that included both Americans (through her husband) and Russian-speakers. 
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Even though she is never eager to initiate a political dispute, she can participate in a discussion 
without feeling out of place.    
  Having a permanent legal status in the US does not automatically mean that an 
immigrant is more inclined to engage in his/her host society politically. It simply puts them into 
a more appropriate position to do so. The sense of belonging and acceptance is important to 
everyone in the sample. Yaroslava (f/e), a Green Card holder, thinks it is not appropriate for 
immigrants to have an opinion about American politics unless they lived in the US for a long 
period: “As immigrants, we need to concentrate on our children and their future. I do not think 
immigrants should have an opinion about something they did not experience or know little 
about.” Yaroslava considers political participation as a privilege that one can gain only after 
finishing economic and social integration into the US society and gaining citizenship.   
Legal status is an important foundation of the political socialization process. Political 
socialization might not start at all without it. For example, Vlad (m/ne) is in the process of 
getting his Green Card, but he wants to apply for citizenship as soon as he is eligible: “I want to 
apply for the US citizenship because a Green Card can be revoked, I know many examples.” It is 
evident that respondents need to feel secure about their status in the US. With the sense of 
security comes curiosity about different aspects of the host society, including politics.  
6.4. Political socialization triggers 
The next three blocks in Figure 6.1. (‘English Proficiency,' ‘Spousal Support,' and 
‘Parenting’) act as triggers of political socialization. They are not agencies themselves. Instead, 
they serve as helpful, encouraging and sometimes, pressing conditions to start socializing 
politically.   
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6.4.1. English language proficiency 
Knowing the language makes it much easier to get familiar with a host environment. 
Consider Aristarch (m/ne) and Yaroslava (f/e), a married couple. They moved to the US in 2011 
after winning in the Green Card lottery. Aristarch does not speak English and feels very 
uncomfortable: “I have a very limited circle of people I talk to – only Russian speakers. It is very 
difficult to communicate with others. Immigrants who speak English sometimes make fun of me. I 
feel isolated precisely because I cannot communicate freely with everyone. For example, I 
cannot go to a bank and properly explain what I need.” Aristarch is very knowledgeable about 
Russian politics. He was born in Grozny and has a strong, educated opinion about the two 
Chechen wars. He shared his thoughts about Russia’s political and economic situation, 
emphasizing that the 2008 financial crisis became the main reason to emigrate from Russia. In 
the US though, Aristarch is a stay-at-home dad and depends on his wife for everything. His 
world had considerably shrunk as he has no exposure to economic, social, or political aspects of 
his environment. He stated several times during our interview that he has no interest in anything 
but his family.  
Yaroslava (f/e), on the other hand, is a very busy esthetician with jobs in several beauty 
spas. She is out most of the day while Aristarch is at home with their small children. Yaroslava 
and Aristarch talk about their life in the US but come to different conclusions: “we have different 
social circles – he communicates with Russians, and I interact mostly with Americans. I have a 
better understanding of the political process in the US.” Yaroslava acts as the head of the 
household and deals with bureaucratic agencies, utility bills, insurances, etc. She has a lot of 
constructive criticism for the US social and administrative systems:  
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“It is a country of many opportunities, but many things need to be fixed like 
unemployment security and maternal benefits. There are no public daycare centers. 
There is no incentive to work because it will be probably cheaper for me to stay at home 
caring for my children. People who work in bureaucratic institutions are not very smart – 
they do not even know the state law properly.”  
Aristarch did not offer any criticism: “I only have good things to say about this country: 
it gives you an opportunity, all you need to do is take it.” Aristarch does not speak English and 
suffers from occasional harassment because of it. Nevertheless, he thinks that his life in the US is 
better and more secure than in Russia. He is hopeful there are plenty of opportunities for him. 
His American dream did not shutter. He has no exposure to any political socialization agencies. 
As follows, he still operates with preconceived impressions of the US. His description of 
America remains consistent with the one he had before coming to the US. Yaroslava, on the 
other hand, told me that not everything she imagined she saw in real life. Aristarch and 
Yaroslava evaluate their common American life based on daily interactions, and they paint two 
very different pictures of America.  
 If an immigrant does not know the language of a host society, it becomes one of the 
main obstacles to his or her comfort level and, especially, to his/her political socialization. 
Knowing the language of the host society is crucial when attempting to learn about the political 
environment with its many nuances. Those who do not speak English either become more 
isolated or suffer from ill-conceived jokes and harassment.   
On average, 85 percent of new Eastern European immigrants have some knowledge of 
English. Eastern European women are more proficient in English compared to their male 
counterparts (Michalikova, 2017, p. 63). Among the three largest Eastern European groups of 
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immigrants (Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian), Russian immigrants are the most proficient in 
English, while Ukrainians are more inclined to use their native language (Ibid., p. 89). 
6.4.2. A Spousal Support 
More than half of women (13 out of 24) in my sample came to the US because they got 
married. Several women stated their husbands are very supportive and encouraging when it 
comes to political adaptation in the US. Rina (f/e) is very happy in her marriage, her husband 
makes her feel safe and encourages her in every way.  
“My husband is the best thing that ever happened to me. He pushes my limits, he 
challenges me but never criticizes. I spoke very elementary English when I came, and he 
was very patient with me at first. After some time had passed, he started encouraging me 
to do little things like answering our house phone by myself. Thanks to his 
encouragement, I started learning about American politics. I was very curious, and he 
was always very patient with all my questions. He explained to me about everything: 
from American state architecture to bi-partisanship.”  
Rina developed an interest in American history and politics because of her husband’s 
encouragement. Similarly, Stephanie (f/e) said that her husband is always willing to have a 
political discussion but had never imposed his opinions on her: “My political opinions had just 
recently formed when I learned the difference between Republicans and Democrats. My husband 
explained the difference between them only when I asked. We have different opinions about 
politics in Russia, and in the US, we like to discuss it, but we never argue.” Stephanie’s husband 
helped her to make sense of American politics without imposing his views. She emphasized that 
she formed her own opinion with his help and encouragement.  
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Olga (f/ne) and Marianna (f/ne) are examples of an opposite situation. Both know little 
about American politics and both mentioned that their husbands do not talk about politics at all.  
Olga shared: “we talk about international developments and how it affects relations between the 
US and Russia. My husband likes Putin, and we agree there. He watches news about presidential 
elections, but he does not share it with me, and I do not ask, it is not interesting to me.”  
Marianna stated that her husband is apolitical: “I am not sure about his political party affiliation, 
we do not talk about it. We usually do not talk about politics. We discussed some of the 
developments between Ukraine and Russia in 2014, but it did not last. I am not even sure what 
he currently thinks about Russia.” 
Olga’s husband is an American and Marianna’s husband emigrated from Russia in the 
early 2000s. Both women do not interact with Americans because they do not speak English very 
well. While Rina (f/e) and Stephanie (f/e) developed opinions about American politics, Olga and 
Marianna had no knowledge of the US political system and did not express any interest in its 
political process. Part of it could be attributed to their personalities, but some of it depends on 
their surroundings, including their husbands. Olga’s husband does not share his thoughts about 
politics and Marianna’s husband is not interested in politics altogether. All four women stated 
that they spend most of their time with their husbands. A political learning for Rina (f/e) and 
Stephanie (f/e) started with their husbands’ encouragement. Olga (f/ne) and Marianna (f/ne) 
lacked such encouragement, and it affected their interest in and knowledge about American 
politics. Spousal support is a crucial trigger that can inspire an immigrant to learn more about 
politics.  
Michalikova indicated that Eastern European women are more eager to naturalize in the 
United States if they are married to Americans: “having a spouse and children multiplies the 
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avenues for contact with American society” (Michalikova, 2017, p. 190). Being married to an 
American-born individual exposes an immigrant to a new social circle which can also trigger 
interest in politics if those social circles are politically active or hold strong political opinions.  
6.4.3. Parenting 
Being a parent is a very challenging task. Being an immigrant parent adds some extra 
concerns. Parenting serves as a trigger to encourage immigrants to adapt and learn as much as 
they can about their new home. Several respondents in my sample have small children. Aristarch 
(m/ne) and Yaroslava (f/e) have a son who was born in Russia and a daughter born in the US. 
Aristarch mentioned that even though he does not feel comfortable in the US, he intends to stay 
for his family’s sake: “I want to stay here and apply for citizenship because my children will 
have a better future in the US.” He tries to do his best to provide for his family. Recently, he 
created his contracting firm and even asked some Americans to help make his company more 
appealing. “They helped me to pick my company’s name and gave some tips on the nuances of 
business in Florida, and on how Americans process information and their preferences when it 
comes to hiring a contractor.” Aristarch tries to provide for his family and learn about 
Americans and their preferences. It is an effort that he would probably not make if he did not 
have children. Being a parent forces you to have long-term plans that include learning as much 
as possible about your surroundings.   
Nikita (m/ne) is in a very similar situation: his wife won a Green Card, and they moved to 
the US. He does not speak English, but he is the only provider in his family: “between my wife 
and I, we have to take care of our child, she does not go to a daycare, so someone has to stay at 
home with her.” Nikita delivers pizzas. The restaurant he works at is his only socialization 
agency. Talking to people at work helped him to get used to the language. Now it limits him and 
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serves as a ceiling for his growth. “Maybe in the future, it will get a better job, I just need to 
learn the language.” Nikita is under pressure to provide for his family. If he is not working, he 
spends time with his daughter; there is no time for anything else. He tries his best to learn the 
language so he can be a more eloquent parent and a good example for his daughter. Among other 
things, Nikita tried to talk to his co-workers about politics, especially ahead of the 2016 
Presidential elections, but no one is interested in politics enough to give him any input.  
Sessi (f/e) is a single mom. She came to the US to reunite with her parents. She has two 
younger siblings. Sessi was pregnant when she emigrated from Russia. “My child was born here. 
I have some assistance from the government. I save a lot of money on his clothes; I get food 
stamps, I get financial aid to go to school.” Sessi tries to be a good mother and provide for her 
child, she goes to college and works at a bar at nights. “I want to concentrate on my studies and 
my English – I want to speak on the academic level so I would not feel like a stupid idiot. I 
started reaching out to people outside of a usual bar environment. I read many books, and I dive 
into the language and culture deeper and deeper.” Sessi does it for two reasons – to provide for 
her son and immerse into American life. Her son is an American. As he grows up, he will get 
more exposure outside of his family, Sessi wants to make sure she could relate to her son as he 
grows older. “I look at my son who was born here, my sister who came here at the age of six, and 
my brother who was only two years old upon arrival – they are all different. I think exposure to 
American values and mentality manifests in their personalities. The younger you were when you 
moved to the US, the less visible are your differences from the American kids.” Sessi wants to 
learn as much as she can about the United States, including its political structure and process. 
She entered a college, and it is her main agency of political socialization. She also befriended 
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two Americans who are very savvy in American politics. It is obvious Sessi is under a lot of 
pressure to become an American herself because of her American child.    
Marina (f/ne) has two children; both were born in the US. She believes it is easier to 
provide for a family in the US because of its high living standards. When our conversation took 
place, she was awaiting her citizenship interview. She considers the US her home: “my children 
will live here, and I want to be next to them and, in time, next to my grandchildren.” Marina’s 
children are her greatest motivation to integrate into American society so she could be the person 
to guide her children through their lives. She wants to know as much as possible about the US, 
including its economic and political systems, to be able to explain it all to her children as they 
grow.   
Parenting seems to be a powerful stimulus for immigrant parents to learn the language 
and to socialize. The two main reasons are: to provide for their children and to be able to relate to 
them as they grow older - to be an organic part of their social and civic environments.  
6.5. Political socialization agencies 
So far, we’ve discussed the conditions that either make it easy and comfortable or force 
you to politically socialize in a host society. According to my findings, legal status is a starting 
point to a successful political socialization. English language proficiency, a supportive spouse, 
and parenting are all triggers that encourage an immigrant to actively pursue political 
socialization. What are the most effective agencies of political socialization? In my sample, I 
found four agencies that helped multiple respondents to learn about and start participating in the 
political process in the United States. These agencies are ‘ESOL classes,' ‘a spouse,’ 
‘volunteering in public organizations,' and ‘an English-speaking church.' 
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  6.5.1. ESOL classes 
The Hillsborough County Public Schools website provides the following description of 
the ESOL class: “This course is for adult students whose first language is not English. English 
Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) classes are designed to teach students to listen, speak, read 
and write in English, and life skills. The goal is to prepare students to use English in their 
everyday lives. Also, this course supports and directs adult students toward career pathways that 
can lead to technical careers, colleges, and universities.”18 An ESOL class is an affordable option 
to learn English, meet other people, and get exposure to American culture and history. Ten 
respondents, or 25% of the sample, took ESOL classes at least for one semester: Nikita (m/ne), 
Aleksandr (m/ne), Pavel (m/ne), Ivan (m/ne), Rina (f/e), Maria (f/e), Anna (f/ne), Margarita 
(f/ne), Belka (f/ne), and Marina (f/ne). A considerable learning success in a class depended on 
time availability and a teacher. For example, Aleksandr (m/ne) went only a few times – he did 
not like how his class was organized. Rina (f/e) and Margarita (f/ne) both took multiple 
semesters with different teachers until they found one they appreciated the most. At first, 
Margarita took ESOL classes to learn English, but she gained much more from it:  
 “For the past two years, I was going to school to learn the language. I was lucky 
to get a very good teacher who taught us a lot about American history and holidays. 
Today I know a lot about the United States, and I feel proud to live in such a great 
country. I am proud of the American history. I admire the Founding Fathers who were 
able to organize such a great country in a short period.”   
ESOL classes provided a lot of information about American history and political 
structure. For Margarita, it was a perfect combination of a language and civic education. It 
                                                          
18 Http://www2.sdhc.k12.fl.us/lynx 
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became her most prominent political socialization agency. If she were to learn English any other 
way, she would not be as proud and grateful for the US political structure.  
Pavel (m/ne) took ESOL classes for a year and a half. He admitted that sometimes he was 
overwhelmed with the diversity in classrooms:  
“My classmates were of different ages and nationalities. Some of them did not 
make any sense, and I felt like an expert of English language compared to them. I liked 
the ‘culture days’ when we all had to share something of our own and discuss the 
American culture altogether. It helped me to get comfortable with the language and use it 
without hesitation.”  
Classroom diversity exposes students to American heterogeneity and ethnic composition. 
After experiencing ethnic and national diversity in ESOL classrooms, Pavel realized that the US 
is a very complex and multicultural country. It prompted his interest in public policies 
concerning cross-ethnic interactions on local and state levels.     
Rina (f/e) came to the US with very elementary English. Today she speaks well thanks to 
her husband’s support and ESOL classes.  
“I took ESOL classes for two years, went to three different schools and was able 
to compare several teachers. Living in the US without knowing English was not an option 
for me. I started to understand the American political system thanks to ESOL classes. We 
had classes that talked specifically about the structure of the American government – 
they prepared people for citizenship tests. Every time there was a national holiday, we 
had discussions about it. It allowed me to compare American and Russian systems. I 
learned about important parts of American history. I dealt with some immigrants from 
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Odessa, and I had a hard time understanding why they do not want to familiarize 
themselves with America. ESOL classes are such a convenient way to do it.” 
ESOL classes improved Rina’s language skills, provided information about the American 
political system and civil society, and encouraged to get a business coach license.  
Belka (f/ne) attended ESOL classes as well. After completing several semesters, she 
“gained a lot of respect for the American educational system. There are so many resources to 
help a student in any way possible.” ESOL classes encouraged Belka to enter a nursing school. 
She also became aware of multiple civil opportunities like volunteering at her local City Hall.   
ESOL class is one of the most accessible socialization agencies, and people who took 
advantage of them learn not only how to speak English but also about American history, 
geography, culture, and its governmental structure. The idea and mechanism of ESOL classes are 
similar to those of the Na’aleh project implemented in Israel in the 1990s during the second big 
wave of immigration from the Former Soviet Union. ESOL education could be considered a 
simplified version of Na’aleh project that combined “ideological mandate as a national project of 
the absorption of newcomers, along with its ‘therapeutic policy of absorption’ intended to grant a 
sense of belonging, identity backing and support” (Plotkin-Amrami, 2008, p. 742). At the same 
time, while Na’aleh was developed for adolescence, ESOL curriculum is developed for people of 
all ages. In my sample, people that benefitted from ESOL classes the most were Belka (f/ne), 
Margarita (f/ne), and Rina (f/e). They emigrated from Russia at ages 37, 40, and 46 respectively. 
As follows, ESOL classes are effective at providing language and civic education to people of 
any age and proficiency level. 
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6.5.2. A Spouse 
  Spousal support was identified as one of the political socialization triggers. It is true in 
situations when spouses encourage curiosity about American politics and help his/her partner to 
develop their own political opinions. Husbands and wives often have similar political 
preferences. It is usually the result of ‘assortative mating’ or having similar political 
‘inheritances.’ The former implies that people select their mates based on several factors 
including homogenous political views. The latter suggests that people interested in similar things 
will eventually develop similar preferences in other aspects of their lives. In this case, the 
spouses themselves become political socialization agents and influence their partners to achieve 
political homogeneity (Weiner, 1978, p. 209). In my sample Abigail (f/e) and her American 
husband seem to fit into the first category: “After coming to the US, my liberal views had 
morphed into a more conservative political outlook. But I did not change my views because of 
our marriage. In fact, we are very alike regarding politics. We tend to agree with each other on 
many political topics.”  
Victoria (f/e) and her husband ground their political inclinations in religion. They met in 
a church as both are religious and devoted individuals. Eventually, they synchronized their 
political preferences based on their religious believes. They fit into a second category proposed 
by Terry Weiner “My husband is a Republican. I also identify as a Republican. I will never vote 
for Democrats because some of their views contradict mine. I am pro-life, I believe that a child is 
a human being at the conception. I support capitalism, not socialism. My political views became 
more conservative. I think it is because of my religious believes. Also, I have children, so 
parenting made me more conservative as well.”  
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At the same time, there are several people in my study (all women) who adopted political 
preferences of their spouses: Alisa (f/e), Katya (f/e), Victoria (f/e), Elena (f/e), Margarita (f/ne), 
Anna (f/ne), Belka (f/ne), and Korina (f/ne). The total of eight respondents, or 20% of the 
sample, adopted the political preferences of their spouses. Alisa (f/e) and Margarita (f/ne) do not 
care about politics because it is not interesting. At the same time, they both admitted to copying 
political opinions of their husbands. Alisa: “I am pretty much apolitical. I just accept whatever 
political views my husband has. He is a man; he was born here, so he has to have some strong 
political opinions.” Margarita (f/ne) thinks that she needs to accept not only her husband’s views 
but also support them:  
“He is my husband, and I need to support him. I changed some of my views under 
his influence. For example, I was a little concerned about the gun ownership law at first. 
My husband is much in favor of this law because it allows him to feel like a man and a 
protector of his family. Now I agree with him: it is a little scary but probably necessary.” 
For Alisa and Margarita, first, men have to have political views; and second, a good wife 
must support those views.  
Anna (f/ne), Belka (f/ne), Korina (f/ne), Elena (f/e), and Katya (f/e) adopted political 
views of their husbands for different reasons: all of them described their husbands as smart, 
savvy, and educated. Anna and Belka are married to long-term immigrants from Russia; Korina 
is married to a Ukrainian immigrant; Elena and Katya are married to Americans. In all cases, 
husbands lived in the US much longer than their wives, and this seems to be the main source of 
their credibility. Consider the following responses:  
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“My husband is originally from South Africa and came to the US when he was 
very young. He travels a lot for his job, and he is very cosmopolitan. He is very smart, 
and he enlightens me about politics. I trust his judgment and agree with his opinions. I 
did not have any thoughts and opinions about politics before we met” (Katya). “I asked 
my husband a lot of questions about everything including American politics. Thanks to 
him I understand the difference between the parties. He formed my opinion about 
American politics” (Elena). “I grew up on my husband’s political views. He emigrated 
from Russia to the US in 1992 when he was 22 years old. He is very smart, and he knows 
much more about American politics than I ever will. Even if I am on the fence about some 
of his views, in time, he will convince me. He does not know a lot about Russian political 
process, so he asks me, and I have nothing to say because I never paid attention to 
politics when I lived in Russia. I am such a political illiterate compared to my husband” 
(Anna). 
Korina (f/ne) is married to a Ukrainian citizen, and they came to the US together on his 
working visa: “My husband likes to talk to Americans about politics, I do not care for it at first. I 
developed my political opinion thanks to him; I did not have any of my own. I started to 
understand more as I listen to him and watch some videos he posts on his Facebook page. I re-
considered some of my previous opinions about the Chechen wars, for example.”  
A spouse is an effective agency of political socialization. It can work three different 
ways: a result of assortative mating where both spouses have similar views from the start; a 
product of common political inheritance which eventually alters other aspects of marriage; and, 
finally, one spouse (usually a wife) adopts political preferences of his/her partner. In my sample, 
the third option was the most common.  
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6.5.3. Volunteering and voluntary associations 
For many respondents in my sample, volunteering is a strictly an American activity. For 
example, Katya (f/e) had no idea what volunteering was before coming to the US: “In Russia, 
there was no such thing as volunteering. I had never experienced it. In the US I attend some 
charity events with my co-workers.” For Nikita (f/ne), who immigrated in 2014, volunteering is 
still a very foreign concept: “No thank you! I do not work for free. In our situation, we cannot 
afford to donate our time for a cause, no matter how good.” 
Voluntary organizations are different from work environments, but they have similar 
effects as agencies of political socialization but without a compensation: gratitude and 
recognition are the currency of volunteering. Both workplace and voluntary associations are 
exposed to and influenced by public policies, laws, and regulations. “While almost every worker 
is affected in one way or another, those who believe that their occupational group is particularly 
influenced by political affairs are more likely than others to participate in routine politics” 
(Wasburn & Adkins Covert, 2017, p. 77). Voluntary organizations usually oriented toward social 
services and dedicated to a particular cause or a societal role. City Halls, courts, educational, 
non-governmental, and not-for-profit organizations are the most common places where people 
can find volunteering opportunities.  
Fifteen respondents, or 37.5 percent of the sample, stated they either volunteered or 
intended to volunteer after they moved to the US. Three people (Abigail (f/e), Kristina (f/e), and 
Korina (f/ne)) volunteered in Russia before emigrating.   
Immigrants consider volunteering opportunities for multiple reasons: to master English 
and learn about the US (Belka (f/ne) and Rina (f/e)); to participate in their favorite activity 
(Marianna (f/ne) and Jason (m/e)); to get involved with their children’s education (Marina (f/ne) 
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and Semion (m/ne)); to do something together with their children/step-children (Anna (f/ne) and 
Alisa (f/e)); and, to fulfil their professional obligations and interests (Alexey (m/ne), Yuri (m/e), 
Nick (m/e) Elena (f/e), Ivan (m/ne), Timur (m/e), Kristina (f/e), and Katya (f/e)).   
For Belka (f/ne) volunteering was a new concept – after finishing her ESOL classes, a 
friend suggested volunteering at City Hall to practice English.  
“I volunteered in the City Hall at the information desk. One of my friends worked 
there and suggested I volunteer. I needed to start communicating with Americans, and it 
seemed like such a great way to do it. It did not help me to improve my English, but it 
helped me to realize that I want to get an education. I appreciate the idea of volunteering 
– people respect that, it is a source of instant gratification.”  
Volunteering was one of the best socialization agencies for Belka. It helped her to 
understand and navigate through the American public system and made her to get out of her shell 
and start communicating despite the lack of English language skills. “When I received my 
citizenship, people at the City Hall surprised me with a celebration party – they even printed my 
picture in a local newspaper – it was incredible, and I appreciated it greatly.” Belka was so 
inspired that she started to pay attention to volunteer organizations in Russia. She supports 
several of them through social networks.  
Jason (m/e) and Marianna (f/ne), are not very active socially. They are both quiet and 
timid.  Joining a local badminton club and volunteering to judge youth badminton tournaments 
allows them to enjoy their favorite sport and socialize with like-minded individuals. It is 
especially important for Marianna as she usually socializes with fellow Russian-speaking moms 
only.  
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Elena (f/e) joined the Toastmasters International and even served as the president of her 
chapter until her daughter was born. Membership in this club allowed Elena to master her 
English, meet new people, and get familiar with the club structure and its mission.  
Marina (f/ne) has two children, her husband works as a truck driver and is usually away 
from home for long periods. Marina started volunteering at her youngest son’s elementary 
school, and she quickly learned about the school structure and the educational process. She 
works as a part-time substitute teacher there. We had a brief discussion about state funding for 
public schools because this is something she is very interested in. She also argued that parents 
need to be involved in their children’s education and support the school system. It is an example 
of a civic engagement that started with volunteering and developed into a devotion to improving 
the educational system.  
Anna (f/e) has a degree in education, and she likes to read to her toddler in both Russian 
and English. She often takes her son to a local public library and expressed a desire to volunteer 
there: “I want to volunteer at the library when my son is a little older. It will be a great help to 
our library and will help my son to understand how things work.” Alisa (f/e) looked into 
volunteering to spend some quality time with her step-daughter: “I tried to volunteer in a library 
and a botanical garden. I wanted to do it with my step-daughter. But there were no openings at a 
time.” Alisa is very spiritual and views volunteering as a bonding experience with a positive 
outcome for all parties involved.  
Three people in the sample stated they volunteered in Russia before coming to the US. 
Kristina (f/e) is a young entrepreneur; she owns a business in Russia.  
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“I volunteered at a local orphanage. We helped with clothes, food, and even 
organized some entertainment. My friends and I had gathered provisions for several 
orphanages. When I find a job in the US, I would like to start volunteer again. I want to 
work with kids.”  
Korina (f/ne) was a professional dancer in Russia. She opened her dance studio when she 
was only 14. Together with her students, she volunteered her time and talent almost every 
weekend in schools, during holidays, and town celebrations. She used these volunteering 
opportunities as dancing practices for her students. In the US, Korina helps out in her daughter’s 
dancing school.  
Abigail (f/e) was a member of a sports volunteering organization in her hometown in 
Russia. She liked organizing sports activities and used her position as a volunteer to establish 
good connections in the sports industry. If she did not come to the US, she would’ve volunteered 
at the 2013 World Student Games in Kazan and later, at the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in 
Sochi.   
Kristina, Korina, and Abigail represent a new generation of young Russian entrepreneurs. 
They had more exposure to the western values in Russia compared to older generations and 
found volunteering to be useful for different purposes. Even after emigrating from Russia, 
Kristina (f/e) tries to keep up: “Even in the US, I follow some local news in my hometown. I want 
to be informed about things my business might get involved with.” 
Volunteering proved to be an effective way for respondents in my sample to socialize. It 
is an easy way to start communicating and receive instant gratification for an effort. It exposed 
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some people to American public systems and structures that lead to a better understanding of 
American society in general. 
When it comes to voluntary organizations in the US, they can be broadly classified into 
two categories: ethnic and mainstream. Ethnic voluntary organizations target particular ethnic 
and/or immigrant groups, while the mainstream voluntary organizations are formed by native-
born individuals for a variety of purposes. “Organizational involvement has been associated with 
increased happiness and better health. It has also helped immigrants acquire important resources, 
including civic and political skills, interpersonal trust, and feelings of citizenship” (Michalikova, 
2017, p. 144).  
Levels of voluntary civic engagement in Eastern Europe are lower than in Western 
Europe and the United States. It is explained by the long history of communism and low levels of 
trust in state and local institutions. In immigration, however, Eastern Europeans usually become 
active volunteers. Historically, Eastern European immigrants preferred to volunteer in their 
ethnic community organizations and places of worship. Nevertheless, even participation in ethnic 
voluntary associations is an indicator of a need for some civic engagement and interest in local 
communities. Polish and Ukrainian immigrants prefer to volunteer in religious institutions, while 
Russian immigrants – in educational organizations like libraries and schools (Ibid., p. 148). In 
my sample, several people expressed an interest to volunteer in their childrens’ schools: Semion 
(m/ne), Korina (f/ne), and Marina (f/ne). Anna (f/ne) and Alisa (f/ne) would like to volunteer in 
their local libraries.  
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Russian immigrants from earlier immigration waves formed a number of professional and 
religious voluntary organizations in the US: Russian Orthodox Catholic Mutual Aid Society19 
(1895), the Russian Brotherhood Organization (1900), and the Russian Orthodox Fraternity 
Lubov (1912). All three were established in the state of Pennsylvania (Ibid., p. 142). The more 
recent examples include the Russian American Foundation20 (1997) in New York and United 
Russian American Association21 (2005) in Houston, TX.  
There are numerous Russian-speaking voluntary groups and organizations in Central and 
South Florida. For example, the Russian-American Community Center in Florida22 acts as a 
liaison between Russian immigrants and American organizations and services. In addition, it 
organizes cultural events, teaches Russian-language classes, and hosts the Russian consulate two 
times a year to assist Russian immigrants who reside in Florida with their documents and other 
citizenship-related needs. Another interesting voluntary organization is the Russian Heritage 
non-profit organization23. It is a unique establishment as it attracts both Russian-speakers as well 
as Americans to talk about Russian history, literature, and culture.   
Aside from actual voluntary organizations, there is a plethora of Facebook groups created 
by and for Russian-speakers in Central and South Florida. Many of them serve as forums to 
connect people who live in the same area and some target specific populations (women, mothers, 
business owners, etc.).   
                                                          
19 https://www.wdl.org/en/item/21414/view/1/21/  
20 https://www.nycservice.org/organizations/717  
21 http://www.uraa.us/  
22 http://russianamericancenter.org/  
23 https://russianheritage.org/  
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 6.5.4. The Church 
The 1954 Johnson Amendment of the Internal Revenue Code does not allow any political 
campaigning in religious institutions. Nevertheless, “religious organizations do take public 
stands on major social issues, as many did, with considerable influence, in the 1960s with respect 
to Civil Rights and the Vietnam War” (Wasburn & Adkins Covert, 2017, p. 72). The ‘religious 
factor’ appears in political preferences and opinions because religious groups rarely differ from 
socioeconomic and ethnic groupings. The research shows that active participation in the church 
can transform into effective political participation (Ibid., p. 74).   
Most immigrants in my sample attend the Russian Orthodox Church only on religious 
holidays. Seven respondents go to church regularly. Five out of the seven prefer English-
speaking churches of different denominations. Elena (f/e) goes to a Russian-speaking non-
denominational church, and Father Alexey (f/ne) came to Florida to establish a church under the 
canonical authority of the Patriarch of Moscow. Father Alexey served in a good church in 
Moscow and had no intention of moving to a different country. He traveled to America in 2014 
to visit the Bishop of New York. He liked the idea of religious freedom and decided to take an 
offer to build a church in South Florida.  
“In Russia, people come to you. In America, you need to attract people. You need 
to pay attention to every person that comes to you. You need to treat each newcomer as a 
guest. People who left Russia a long time ago tend to be atheistic, but now they try to 
approach religion. They have lots of churches to choose from. I represent only one of 
many. If people come to my church, they really like it.” 
Father Alexey has 40 people who come to his services. All of them are Russian-speakers. 
He is very interested in getting a law degree in the US – a religious institution in the US has 
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many exemptions and benefits, and he wants to know about them. Father Alexey constantly 
consults with lawyers. He is very excited about having a church in the US because he appreciates 
the variety of religious institutions. It alleviates him from an extra pressure of being the only 
priest people can come to (in Russia, the Orthodox Church traditionally dominates). At the same 
time, he appreciates his church-goers because they chose his among many other religious 
institutions. It makes him cherish what he does even more.  
When Victoria (f/e) came to the US for a summer exchange program, she went to a 
Baptist church. She was a regular church-goer in Russia, and she wanted to compare religious 
services. The second reason was to practice her English with fellow Christians. What she 
encountered changed her entire view of on religion and how it should be practiced: “I realized 
that Bible studies are vital to religion. I felt the word of God. It was alive, and I wanted to know 
more. I wanted to be in a church that studied the Bible.” That summer she met her future 
husband, also a devoted church-goer. Victoria and her husband attend church “to study the word 
of God and to purify our souls.” The Baptist church and a bible study appealed to her so much 
that it became one of the factors that urged her to move to the US permanently. The main one 
was, of course, her husband. They have the same preferences and opinions when it comes to 
politics. The ‘religious factor’ plays a vital role in forming conservative views on marriage, 
child-rearing, and politics. It is no surprise that Victoria identifies as a traditionalist and a 
Republican.  
Sveta (f/e) and Ivan (m/ne) view American churches as a business to make money 
(American churches lack ‘holiness’ and act more like a social club) and prefer to attend Catholic 
churches. Ivan does it for the appreciation of Catholic traditions; Sveta attends a Catholic Church 
because she mostly communicates with Puerto Ricans and Europeans at work and at home.  
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Finally, Yaroslava (f/e), who is not very religious, gained a great appreciation for 
American churches because “they are essential. They carry an important social load. I joined a 
church because they have more of a social mission than the religious one. If I am in trouble, I 
will go to a church first because I know they will be able to help me.” Yaroslava attends two 
churches: one is a Russian-speaking church (to socialize with fellow Russian-speaking 
immigrants), and another is an English-speaking international church because “they do many 
things for our community like summer camps for children free of charge; they gather money for 
international missions; help homeless and starving in the area. They do a lot of things, and I 
support that.” Yaroslava appreciates a social role of the church. She sees that it is an important 
element of the American society. Before coming to the US, Yaroslava considered all American 
churches to be sects that collect people’s money. After living in the US for seven years, she 
changed her mind and became a passionate supporter of the church mission. The two churches 
Yaroslava attends, are her main socialization agencies, she considers them as institutions that are 
supposed to alleviate social and economic tensions in America.  
The church, as an agency of political socialization, affects respondents in different ways, 
but it is a powerful agency nonetheless that can form both religious and political outlooks toward 
the world.  
6.6. Output Structures 
The last element of political socialization is output structures (Figure 6.1.). Output 
structures incorporate bureaucratic institutions on local, state, and federal levels. Bureaus, 
according to William Niskanen, are organizations that provide services which have value but 
cannot be obtained for money (Niskanen, 1971, p. 7). U.S. Customs, Department of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV), and Internal Revenue Service are all good examples of bureaucratic 
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institutions that every immigrant has to deal with regardless of English language proficiency, 
residency status, or exposure to other political socialization agencies. The initial introduction to 
the American bureaucracy happens at the airport upon arrival to the US. This is the one process 
where the US citizens are separated from permanent residents and other visitors. However, once 
you pass the US Customs, there is no more separation. For example, a visit to a local DMV 
office lets an immigrant to share experiences with Americans who live in the same community: 
to stay in the same lane and to be subjected to the same process. It helps to create a sense of 
belonging to a local community and also reveals the workings of the American bureaucratic 
machine.   
Respondents’ overall impression about the US bureaucracy is very positive and 
consistent with expectations laid out by Max Weber who viewed bureaucracy as an ideal form of 
a government organization. “Bureaucracy…is fully developed in political and ecclesiastical 
communities only in the modern state, and, in the private economy, only in the most advanced 
institutions of capitalism” (Wharton, 2016, p. 11) Weber considered order and administrative 
regulations to be the most important aspect of bureaucracy as “office holding is not considered a 
source to exploited for rents or emoluments” (Ibid., p. 13).   
Valentin (f/e) talked about the effectiveness of bureaucratic institutions in comparison to 
Russian bureaucracy:  
“Here everything is created for people and their comfort. In Russia, bureaucratic 
institutions are created to torture you. The system is built to create obstacles in 
everything. My wife and I had to deal with the Russian bureaucracy during our last trip. I 
was under the impression that there is a certain group of people that were born to work 
in Russian bureaucratic institutions: we had to talk to a young girl, but she already had 
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that nasty bureaucratic attitude – it was scary even to ask a question. You probably had 
to pass some exam to work in those places.” 
Ivan (m/ne) complained about his experiences with Russian state institutions: “Russia’s 
political structure is a mess. There is corruption, and uncontrolled theft! I worked for the 
administration of the city of Saint Petersburg. There were cases of bribery, corruption, and 
nepotism everywhere. If you want to talk to a manager of any level, you need to give a bribe to 
his/her secretary first.” 
There is an agreement among all the respondents that bureaucracy is much more effective 
in the US compared to Russia. American bureaucracy is transparent, straightforward, and 
efficient. Most mentioned corruption as the main problem with bureaucracy in Russia. Nikita 
(m/ne) provided an example:  
“The positive aspect of the Russian bureaucratic machine is that you can quickly 
solve all your problems with money. Everyone, starting from the smallest bureaucratic 
clerk, will expect bribes. Otherwise, they will prolong a process or make it difficult. For 
example, the passport to travel outside of Russia take three days to issue. According to 
the law, it has to be issued within 30 days. Bureaucrats will make you wait for all 30 days 
even though they will have your passport much earlier than that – they expect you to pay 
extra if you want it earlier than 30 days. Some bureaucrats will help if you explain the 
situation, but not all of them – their salaries are very small, and they try to make extra 
money any way they can.” 
The efficacy of output structures in the US promotes immigrants’ political socialization 
because it displays order and stability. It makes people comfortable, confident and inclined to 
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trust a state bureaucracy that is not trying to get their money in exchange for poor services. It is 
something that many respondents did not experience in Russia. 
6.7. Summary 
Gitelman identified three agencies of political socialization used by Soviet Jews in Israel: 
“immigrant associations, the Histadrut (General Confederation of Labor), and political parties” 
(Gitelman, 1982, p. 252). For Soviet and Russian Jewish immigrants in the US, ethnic 
organizations had traditionally served as political, cultural, and economic socialization agencies 
(Isurin, 2011; Lewin Epstein et al., 1997; Morawska, 2004; Shasha & Shron, 2002).  
In this chapter, I constructed the model of political socialization of Russian immigrants 
who reside in four main metro areas of Central and South Florida. The model of political 
socialization includes general elements that affect the socialization of all respondent in the study: 
legal status (the starting point) and output structures (bureaucracy). Further, the model consists 
of triggers that make political socialization more likely: language proficiency, spousal support, 
and parenting. Finally, agencies of political socialization include ESOL classes, spouses, 
volunteering, and the church.    
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Chapter 7 Data Analysis 
This chapter addresses the second set of research questions: How and why do Russians, 
who permanently reside in the United States, perceive American democracy? Do they see 
differences between political systems in Russia and the US? How do ethnic Russian immigrants 
view Russia? Do English language proficiency and exposure to multiple socialization agencies 
make a difference? 
According to Larry Diamond, “political culture theory predicts that democracy should be 
more legitimate and stable when there are high but not polarizing levels of political efficacy, 
participation, and information” (Diamond, 1999, p. 208). High levels of support and satisfaction 
with a political system occur when citizens are informed, proactive, and believe they can affect 
political outcomes (internal efficacy). In return, citizens expect understanding and support from 
their government (external efficacy) (Ibid.). To explain respondents’ attitudes toward American 
democracy vs. Russian authoritarianism, I should first address their perceptions of politics and 
the political process.   
During interviews, respondents were asked about their opinions on American and 
Russian political systems, democratic institutions (branches of government, political parties, 
interest groups, and independent media) and processes (elections, political participation, 
freedoms, and liberties). What do they think about Russia now? Did their perception of America 
change after residing in the US for some time? Respondents were also asked to evaluate their 
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involvement in political processes (Russia, the US, or both). Based on their replies, the sample 
was divided into four groups presented in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 Political classification of respondents 
Classification based on political opinions, participation, and efficacy 
Admirers Skeptics Incurious Recluses 
Yuri (m/e) 
Abigail (f/e) 
Rina (f/e) 
Elena (f/e) 
Anna (f/ne) 
Marina (f/ne) 
John (m/e) 
Ivan (m/ne) 
Semion (m/ne) 
Pavel (m/ne) 
Vladislav (m/ne) 
Yaroslava (f/e) 
Stephanie (f/e) 
Katya (f/e) 
Sveta (f/e) 
Sessi (f/e) 
 
Timur (m/e) 
Nick (m/e) 
Bill (m/e) 
Jason (m/e) 
Alexey (m/ne) 
Alisa (f/e) 
Victoria (f/e) 
Kristina (f/e) 
Yana (f/e) 
Maria (f/e) 
Olga (f/ne) 
Marianna (f/ne) 
Margarita (f/ne) 
Belka (f/ne) 
Korina (f/ne) 
Chepe (f/ne) 
Valentin (m/e) 
Aristarch (m/ne) 
Aleksandr (m/ne) 
Nikita (m/ne) 
Andrei (m/ne) 
Tapolina (f/ne) 
Alevtina (f/ne) 
Lukeria (f/ne )  
 
 
Total:                           6 10 16 8 
Percentage:            15% 25% 40% 20% 
Let’s look at each group separately and break down the responses on sections about 
political systems comparison, mass media comparison, political participation, and political 
efficacy. 
7.1. The Admirers 
The Admirers is the smallest group that consists of both speakers and non-speakers of 
English. All six members consider America to be a far more stable and prosperous country 
compared to Russia. Since their arrival in the US, they do not look back and see their future in 
the US only.   
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7.1.1. American vs. Russian political systems  
“Democracy is theoretical, it does not exist but compared to all others, America comes 
pretty close to it” Abigail (f/e).  
Admirers consider a political system in the US to be effective, transparent and designed 
for a bottom-up communication. All six respondents agree that when it comes to domestic vs. 
foreign policies, there is a considerable difference in priorities in Russia and the US:   
“The US government takes care of its own people first and then moves to an 
international political arena. In Russia, it’s the reverse. I remember when I was a little 
girl, my grandmother would not give me any candy because she was saving it for our less 
fortunate relatives. Everywhere in Russia, it is like that: give the best to others and 
disregard your own” (Marina (f/ne)).  
Abigail (f/e) and Rina (f/e) argued that the US is not Russia’s enemy. “I do not think the 
American government cares much about Russia and its government. They do not notice Russia 
unless they need to cooperate on something” (Abigail). “The US is not an enemy. Russia 
imagines all its enemies. The Russian government does not know how the global system works, 
and we constantly embarrass ourselves” (Rina).  
Overall, there is a very negative attitude toward Russia’s political system and a very 
positive one toward the US, “it is like night and day” (Rina). 
7.1.2. American vs. Russian mass media and information  
In Russia, this group mostly watched TV and preferred local/regional newspapers. Anna 
(f/ne) listened to the radio and did not watch TV. In the US, Admirers use TV, internet, and 
radio. They try to watch and listen to either western media only (Yuri, Marina, Elena) or western 
media and Russian independent news outlets like ‘Dozhd’ and ‘Echo Moskvi’ (Rina, Anna, 
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Abigail). According to their assessment, American news channels are more objective and have 
much better quality compared to Russian channels. The US media is also more diversified: there 
is room for different points of view. Anna (f/e) argued that Russian media sources are irrationally 
obsessed with America: “here you can turn on your TV and not hear about Russia for weeks. In 
Russia, you hear about the US every day. Russian social networks are flooded with Obama 
memes.” She also argued that American news channels have fewer reasons to lie to their viewers 
because they are free to speak their mind.  
7.1.3. Political participation 
Three respondents, Abigail (f/e), Elena (f/e), and Anna (f/ne) complained about the 
electoral process in Russia. There are no free and fair elections in Russia. The outcome is always 
the same, and it does not correspond with people’s hopes and aspirations. Anna’s first marriage 
was in Russia, and she changed her last name. On the Election Day (the 2012 Presidential 
elections), she went to a polling station and learned that she was listed under her maiden name. 
She pointed out the mistake and they gave her a ballot with her new last name, but did not cross 
her old name from the list: “I was furious: I went to an observer and told him they counted me 
twice so they can use my vote again! After that incident, I changed my mind about Russian 
politics: it went from neutral to negative.”  
Abigail decided to leave Russia after 2011 Bolotnaya Square protests, following Russia’s 
2011 Parliamentary elections; “it was like the veil fell from my eyes. I saw Russian state for what 
it was – an authoritarian regime that will never change.”  
Elena described the difference between elections in two countries: “In Russia, 
Presidential elections are predictable. In the US – you never know who will win. There is 
suspense till the very end. I think it is more honest that way. We do not have a tsar here.”  
155 
 
Yuri (m/e) said he regularly voted in Russia until the 2012 Presidential elections: “I 
believed my voice meant something. I know it does in the US.” He is now excited to become a 
citizen so he can vote in American elections which will be more considerate of his vote. The rest 
of the Admirers feel the same way. 
7.1.4. Political efficacy 
Admirers are enthusiastic to participate in American politics: 
“American and Russian political systems are different because of different social 
roles and responsibilities. People in Russia do not want to show that they disagree. They 
do not want to protest; they can only discuss things over their dinner tables. My opinion 
drastically changed since I moved here. I realized that the government is us, the people, 
and we can change it however we see fit” (Rina (f/e)). 
Overall, Admirers became more active participants in the political process after 
immigrating to America. They want to know more; they would consider different forms of 
participation like canvassing and petition-signing. For all of them, the Russian political system 
was one of the main reasons for immigration. All six Admirers are currently permanent residents, 
but all of them want to become citizens so they can become active participants in the American 
democratic political process.  
7.2. The Skeptics 
This group consists of five men and five women. One man and all the women speak 
English. These are the people who came to the US with high expectations but soon realized the 
reality is not as rosy as its image from afar. Skeptics are a group of people who critically assess 
their environment. They had strong opinions about politics in Russia. It did not change upon 
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their immigration to the US. They acknowledge positive and refuse to ignore negative aspects in 
both countries.  
7.2.1. American vs. Russian political systems  
“Russian and American political systems are like two different dishes, you can be picky, 
but if you are hungry, you will eat either one. In a sense, American and Russian political systems 
are both acceptable, they differ in methods, but have the same goal in mind” (Vlad (m/ne)).   
Ivan (m/ne) and Pavel (m/ne) compared the United States to its old nemesis – The Soviet 
Union:  
“Nothing surprised me in the US. It was like I went back in time – the US is the 
rich Soviet Union! I personally saw traffic police hiding on the interstate so they could 
catch as many violators as possible. They are especially active toward the end of each 
month because they have to reach their monthly quotas, just like in the USSR! There is a 
propaganda of the national flag and anthem in schools. My residential community is like 
a good old Soviet garden society: people try to compete in everything and take advantage 
of one another” (Ivan). “Like the Soviet Union in the past, America is a police state. It is 
a good thing because I want to live in a safe place and be able to walk in the streets at 
night” (Pavel).  
Semion (m/ne) thinks that the US exists at the expense of other countries: “When a 
country is getting destroyed, its resources are available to others. After the USSR collapsed, 
Americans lived well on its ruins.” He also doubts the effectiveness of the American system of 
checks and balances. It is in human nature to compete and there must be one branch that 
overpowers the other two. In his opinion, it is the legislative branch that dominates. Stephanie 
(f/e) feels the same way: “if an American President wants to accomplish something, he is under 
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the enormous pressure because the legislature might prevent anything from happening. In 
Russia, if the president wants something – it happens.”  
Skeptics are critical about both Russia and the US. None of them changed their views 
about politics after immigration. Instead, their views became reinforced after the move. 
7.2.2. American vs. Russian mass media and information  
In Russia, Skeptics watched TV mostly for sports, entertainment, and educational 
programs. Not all of them followed the news daily. In the US, most of them prefer to use the 
Internet over TV and radio: they watch American media for the news and Russian for 
entertainment (movies and comedy TV shows).  
Overall, Skeptics admit that America has better quality mass media, but they do not 
believe it is more objective than the Russian media. Both Russian and American mass media are 
dependent on their benefactors and interpret the news in particular ways. “The US mass media is 
more professional. They know how to manipulate public opinion. They are doing a very good job 
in that, and they keep improving. But I think that Russian media outlets are more objective and 
truthful” (Vlad (m/ne)). Sessi adds: “You believe American media more because it appeals to 
your emotions, but I cannot tell if American media is freer and more objective.”  
Yaroslava (f/e), Katya (f/e), and Ivan (m/ne) do not trust any media. The US media tend 
to be egocentric and focuses more on American events, while Russian media is more diverse. “In 
both countries, media depends on their sponsors; in the US it is more obvious. In Russia, they try 
to conceal it” (Yaroslava); “Mass media everywhere makes money by talking about what people 
pay to hear” (Ivan). Stephanie had an example of deliberate misinformation by one of the US 
news channels: 
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“In Russia, there is an issue of censorship, but in the US they twist information. I caught 
it once: there was an interview with an elderly man in Donetsk, Ukraine. A reporter asked him: 
‘What do you think of Putin?’ He answered: ‘I like him, I want him to take us to Russia.’ But the 
translation made it sound like he was against Putin. They lied just like that, in front of me!” 
7.2.3. Political participation 
Skeptics are split in their preferences between political processes in Russia and the US. 
John (m/e), Semion (m/ne), Vlad (m/ne), and Pavel (m/ne) pay more attention to Russian 
politics. They admitted doing it out of habit. All three voted in Russian elections regularly and 
have stronger opinions about Russian political developments than American ones. Sveta (f/e), 
Sessi (f/e), Yaroslava (f/e), and Katya (f/e) pay more attention to American politics. As 
Yaroslava put it: “I want to participate in American politics because I live here, I pay my taxes 
here, and I want to make sure my children will benefit from the money I pay to the government.” 
Finally, Stephanie (f/e) and Ivan (m/ne) are equally interested in both: “I consider both Russia 
and America as my homes, and I am very protective of both. I wish the two countries were closer 
to each other; they are both great nations” (Stephanie).  
Skeptics are active voters. Katya (f/e) is the only one that had never voted in her life: she 
left Russia before she was eligible to vote, and she is still a permanent resident with no voting 
rights in the US. The rest of Skeptics vote regularly, but it is their only form of participation. 
They are informed spectators of politics who limit their participation to ballot castings.  
7.2.4. Political efficacy 
Unlike Admirers, Skeptics are pessimistic about their abilities to influence politics. In 
Russia, the political process is capitalized by the elites, and in the US, it does not matter who is 
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in charge: Democrats or Republicans. Neither is capable of drastically changing the system – it is 
too stable. Semion (m/ne) had an interesting take on political efficacy:  
“My friend once told me when he was little, his dad let him drive a train. He told 
him to turn a big red wheel, and the train will go where he wants. It is a perfect analogy 
to a political process - people think they are in charge, but, in reality, they decide 
nothing. They turn a big red wheel, but the real machinist is in the bushes nearby.  The 
only way to make things happen is to initiate them from above. And the only way to 
trigger a change at the top is to allow social elevators to work and bring different people 
with different backgrounds and ideas to the top – that happened during the Civil Rights 
movement in America.” 
Skeptics are realistic about the political process and the part played by the public. 
The consensus in the group: there is little ordinary people can change. Skeptics are 
opinionated spectators that do not want to get involved. Sessi’s (f/e) father advised her to 
stay away from politics and political parties:  
“There is no point in getting involved. After I moved to the US, I realized that my 
political opinion is not important and can harm me. There is no point voting in Russia 
because there is no one to choose. In the US, politics is the realm of rich people. I have 
nothing against them, but why do they have to spend millions of dollars to impress 
ordinary people? Why don’t they spend their money to alleviate hunger in Africa, for 
instance?” 
In sum, Skeptics are critical of the political process no matter where it takes place. 
For them, it is imperfect regardless of a geographical location.  
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7.3. The Incurious 
The Incurious is the most populous group in the study. There are 16 members: 5 males 
and 11 females. Four out of five men and five women speak English. The main characteristic of 
this group is they are not interested in politics. Their reasons for changing citizenships are purely 
economic (except Yana (f/e) and Chepe (f/ne), who had professional reasons: research 
opportunities). They were never into politics in Russia, and that did not change after they 
immigrated to the US. It does not mean that members of this group are not educated about 
politics, they simply have different priorities.  
7.3.1. American vs. Russian political systems  
Quod Dei Deo, Quod Caesaris Caesari (Latin for ‘That Which is God’s to God; That 
Which is Caesar’s, to Caesar’). In other words, the consensus in this group is as follows: Russia 
and the US have profoundly different political systems because they are different countries. 
Timur (m/e) is a post-doctoral researcher in biology. He thought about social science as a career 
field but found it to be too subjective and imperfect. Nevertheless, his hobby is learning about 
politics and political history in the US and the Former Soviet Union:  
“The American political system is more suited for America just as the Russian 
political system is suited for Russia. If you try to implement the Russian system in 
America and vice-versa, it will result in a civil war or a dissolution. Russia is a classic 
autocratic regime with a little bit of plutocracy and oligarchy. The US is a mix between 
plutocracy and the federal government.”    
Timur (m/e) is confident that different countries develop their political systems that 
reflect the country’s history, traditions, and culture. It is not a good idea to copy someone else’s 
political system because it will fail due to incompatibility with the domestic system of values. 
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Alisa (f/e) supports strong leadership in Russia because, “from a historical perspective, Russia 
needs an iron fist because it is a big country. Without control, it will cease to exist. I support 
strong but wise leadership in Russia. It is the best option for Russia, but might not be ideal for 
other countries.” In other words, there is no universal political system which can be successfully 
implemented in every country on the planet. States, like people, are unique. Two individuals 
might have some things in common, but it is impossible to have everything in common. It is 
normal for countries to have unique ways of conducting their political affairs.    
For the Incurious, “politics are less important than economics” (Timur). Belka (f/ne), 
Marianna (f/ne), and Alexey (m/ne) measure states’ performance in economic terms: 
“The American political system is more effective when it comes to the market economy. 
Russia tries to replicate it, but it is not very successful. In the US the economic situation is 
stable, and laws are working. In Russia it is not stable yet” (Belka).  
“I mostly see differences between the two countries in economic aspects and not politics. 
The US has a huge foreign debt. The American dollar is supported by nothing; it is just paper. 
The Russian ruble is backed by gold and other resources, and Putin tries to minimize Russian 
foreign debt. At the same time, Russians live much worse compared to Americans. I am aware 
that in the US 80% of people are poor, and only 20% are rich. But the middle class here is 
bigger than in Russia” (Marianna (f/ne)).  
“I do not think that the American political system is more effective than the Russian one 
because of its immense foreign debt, but people live better here” (Alexey (m/ne)).   
Nick (m/e), Bill (m/e), and Kristina (f/e) compared the US’s and Russia’s business 
opportunities. For Nick and Bill, the US is a better place for business because the American 
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government provides tax breaks to businesses and supports entrepreneurial freedom and 
creativity. They also emphasized that the American government performs best at the local level. 
Kristina (f/e), who has a business in Russia, argued that until 2014, the business environment in 
Russia was slowly improving:  
“In the past couple of years, things got better in Russia - it was easier to create 
and develop a business, there is a whole new bureaucratic system that supports business 
development, and it is very convenient compared to what was there before. There are 
more construction sites, many new businesses, and new products available in Russia 
today.”  
The 2014 political development and economic sanctions against Russia (in response to an 
annexation of the Crimean peninsula) affected Kristina’s business, and together with her 
husband, she decided to move to the US. However, she noted that the 2016 US Presidential 
Elections revealed an internal conflict within the American population: “People could not choose 
between the two candidates, these elections might trigger economic instability and lead to a 
fragile business environment. My husband and I started to express similar concerns we had in 
Russia - it might be too unstable to stay here and open a new business.” 
It is evident that the Incurious evaluate the US and Russia in economic terms rather than 
political ones. Many of them confessed they do not understand politics very well and it does not 
affect them enough to encourage learning more about it.  
7.3.2. American vs. Russian mass media and information  
The Incurious mostly watched TV before emigrating from Russia. NTV and STS (an 
entertainment channel) were mentioned most of the times. Several of them (Yana (f/e) and Olga 
(f/ne)) mentioned limited choices of the television channels. They also used local websites and 
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printed media. In the US, the Incurious use the Internet. A lot of them get information from 
sources like RBK, Russia 24, CNN and alike, blogs (mostly Russian like Life Journal), and 
social networks (Facebook and vkontakte.ru). Nick (m/e) reads the Wall Street Journal. Timur 
(m/e) listens to NPR. Incurious prefer scientific shows, documentaries, humorous programs, and 
soap operas. They follow neither pro-government nor opposition news media. There is a group 
consensus that mass media in the US and Russia are the same: they both lie. Alisa (f/e) and 
Kristina (f/e) try to avoid mass media altogether: “mass media is evil everywhere” (Alisa). 
Kristina was more specific: 
“In Russia, they say one thing, in the US they say another, but the truth is 
somewhere in the middle. I prefer to compare the news in the US and Russia, but I get 
upset and try to avoid it. In Russia, news is more interesting and diversified. In the US 
they tend to concentrate on one thing for a long time. I think news agencies in the US 
speak their opinion more freely, but I doubt there is much truthfulness to what they say. 
In Russia, people would be afraid to freely express their opinions; they would rather not 
talk about it at all.”    
Respondents in this group either tend to avoid news altogether or receive it second-hand. 
Margarita (f/ne), Belka (f/ne), Korina (f/ne), and Alisa (f/e) all said their husbands watch the 
news and later share with them. “I do not watch the news or follow any news agencies on social 
media, but I am exposed to politics because of my husband’s interests: he posts a lot of news 
stories on his Facebook wall, and I only read his posts” (Korina).  
Exposure to mass media leads to reservations about their objectivity and dependability. 
The Incurious prefer to avoid both Russian and American mass media.  
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7.3.3. Political participation 
All the Incurious group members mentioned they were not interested in politics and they 
do not associate with any political party anywhere in the world. The Incurious look at the 
political process from the outside as if it proceeds parallel to their lives. Yana (f/e) called 
elections in Russia a joke, and Kristina (f/e/) defines the American electoral process as theatrical. 
Timur (m/e) grounded electoral process in economics:  
“I cannot name a single political force I associate with. I could potentially 
support many but not seriously subscribe to any of the platforms because they all try to 
appeal to an average voter, and the average voter is stupid. Voting does not have a 
meaningful impact. To have a real representative government, you need to have an array 
of economic interests represented. You need to have a developed economy with multiple 
forces within it.” 
In his opinion, elections are meaningless in Russia until there is a real economic 
diversification in place.  
Nick (m/e) and Jason (m/e) both stated they are not interested in politics. This did not 
change after moving to the US. Nick usually pays attention only to business news as it is relevant 
to him and his professional interests. Nick is a business owner and evaluated the 2016 
Presidential elections based on candidates’ proposals for businesses. He had met Donald Trump 
several years back and had an opinion about him as a person but not as a presidential candidate. 
For Nick, politics are irrelevant.  
Belka (f/e) voted in Russia, but she usually checked “against all” box. “To vote for 
someone, you need to take an interest in it and research every candidate - I had neither time nor 
interest.”  
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In general, the Incurious do not consider political participation as important. It is 
irrelevant to their lives or interests. They vote because it is their civic duty. At the same time, for 
most of them, politics is a big game for the rich and power-hungry people.   
7.3.4. Political efficacy 
Since their interest in politics is minimal, there are low expectations of people’s political 
efficacy. The Incurious gave up on the idea that it is possible to change something by casting a 
vote. Olga (f/ne) regularly voted in Russia until the 2004 Presidential election: “after that 
election, there was no point in voting - Putin was not going anywhere.” Maria (f/e) agrees with 
it: “I voted in Russia, but it was pointless because everyone knew the winner. It was just a waste 
of my vote and my time.” The Incurious agree that popular elections in Russia do not mean 
anything and people who vote cannot change the system. They also agree there is no point to 
vote in the US but for a different reason: Republicans and Democrats balance each other 
regardless of who is in power at the moment. As Yana (f/e) put it, “in the US, I do not have to 
choose between the two parties because they are both very respected and not a lot of policies 
would change if one replaces the other. I vote, but I always vote for an actual person and not 
his/her party.” 
7.4. The Recluses 
The last group consisted of eight individuals, seven of whom do not speak English and 
spend most of the time with their families or other Russian-speakers. Also, the sample’s oldest 
cohort – Tapolina (f/ne), Alevtina (f/ne), and Aleksandr (m/ne) are in this group.  
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7.4.1. American vs. Russian political systems  
Recluses are people who used to be active participants in the Russian political and most 
of them still have strong opinions and plenty of criticism for the Russian government. They are 
also passionate supporters of the American political system: 
“I would never call the Russian regime a democracy. Everything that is done there is for 
the benefits of elites only. It is a totalitarian regime. The American system of checks and 
balances makes more sense because people are in charge of their destinies, and if they want, 
they can achieve a lot.” (Valentin (m/e)).  
“The American political system is more effective compared to the Russian one. The 
Russian government does not allow people to have decent lives: salaries are very small. Russia 
and the US fight a lot, and I blame Russia for it” (Aleksandr (m/ne)).  
“The American political system is more effective because it is stable and does not change 
as often as the Russian one does. In Russia, there are no protections for people. The US and 
Russia are very aggressive in their foreign policies. The US has global reach, and Russia is only 
a regional power. That is why Putin goes to places like Chechnya and Ukraine” (Tapolina 
(f/ne)). 
American political system is stable, so there is no need to participate. Just relax and enjoy 
your time. For Valentin, Aleksandr, and Tapolina moving to the US meant there are no more 
economic and political struggles. They sought stability, and once they found it in the US, they 
took it for granted and distanced themselves from the political process.   
Nikita (m/ne) and Aristarch (m/ne) argued that the Russian government is corrupt. They 
both moved with their families to the US after winning in the Green Card lottery. Both men 
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thought the US was a better place to raise a family. Since they do not speak English, there is a 
lack of socialization and communication with Americans. Their preconceived notion about the 
US remains unchanged. “The American political system is stable, and people have their say in 
all political matters. There is no bulky bureaucracy like in Russia. Almost any problem can be 
solved over the phone” (Nikita). Aristarch did not hesitate when asked which political system is 
better: the American one, of course. It is better than the Russian system because ordinary people 
live better and there are a lot of opportunities, even though in his case they are ephemeral. Both 
men had engaging careers in Russia. In the US, Nikita delivers pizzas, and Aristarch is a stay-at-
home dad who tries to develop his own contracting company. I think this is the main reason why 
they are not interested in politics anymore: “after we moved here, I care only about my family 
and nothing else” (Aristarch). They feel insignificant in the US, and it negatively affects their 
interest in politics and the ability to influence their political environment. As a result, their world 
had shrunk to only fit their families.  
Two Recluses – Andrei (m/ne), Lukeria (f/ne) – admit they became more pro-Russian 
while living in the US. Andrei and Lukeria have their own business. They came to the US to 
make money and, eventually, stayed. Before opening their business, they worked in hotels as 
housekeepers and a laundry personnel. Their impression of America comes from interactions 
with low-paid working people in the service industry. They consider Americans to be poorly 
educated but admit there must be intelligent people with great educational credentials. However, 
having lived in the US for thirteen years, they had never come across those people. For Andrei, 
“the Russian system is more effective because it is authoritarian and things get done. In the US 
there are too many people involved in negotiations and decision-making. On the other hand, the 
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US strategy is more future-oriented. Policies are created with people’s benefit in mind.” Lukeria 
provided some criticism for the American legislature:  
“I do not like that the US Congress has too much power. People vote for the 
President, but a lot of Presidential initiatives are canceled by the Congress. 
Congressmen are driven by unknown interests, and I think they are not patriotic enough. 
They think about the US global leadership, but the main effort should be visible on the 
domestic front. The life in America has to be better, and it should be the Congress’s main 
priority.” 
Andrei and Lukeria appreciate the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, for his style of 
communication with people: “Putin conducts and participates in different forums and holds 
‘direct line’ conferences to communicate with Russian citizens several times a year. I do not see 
anything like that here, but I do not know enough about the American government” (Lukeria).   
7.4.2. American vs. Russian mass media and information  
The Recluses’ mass media habits did not change after immigration. Before moving to the 
US, they mostly watched TV and read popular newspapers (i.e. ‘Argumenty I Fakty’ and 
‘SPEED Info’). After the move, they continue to watch Russian TV and use Russian social 
networks (vkontakte.ru and odnoklassniki.ru). The majority of Recluses think that the American 
media is better compared to the Russian media. It is interesting considering they do not speak 
English very well. Valentin (m/e), the only Recluse that speaks English, is adamant about 
freedom of speech issue in Russia:  
“I often read Russian mass media - there is no freedom of speech, there is only a 
pro-government propaganda. TV channels, Like Kultura, are allowed to exist 
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independently, only if they have nothing to do with politics. In the US it is more 
interesting - different channels have different views. It is more diversified in the US.”  
Aristarch (m/ne) and Andrei (m/ne) talked about the same feature of American media – 
freedom of expression: “In Russia, anti-commercials are not allowed, but it is ok in the US, from 
products to politics – it is ok to talk bad about your opponent. That is why American media is 
better and more truthful” (Aristarch). “I am shocked by the behavior and tactics of presidential 
candidates during these elections. They poured so much dirt on one another” (Andrei).  
Aleksandr (m/ne) tries to watch both Russian and American TV channels: “The Russian 
media broadcasts are all lies, American media is more truthful. It is freer and more objective 
too. In Russia, there is censorship and other barriers for truthful media outlets.” Tapolina (f/ne) 
and Alevtina (f/ne) could not make a comparison because they do not watch American TV. 
Without knowing the language, there is no point.   
7.4.3. Political participation 
Some Recluses voted in Russia, but in the US they are spectators. Valentin (m/e) and 
Andrei (m/ne) are US citizens. Valentin identified as a Democrat because he is “for innovation 
and against conservatism.” At the same time, he is more interested in the Russian politics – he 
called it a habit. He has more opinions about the Russian government and political system. His 
attitude toward Putin has changed from positive to very negative after moving to America. 
Valentin looks at the US as a stable country where nothing changes, so there is no point in 
following any political news. It is a good thing. Andrei is interested in politics in both countries, 
but he participates in neither: “I do not have political identification, and I do not engage in 
political processes anywhere.” 
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Nikita (m/ne) and Aristarch (m/ne) did not change their political views: they are still very 
critical of Russia and very praising of the US.  
7.4.4. Political efficacy 
Recluses appreciate American system because American people live better than average 
Russians. For people like Aristarch (m/ne), Aleksandr (m/ne), Tapolina (m/ne), and Alevtina 
(m/ne), the size of your salary and your retirement paycheck is the main indicator of a successful 
political system. If a state can provide a decent living for people, it means people have some say 
in politics.  
Others like Valentin (m/e), Andrei (m/ne), and Nikita (m/ne), think that freedoms and 
opportunities come first: if there are more career opportunities for people and a political system 
responds to peoples aspirations, then social elevators are working and the dialogue between the 
government and its people is on-going.  
7.5. Survey results 
The Pew Research Center political typology survey classifies voters into eight groups 
based on their political attitudes and values. The survey form used in the study can be found in 
Appendix A. Here is the list of political typology groups from Left (liberal) to Right 
(conservative) of the political spectrum (Pew Research Center, 2014, pp. 2-10): 
1. Solid Liberals (SL) – express liberal values on every social issue and are 
dedicated voters of the Democratic Party;  
2. Faith and Family Left (FFL) – a religious, racially and ethnically diverse group 
that is uncomfortable with changes and deviations from a traditional family 
structure, but votes for the Democratic Party. They are less affluent and less 
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educated than Solid Liberals or Next Generation Left. They support expensive 
social programs.  
3. Next Generation Left (NGL) – this is the youngest group of voters. They are 
optimistic and have progressive views on social issues. They embrace diversity 
but wary of big and expensive social programs.  
4. Hard-pressed Sceptics (HpS) – do not have a clear party preference, but lean 
Democratic. They are the most financially challenged group and favor an 
increased government social spending. Their views on social issues, however, 
tend to be more conservative compared to other groups in the Democratic camp.  
5. Young Outsiders (YO) – do not have a clear party preference, but lean 
Republican. They disagree with an increase in government spending on social 
programs. Possess more liberal views on social issues.  
6. Business Conservatives (BC) – reliable voters of the Republican Party. Tend to 
be wealthy and optimistic. They are socially progressive, favor business growth, 
desire a smaller government, and support an engaging foreign policy. 
7. Steadfast Conservatives (SC) – on average are older than Business conservatives 
and more traditional when it comes to social issues. They are skeptical of both big 
government and big business. Do not like an active international involvement. 
8. Bystanders (not a part of the political spectrum) – this group is on political 
sidelines. They are not registered to vote and pay no attention to politics.  
The Pew Research Center survey has 23 questions with two possible answers for each (A 
and B). For this study, I altered their survey by including an additional answer option C - ‘I don’t 
know.’ Typically, I asked my respondents to take the survey on paper before or after our 
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interview. After I collected all the surveys, I took the online political typology test24 forty times 
with answers I received from respondents. I treated option C as no answer and simply skipped 
questions when my respondents marked ‘I don’t know’ option as their answer. Table 7.2 adds the 
survey results to already established groupings shown in table 7.1. 
Table 7.2 Political classification and political typologies of respondents 
  Classification based on political opinions, participation, and efficacy 
Admirers Skeptics Incurious Recluses 
Yuri (m/e) - FFL 
Abigail (f/e) - YO 
Rina (f/e) - YO 
Elena (f/e) - SC 
Anna (f/ne) - NGL 
Marina (f/ne) - NGL 
John (m/e) - NGL 
Ivan (m/ne) - NGL 
Semion (m/ne) - NGL 
Pavel (m/ne) - FFL 
Vladislav (m/ne) - FFL 
Yaroslava (f/e) - FFL 
Stephanie (f/e) - NGL 
Katya (f/e) - NGL 
Sveta (f/e) - YO 
Sessi (f/e) - NGL 
 
Timur (m/e) - NGL 
Nick (m/e) - SL 
Bill (m/e) - YO 
Jason (m/e) – YO 
Alexey (m/ne) - NGL 
Alisa (f/e) - YO 
Victoria (f/e) - NGL 
Kristina (f/e) - NGL 
Yana (f/e) - Bystander 
Maria (f/e) - SC 
Olga (f/ne) - BC 
Marianna (f/ne) - YO 
Margarita (f/ne) - YO 
Belka (f/ne) - NGL 
Korina (f/ne) - NGL 
Chepe (f/ne) - YO 
Valentin (m/e) - YO 
Aristarch (m/ne) - SC 
Aleksandr (m/ne) - 
NGL 
Nikita (m/ne) - YO 
Andrei (m/ne) - NGL 
Tapolina (f/ne) - FFL 
Alevtina (f/ne) - HpS 
Lukeria (f/ne ) - YO 
 
 
Total:                      6 10 16 8 
Figure 7.1 shows the distribution of the sample along the political typology spectrum 
from the Left (liberal) to the Right (conservative). It also identifies percentages of political 
typology in each of the four groups based on interviews. The Next-Generation Left is the most 
populous political typology group – 16 respondents, or 40 percent of the sample. They are 
present in all four political classification groups identified in this study. The Next-Generation 
Left is in the Democratic Party camp. The second most populous typology group is the Young 
                                                          
24 http://www.people-press.org/quiz/political-typology/  
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Outsiders – 12 respondents, or 30 percent of the sample. They can also be found in all four 
classification groups. The Young Outsiders can be characterized as non-committing Republicans.  
Both the Next-Generation left, and the Young Outsiders “tend to be very liberal on social 
issues, very secular in their religious orientation and are generally open to immigration” (Pew 
Research Center, 2014, p. 19).   At the same time, they differ in their opinions about the 
government spending as the Next Generation Left group is more supportive of expensive social 
programs. 
The third most populous group in the sample is Faith and Family Left which consists of 5 
respondents or 12.5 percent of the sample. The only group where Faith and Family Left is not 
represented is the Incurious. There are also three Social Conservatives (one Admirer, one 
Incurious, and one Recluse); a Solid Liberal; a Business Conservative, and a Bystander in the 
Incurious group. Finally, there is one Hard-pressed Sceptic Recluse.  
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Figure 7.1 Political typology distribution by the group and among the four classification groups. 
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As a group, respondents provided uniformed answers (30+ votes) on seven questions 
(numbers of responses are in parentheses): 
2. A. Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they are willing to work hard (34) 
 B. Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people (5) 
 C. No opinion (1) 
3. A. This country should do whatever it takes to protect the environment (30) 
 B. This country has gone too far in its efforts to protect the environment (5) 
 C. No opinion (5) 
5. A. Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can’t get ahead these 
days (0) 
 B. Blacks who can’t get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own 
condition (33) 
 C. No opinion (7) 
14. A. The best way to ensure peace is through military strength (7) 
 B. Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace (31) 
 C. No opinion (2) 
15. A. Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside of our control (4) 
 B. Everyone has it in their own power to succeed (32) 
 C. No opinion (4) 
19. A. Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost many jobs and hurt the economy (3) 
 B. Stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost (35) 
 C. No opinion (2) 
23. A. Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents (37) 
B. Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and 
health care (0) 
C. No opinion (3) 
Two of the questions that received uniformed answers are about environment policies (#3 
and #19) which means that respondents in general are in favor of protecting the environment. 
Answers to questions #2, #5, and #15 indicate that respondents are self-sufficient and do not rely 
on the system to provide for them. Question #14 reveals that, as a group, respondents are not 
militaristic. Finally, in question #23 the majority of respondents agreed that immigration is a 
good thing for a country.     
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A ‘No opinion’ answer choice was introduced to provide more options. Thirty six 
respondents used it at least once. Table 7.3 shows the number of times each respondent used 
option C – ‘No opinion’ as an answer. The numbers are in parentheses. 
Table 7.3 Number of times respondents chose a ‘No Opinion’ option 
  Classification based on political opinions, participation, and efficacy 
Admirers Skeptics Incurious Recluses 
Yuri (m/e) – FFL (4) 
Abigail (f/e) – YO (2) 
Rina (f/e) – YO (4) 
Elena (f/e) – SC (1) 
Anna (f/ne) – NGL (2) 
Marina (f/ne) – NGL (1) 
John (m/e) – NGL (0) 
Ivan (m/ne) – NGL (9) 
Semion (m/ne) – NGL (5) 
Pavel (m/ne) – FFL (4) 
Vladislav (m/ne) – FFL 
(0) 
Yaroslava (f/e) – FFL (1) 
Stephanie (f/e) – NGL (3) 
Katya (f/e) – NGL (5) 
Sveta (f/e) – YO (0) 
Sessi (f/e) – NGL (4) 
 
Timur (m/e) – NGL (1) 
Nick (m/e) – SL (10) 
Bill (m/e) – YO (8) 
Jason (m/e) – YO (8) 
Alexey (m/ne) – NGL (6) 
Alisa (f/e) – YO (11) 
Victoria (f/e) – NGL (10) 
Kristina (f/e) – NGL (7) 
Yana (f/e) – Bystander 
(15) 
Maria (f/e) – SC (3) 
Olga (f/ne) – BC (4) 
Marianna (f/ne) – YO (5) 
Margarita (f/ne) – YO (3) 
Belka (f/ne) – NGL (4) 
Korina (f/ne) – NGL (2) 
Chepe (f/ne) – YO (5) 
Valentin (m/e) – YO (0) 
Aristarch (m/ne) – SC (4) 
Aleksandr (m/ne) – NGL 
(2) 
Nikita (m/ne) – YO (3) 
Andrei (m/ne) – NGL (2) 
Tapolina (f/ne) – FFL (1) 
Alevtina (f/ne) – HpS (8) 
Lukeria (f/ne ) – YO (2) 
 
 
Total:                           6 10 16 8 
There are four people who did not use a ‘No Opinion’ option in their surveys: three 
Skeptics (John (m/e), Vladislav (m/ne), Sveta (f/e)) and one Recluse (Valentin (m/e)). Five 
respondents used a ‘No opinion’ answer only once: two Admirers (Elena (f/e) and Marina 
(f/ne)); one Skeptic (Yaroslava (f/e)); one Incurious (Timur (m/e)); and one Recluse (Tapolina 
(f/ne)). There are four people who opted for a ‘No opinion’ 10+ times. All of them are in the 
Incurious group: Nick (m/e), Alisa (f/e), Victoria (f/e), and Yana (f/e).  
When looking at responses altogether, a ‘No opinion’ option was used in every question 
at least once (Question #2). There are seven questions that received 10 or more ‘No opinion’ 
answers (the numbers of responses are in parentheses). 
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6. A. Business corporations make too much profit (9) 
B. Most corporations make fair and reasonable profits (16) 
C. No opinion (15) 
7. A. Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits without 
doing anything in return (20) 
B. Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don’t go far enough to help 
them live decently (10) 
C. No opinion (10) 
10. A. The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional 
American customs and values (8) 
B. The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthens American society 
(18) 
C. No opinion (14) 
11. A. Government is always wasteful and inefficient (11) 
B. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for (17) 
C. No opinion (12) 
13. A. Too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few large companies (26) 
B. The largest companies do not have too much power (3) 
C. No opinion (11) 
16. A. Homosexuality should be accepted by society (11) 
B. Homosexuality should be discouraged by society (17) 
C. No opinion (12) 
22. A. The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going 
deeper into debt (17) 
B. The government today can’t afford to do much more to help the needy (10) 
C. No opinion (13) 
 
Among questions that received the most numbers of ‘No Opinion’ answers are questions 
about the welfare state (#7, #11, #22); the distribution of influences between private and public 
sectors (#6 and #13), and identity (#10 and #16).  
7.6. Summary 
In Chapter 3 I mentioned The Boris Nemtsov Foundation’s study about Russians in 
Germany. Their sample consisted of Russian-speaking immigrants from the former USSR and 
second-generation Russian-speaking immigrants who were born in Germany. The study analyzed 
immigrants’ attitudes toward Russia and grouped respondents based on the duration of 
immigration; language spoken at home; language skills (German vs Russian); number and 
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frequency of contacts in  the country of origin; connections in Germany; level of integration; and 
media consumption. The groups, listed from the most integrated to the least integrated, are: New 
Generation (34 percent of respondents); Middle Men (36 percent); Burgers (14 percent); and 
Imported Parents (16%) (Koneva & Tikhomirova, 2016).  
In this chapter, I used a similar technique and divided respondents into four groups based 
on their opinions about political systems in the US and Russia; their comparison of American 
and Russian mass media; their political participation, and opinions on political efficacy. The four 
groups are the Admirers (15 percent); the Skeptics (25 percent), the Incurious (40 percent), and 
the Recluses (20 percent). They are distinct in some aspects (political systems comparison and 
political efficacy) and somewhat similar in others (mass media comparison and political 
participation). For 26 respondents (Skeptics and the Incurious), or 65 percent of the sample, 
moving from Russia to the United States, did not change their political perceptions. Skeptics 
remained critical of both Russian and American politics while the Incurious remained equally 
uninterested in both. Political behavior had changed in the two remaining groups: the Admirers 
(they became more active) and the Recluses (they had withdrawn from the political process 
altogether). Somewhat similar conclusion was made about immigrants from Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) in Israel. Michael Philippov and Anna Kaufelman observed that these immigrants 
adapt to Israel very slow. While immigrant youth adapts to new cultural codes relatively easy, 
adult population sticks with their Russian identity: they prefer Russian-speaking social circles 
and rely on Russian-speaking mass media. FSU immigrants have a vague understanding of 
democracy and associate democratic reforms with political instability and economic turmoil 
(Philippov & Knafelman, 2011). “In Israel Homo Sovieticus is transformed into a person who 
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does not believe in his/her ability to affect national politics and simultaneously respects the 
political symbolism of the state” (Ibid., p. 40).   
In the second part of the chapter, I analyzed the results of the Pew Research Center’s 
Political Typology survey. Its results reveal that the Next Generation Left and the Young 
Outsiders together incorporate 70 percent of the sample. These two groups are both located 
toward the center of the political typology spectrum. They have some commonalities. They both 
have liberal views when it comes to immigration, religious practices, and a family structure. 
Nevertheless, they support different sides of the government spending argument: the Young 
Outsiders are wary of large government and expensive social programs while the Next 
Generation Left supports the spending notion. 12.5 percent of the sample consists of the Faith 
and Family Left, which is a more liberal group when it comes to the government programs but 
conservative about religion and a family structure. The fourth most populous political typology 
group is Steadfast Conservative with three people or 7.5% of the sample. This group is the most 
conservative on the political typology spectrum.    
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Chapter 8 Discussion 
In this chapter, I discuss the results of data analysis, make some important conceptual 
observations, and outline limitations of the study and the chosen method. Based on limitations, I 
suggest several ideas for future projects to enhance the present study. 
8.1. Initial assumptions vs. findings 
My initial assumptions (Chapter 4) about political socialization of first-generation ethnic 
Russian immigrants read as follows: English language proficiency ensures a successful 
socialization in the American society. Next, exposure to multiple political socialization agencies 
results in faster and more effective political socialization.  
Based on the data analysis (Chapter 7), I can conclude that my initial assumptions are 
only partially correct. The Recluses group consists of eight people, and seven of them do not 
speak English. Their decreased political participation is caused by a lack of exposure to their 
English-speaking environment. The main reason, as stated by Recluses themselves, is inability to 
speak English (or speak it well enough). The remaining three groups – the Admirers, the 
Skeptics, and the Incurious – consist of both those who speak English fluently and those who do 
not speak it at all (see Table 8.1.): 
Table 8.1 Number of speaker and non-speaker of English in each group 
Group Bilingual (English and Russian) Russian-speakers only 
Admirers 4 2 
Skeptics 6 4 
Incurious 9 7 
Recluses 1 7 
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My data analysis suggests that, when it comes to political socialization, the results are 
mixed. Knowledge of the English language is not the determining factor. Inability to speak 
English negatively affects comfort level and stops political socialization only for some 
immigrants, but not for all. While the Skeptics and the Incurious did not have any changes to 
their opinions about politics after immigration, the Admirers proved to be more politically 
enthusiastic in the US regardless of their language skills. The lack of English can be successfully 
compensated by other agencies of political socialization: a spouse for Anna (f/ne) and a 
combination of agencies for Marina (f/ne).   
The Admirers became more politically enthusiastic after they moved to the US. They 
wanted to actively participate in politics in Russia but did not see any opportunities. For them, 
the authoritarian regime established by Vladimir Putin became one of the main reasons for 
emigration from Russia. Even though none of the Admirers are the US citizens yet, all six of 
them plan to apply for the US citizenship when they are eligible. Admirers believe in American 
democracy and try to learn about it through mass media, their American friends and colleagues, 
spouses, and other available agencies of political socialization. Their political behavior changed 
not only due to contacts with Americans but also because they deliberately sought the exposure. 
Admirers are curious and resourceful. Based on their experiences, I conclude that in the US, a 
political socialization is available to anyone upon request.  
On the other hand, the Recluses became more withdrawn from the political process. They 
possess strong opinions about politics in Russia and still like to discuss Russia’s current political 
developments. At the same time, they could not say anything specific about American politics. 
Their assessment of the US and its political process does not differ from the one they had prior to 
immigration. Recluses have limited to no exposure to the American society because they do not 
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speak the language. Since they are not able to communicate with Americans, their social circles 
are limited to their immediate families and other Russian-speaking immigrants. Nikita (m/ne) 
and Aleksandr (m/ne) work in American companies but admit that communication with co-
workers is very limited. Valentin (m/e), despite fluency in English, decreased his political 
activities because he does not need to worry about politics anymore – he is in a country with a 
strong and stable political system, and it will not change anytime soon.  
The 2016 Presidential Elections in the US showed the lowest voter turnout since 199625. 
In some respects, the Recluses might be more American than the Admirers are. This would be 
consistent with Robert Putnam’s conclusions about the  transformation of American society 
towards greater political apathy (Putnam, 1995). There is no guarantee that exposure to political 
socialization agencies will produce successful political socialization and turn immigrants into 
active participants of the political process. It depends mostly on immigrants’ desire to learn 
about American politics. It is their decision whether or not they want to participate in it. With 
that said, political socialization agencies used by first-generation ethnic Russian immigrants in 
the sample are not exclusive (ethnic-centered) or restricted in any way. They are available to 
anyone at little (ESOL classes), to no cost (churches, partners, volunteering).  
8.2. Data interpretation 
Figure 8.1 shows a comparison between the study’s results and average American voters’ 
distribution among eight political typology groups.  
The spread among the groups in the 2014 American political typology survey is almost 
even with each political typology group holding between 10 and 15 percent of the public. The 
                                                          
25 https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/11/politics/popular-vote-turnout-2016/index.html  
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study’s survey results show that most respondents (57.5 percent) are located toward the left side 
of the political spectrum with the Next Generation Left group consisting of 15 individuals or 40 
percent of the sample. The right side of the spectrum hosts 42.5 percent total with 12 respondents 
(30 percent of the sample) identified as the Young Outsiders. 
 
Figure 8.1  Study political typology distribution vs. 2014 average American typology distribution 
 
As mentioned earlier, The Next Generation Left and the Young Outsiders have certain 
things in common. For example, both groups are located toward the middle of political spectrum 
which hosts, in the words of Anthony Downs, “the crucial middle-of-the-road voters” (Downs, 
1957, p. 117). Theoretically, they can be pulled towards either Republicans or Democrats as they 
are very moderate and avoid extremes in their political preferences. For example, the Young 
Outsiders, unlike the rest of the right-wing groups, tend to have good opinions about both the 
Republican and the Democratic political parties. The Next Generation Left stands out on the left 
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of the spectrum thanks to an individualistic manner and positive attitudes toward the private 
sector. Figure 8.2 is the Pew Research Center’s placement of the Next Generation Left and the 
Young Outsiders on the political ideology spectrum (Pew Research Center, 2014, pp. 9-10).  
   
Figure 8.2 Group locations on the political spectrum26 
 
Figure 8.3 demonstrates the large overlap between the two groups when placed together 
on the spectrum. 
 
Figure 8.3 The overlapping area between The Next Generation Left and The Young Outsiders 
 
I assume that, under the right circumstances, 70 percent of the sample can easily switch 
between the Republican and the Democratic political parties. Indeed, many respondents argued 
                                                          
26 Figures 8.2 and 8.3. are different combinations of two images reprinted from “Beyond Red vs. Blue: the political 
typology” by The Pew Research Center (2014), retrieved: https://www.people-press.org/2014/06/26/the-political-
typology-beyond-red-vs-blue/ Reprinted with permission. More information can be found in Appendix A. 
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that the US political structure is very stable and it does not matter which political party is in 
power because neither can shake the system to its core, so to speak.  
On the other hand, being in the middle means lacking strong beliefs and civic passions. 
Many respondents stated they either do not care about politics or do not find it important. If that 
was true then I expected to see more survey results similar to that of Yana’s (f/e) who declared 
her utter ignorance toward politics by choosing option ‘C’ (No Opinion) 15 out of 23 times. Her 
political ideology could not be determined, and I placed her in the Bystander group. Based on 
numerous declarations of being apolitical, I should have more people in a Bystander group. 
Instead, a lot of those who declared their lack of interest in politics scored either as The Next 
Generational Left (Timur (m/e), Belka (f/ne), Korina (f/ne)) or the Young Outsiders (Alisa (f/e), 
Marianna (f/ne), Jason (m/e), Bill (m/e), and Valentin (m/e)). In fact, as Figure 7.1 shows, the 
Incurious group was the most diverse in political typologies. What does it mean? In my opinion, 
there are two possible explanations.  
The first possible explanation: perhaps respondents do not understand what is political. 
Many of them provided plenty of criticism toward the government (both Russian and American) 
but did not elaborate on any other aspects of the political process. For example, at the end of the 
interview, I asked respondents to describe a civil society – all of them had struggled with it. In 
the literature, there is no specific definition of a civil society and it can be only loosely described 
as a combination of several aspects: a part of society (i.e., voluntary organizations); a kind of 
society in a pursuit of positive norms; and a distinct reciprocal public sphere (Chebankova, 2013, 
p. 164). Respondents, however, came-up with one-sided descriptions: the majority agreed that in 
a civil society people’s needs come first and their ability to keep governments in check follows. 
In their collective opinion, a civil society exists to provide for people and give them the ability to 
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control the process. No respondent mentioned any duties and obligations of citizens in a civil 
society. The tendency to only see privileges but not responsibilities indicates political immaturity 
and a lack of civic exposure.  
Moreover, most respondents consider voting as the only kind of political participation 
available to them. There were few people (Rina (f/e), Abigail (f/e), and Yuri (m/e)) who talked 
about canvassing, volunteering for a political campaign, and public protests as forms of political 
participation they are willing to perform once they become the US citizens but they had never 
done anything like that.  As for the rest of respondents, being a spectator and an occasional voter 
sums up their political participation. Political literacy and civic engagement require exposure and 
practice. Even when it comes to voting, research shows that naturalized US citizens with 
previous democratic experiences are more likely to vote and be politically active than those who 
emigrated from authoritarian states (Goldsmith & Holzner, 2015, p. 50). In case of Russian 
immigrants, the exposure to democratic practices and principles of a civil society was minimal 
before immigration. If it had occurred at all, it would’ve taken place in the 1990s when any 
democratic development was overshadowed by drastic and, for the most part, unfortunate 
economic and social changes.                       
The second possible explanation of political confusion is the inferiority complex. As 
early as the 1920s, sociologists paid attention to immigrants’ humbleness. Immigrants feel 
inferior to native-born Americans because of their minority status, lack of language and cultural 
skills. An inferiority complex minimizes immigrants’ chances to successfully integrate into a 
host society and creates a feeling of defeat and, sometimes, resentment. Herbert Miller called it 
‘the oppression psychosis’ (Miller, 1921, p. 139). An outside demand and even an internal desire 
to assimilate into the native majority can perpetrate inferiority in minorities and immigrants 
187 
 
(Alba, 1999, p. 9). In case of Russians in America, the sense of inferiority is the product of a 
long history of rivalry between the USSR and the US during the Cold War – a competition of the 
two different economic systems, ideologies, and lifestyles. The Soviet defeat confirmed 
American superiority in all these aspects and forced Russia to pursue a liberal model of 
development. Western countries, predominantly the US, became the source of advisers, models, 
and examples for emulation. In the Russian collective mind, circa mid-1990s, the West was an 
exceptional place where governments took care of the sick and disabled and everyone lived in 
luxury and comfort. The westerners, according to this premise, were enlightened individuals and 
brilliant professionals in their fields. Western products have the highest quality and the best 
design esthetics. In other words, the West is an ideal civilization while Russia is somewhere very 
far behind.  
When asked about their pre-emigration image of America, all forty respondents provided 
a description similar to the one above. They were very positive, optimistic, and idealistic. Not 
one person mentioned anything negative when describing their impression of America from afar. 
For many respondents (Abigail (f/e), Yana (f/e), Rina (f/e), Katya (f/e), Anna (f/ne), Marina 
(f/ne), Tapolina (f/ne), Yuri (m/e), Nikita (m/ne), Aristarch (m/ne), Aleksandr (m/ne), Alexey 
(m/ne)), their pre-conceived impressions did not change after living in the US for years despite 
numerous difficulties each of them had encountered. There is a strong belief in the American 
economic and social superiority. So prevalent was the belief that President Dmitry Medvedev27 
addressed it in his 2009 “Go Russia!” article (emphasis added): 
                                                          
27 Dmitry A. Medvedev was the third President of Russia (2008-2012). He currently serves as the Prime Minster of 
Russian Federation (2012 - present).  
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  “We must have interested partners and involve them in joint activities. And if we need 
to change something ourselves in order to do so, abandon previous prejudices and illusions, then 
we should do so. I am of course not referring to a policy of unilateral concessions. Lack of will 
and incompetence will not gain us any respect, gratitude, or gains. This has already happened 
in our recent history. Naive notions of the infallible and happy West and the eternally 
underdeveloped Russia are unacceptable, offensive and dangerous. But no less dangerous is 
the path of confrontation, self-isolation, mutual insults and recrimination” (Medvedev, 2009).     
President Medvedev criticized previous attempts to modernize the Russian economy and 
emphasized the importance of making Russia relevant in the contemporary world. In order to 
change the entire country, people need to change their thinking first. The sense of inherent 
backwardness is a serious problem in Russia and those who immigrate to Western countries feel 
inferior even before settling. That is why most Russian immigrants often feel it is not their place 
to develop or express opinions about politics in the US.  
 Thus, a lack of political knowledge and an inferiority complex can serve as a good 
explanation for respondents’ declarations of being apolitical but having strong political views at 
the same time.  
Initially, I divided my sample based on English language proficiency and gender. The 
division by gender allowed me to see the differences in attitudes and responses between men and 
women. Russian women are more active and more inquisitive compared to Russian men. There 
are 24 female participants in my study and only 16 males. Men were more hesitant to participate 
compared to women. It was mostly due to their busy schedules and the lack of interest. Women, 
on the other hand, were excited to participate and talk about their experiences. My data shows 
that, compared to Russian men, Russian women are more open to economic, cultural, and 
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political socialization in the US. Among the study participants, 8 women came to the US after 
marrying American men. All 8 marriages were going strong at the time of data collection. It 
shows that Russian women are more accepting of a foreign culture and willing to learn and, 
when occasion calls for it, to compromise. Russian men, on the other hand, refuse the idea of an 
intercultural marriage. They do not believe in it and insist that cultural differences will destroy 
even the strongest of romantic connections (Andrei (m/ne)).  
It is interesting to note that the Admirers group in my classification consists of five 
women and only one man. Two female Admirers demonstrated their enthusiasm about the 
American political process despite lacking in their English language skills. Many of my female 
respondents are either breadwinners in their families (Yaroslava (f/ne) and Stephanie (f/e)) or 
self-employed enthusiasts who find their place in a foreign economic and cultural environment 
with ease (Abigail (f/e), Rina (f/e), Kristina (f/e), Alisa (f/e), Korina (f/ne)). Based on my data, I 
can conclude that Russian female immigrants adapt better to their host environment compared to 
Russian male immigrants because they are more accepting of a foreign mentality. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, Nina Michalikova found considerable differences between 
East European male and female immigrants in the US. She noted that East European women are 
more educated and more socially active compared to East European men. Women tend to be 
equally well integrated into the labor market and social environments, like neighborhoods 
(Michalikova, 2017, pp. 161-165). My data confirm these findings.        
8.3. Comparisons to Russian speakers in the US, Israel, and Germany 
Soviet Jews in the US, did not feel inferior to Americans and preferred integration in the 
US society by economic means through business ownerships (Gold, 1997, p. 272). However, 
they felt condescending attitudes from American Jewish community for either not being very 
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religious or for being too conservative about politics. Soviet Jews usually affiliated with 
Republican Party while American Jews, for the most part, are Democrats. As a result, many 
Soviet Jews resented resettlement programs initiated by American Jewish organizations. In 
addition, those who held important positions in the USSR, felt ashamed for not retaining similar 
status in the US and intentionally withdrew from American Jewish communities (Ibid., p. 168).  
In Israel, Russian-speaking immigrants from the FSU have a passive perception of their 
role in national politics. They “are unfamiliar with the mechanisms of public influence in a 
democratic society (laws, bureaucratic procedures, and so on)” (Philippov & Knafelman, 2011, 
p. 44). Russian-speakers in Israel do not believe in a fairness of electoral campaigns and insist 
that a state should have a distance from its citizens (Ibid.). At the same time, they embrace the 
right-wing of political spectrum and favor strong leadership, individual liberties, and national 
level politics (Ibid., p. 41). A more recent research indicates that Russian-speakers in Israel 
started to move away from the national politics toward local political scenes. FSU immigrants 
are among the three largest and most influential groups in Israeli politics (the other two are the 
Arabs and ultra-Orthodox Jews). Their “advantages stem their large size, human capital, strong 
ethnic consciousness, and their increasing desire to be a leading group in Israel” (Al-Haj, 2015, 
p. 96). It is evident that Russian-speaking immigrants feel more politically confident and 
efficient in Israel. They are no longer strangers, but one of the leading groups of citizens and 
decision-makers.  
  Germany has a reputation of a stable, socially-oriented state. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, there was an influx of immigrants to Germany consisting mostly of Russian-
speaking Jews and ethnic Germans from Kazakhstan and Russia (Münz & Ohliger, 2003, p. 
292). Upon their arrival, ethnic Germans from FSU and Eastern Europe (collectively called 
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Aussiedler) were not targeted by German political parties because they “were seen as having a 
lifestyle that was outdated and, hence, would tend toward being conservative” (Ibid., p. 289). 
Aussiedler, while great in numbers, lacked social networking skills and, as a group, had low 
organizational and mobilization capabilities (Ibid., p. 299).  
Russian-speaking immigrants viewed Germany as a well-developed country with high 
standards of living. At the same time, they had to go through a disillusionment stage, similar to 
Russians in America. Reality was not as rosy as it seemed from afar: German people were not 
very friendly and German bureaucracy was bulky and confusing (Isurin, 2011, p. 77). Russian-
speakers felt inferior toward Germans whom they perceived as far more cultured and 
sophisticated people. In addition, immigrants often felt unwelcomed due to a wide-spread 
prejudice against foreigners (Ibid., p. 88).    
A limited research shows that, as of 2016, approximately 35 percent of Russian Germans 
supported the Christian Democratic Union for Germany (CDU), a center-right political party. 
Ten to fourteen percent favored the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a right-wing to far-right 
political party (Stratievski, 2017).  Russians in Germany is a complex group that incorporates 
over eighty different nationalities. They do not play a substantial role in German politics because 
“a homogenous Russian-speaking community simply doesn’t exist in Germany” (Ibid.).  
Why do immigrants from the USSR and later Russia tend to be more conservative in their 
political views? In my opinion, the best explanation was provided by Zvi Gitelman. In his 1982 
study of the Soviet and American immigrants to Israel, he noticed that after living in Israel for 
three years, immigrants from the Soviet Union had changed their opinion about political efficacy 
(it became more positive), but not an authority (remained the same). Gitelman hypothesized that 
“the sense of efficacy is more sensitive to the specific political system, whereas attitudes toward 
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authority are more immune to changes in political environment” (Gitelman, 1982, p. 313). He 
theorized that attitudes toward authority are formed continuously starting at an early age. People 
are exposed to an authority concept in their families, at school, and at work. As follows, opinions 
on authority are more stable and less amenable to change. In a paternalistic state such as Russia, 
people are historically more submissive to authority. As follows, while immigrants’ opinions on 
political efficacy can be influenced by experiences in their host society (as it was displayed in 
my study), attitudes toward authority had proven to be very consistent and resistant to changes 
among immigrants from Russia and other former Soviet republics.     
8.4. Theoretical findings 
In this study, only the Admirers are willing and ready to participate in the political 
process in ways they had never considered in Russia. At 15 percent, they are the smallest group 
in the sample. What happened to the others? If we were to evaluate Skeptics and the Incurious 
using Almond and Powell’s conceptualization, both groups would qualify as ‘subjects’ in the 
political culture framework:  
“Subjects are those citizens who become part of the national political system and 
perceive its impact, or potential impact, on their lives. But their view of their own role in 
politics remains that of subjects, affected by governmental action, but not active in 
shaping it. They may have policy preferences, as well as positive or negative expectations 
about their treatment by police and administration. They may even develop a sense of 
legitimacy toward, or alienation from, the regime and the authorities. But they remain 
passive in their orientation toward political participation” (Almond & Powell, 1978, p. 
35).  
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In order for subjects to transform into participants, they need to exhibit high levels of 
political trust and low levels of political hostility. Political trust refers to an individual’s 
willingness to work with others and the ability to view himself/herself as an important part of the 
group. Political hostility is an “emotional component of intergroup and interpersonal relation in a 
society” (Ibid., p. 38). A sense of mutual hostility can easily develop if groups base their 
relations on differences and do not search for a common ground. Political trust and political 
hostility are inversely related, and a balance between them depends on political culture. Almond 
and Verba defined the US political culture as a participant (Almond & Verba, 1963). A century 
earlier, de Tocqueville, an outsider, had acknowledged the infectious atmosphere of groups and 
associations present in the US (Tocqueville, 1945b). Though public activities might have 
decreased toward the end of the 20th century (Putnam, 1995), even the study participants agree 
that the US is a country with an active collective consciousness and energetic political 
disposition. They described the US as the most organized and comfortable place for living with 
no bureaucratic or other forms of corruption. They trust in American government much more 
than the Russian one. At the same time, only Admirers became politically enthusiastic in 
America. Why did the American political culture fail to disarm the Skeptics and excite the 
Incurious?    
A glance in more recent work by one of the original contributors to political culture 
concept (G. Bingham Powell), reveals a simplified logic behind the classification of political 
culture into parochial, subject, and participant – a congruence theory. “For instance, support for a 
democratic system is typically higher in societies that have a more participatory political culture. 
Authoritarian states are more likely to endure where people lack the skills or motivations to 
participate and the state discourages their participation” (Powell et al., 2012, p. 50).  According 
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to Powell et.al, a proper education and a democratic setting should, eventually, make people 
politically active. Looking at my sample, there are sixteen respondents (40%) with advanced 
degrees; eighteen (45%) have college degrees; five individuals (12.5%) went to a trade school; 
one did not finish his Bachelor’s degree, and one was in college at the time of the interview. In 
other words, it is a very educated bunch, and one cannot blame the lack of political participation 
on ignorance. All respondents immigrated to the US between the years of 2004 and 2014. So 
they had spent at least several years in a participant political culture before interviews took place. 
Nevertheless, they remain as passive observers. What is the problem? 
Larry Diamond pointed out that “socioeconomic development does generate more 
‘modern’ attitudes and values: greater tolerance and valuing freedom, higher levels of political 
efficacy, greater capacity to participate in politics and civic life” (Diamond, 1999, p. 162). After 
researching the evolution of political culture studies, I realized there is an assumption at the base 
of the concept that was never questioned. We assume that educated individuals will readily 
participate in the political process if opportunity presents itself. We assume that an authoritarian 
regime is the only barrier that prevents people from being politically active. Finally, we assume 
that political participation is a natural human behavior. What if these assumptions are wrong? As 
this study shows, it is possible to gather forty educated individuals who, for the most part, are not 
interested in political participation and feel quite comfortable on the sidelines of the political 
process. There are people like Semion (m/ne) the Skeptic and Timur (m/e) the Incurious. Both 
are post-doctoral researchers, and they both came to the US in 2004-2005 timeframe which 
means they’ve spent more than a decade in the US by the time our interviews took place. Timur 
and Semion like to talk about politics, they vote, and volunteer their time and expertise. At the 
same time, both are disillusioned about politics. According to political culture concept, they 
195 
 
should desire to change political process if they dislike it. On the contrary, Timur and Semion 
prefer to withdraw from it and so do many other respondents. Because of examples like these, I 
do not agree with the assumption that people would naturally become politically active in an 
encouraging political environment.  
I also question the premise about political culture’s developmental progression from a 
parochial to a subject and from a subject to a participant. Had this process ever occurred? In my 
opinion, the three types of political culture follow an outdated logic: one can picture it as a three-
step ladder with a parochial step on the bottom and a participant on the top. For some 
unexplained reason, every country is expected to climb this ladder in order to reach the top step.  
Furthermore, when it comes to questions of identity and culture, one of the most 
prominent theories today is liberal multiculturalism. It teaches us to tolerate, respect, and support 
opinions, identities, and culture that are different from ours. Political philosopher Will Kymlicka 
argued that “liberal multiculturalism is the view that states should not only uphold the familiar 
set of common civil, political, and social rights of citizenship…but also adopt various group-
specific rights or policies that are intended to recognize and accommodate the distinctive 
identities and aspirations of ethnocultural groups” (Kymlicka, 2007, p. 61). The message of 
multiculturalism is to celebrate diversity of cultures, religions, ethnicities, identities, etc.  
However, when it comes to political culture, countries, and societies are still judged 
against the three-step ladder in an attempt to achieve Francis Fukuyama’s ‘true global culture’ 
“centering around technologically driven economic growth and the capitalist social relations 
necessary to produce and sustain it” (Fukuyama, 2006, p. 126). In my opinion, the concept of 
political culture is an exceptional and important part of the Comparative Politics studies. It 
provides an opportunity to look past the dry constructs of states’ political structures in search for 
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deeper meanings behind domestic and foreign policy decisions. At the same time, it should not 
be used as a measuring tool, but rather a catalog to document and preserve the richness of 
political cultures and their lifecycles throughout the human history.         
8.5. Study limitations and future opportunities 
As any social research, this study has its limitations and imperfections. The common 
problem in social science research is a lack of the middle ground: it is either too narrow 
(qualitative methods) or too wide (quantitative methods) (Gerring, 2001). Qualitative studies are 
based on an in-depth research in a natural setting; it requires a massive amount of information 
about a subject or a case. That is why a good qualitative study has few subjects (cases) but 
provides detailed descriptions. The ultimate goal is to paint a complex and holistic picture of a 
phenomenon.  In my opinion, the qualitative method has one main limitation – subjectivity. An 
in-depth analysis leaves little room for objectivity and generalizability. Since the researcher is 
deeply involved in the process of his/her research, it could be challenging to differentiate 
between experiences of the researcher and the researched. I think my interview questions had 
changed my respondents in some ways as they had never considered many of the questions. 
Likewise, they had changed me, my perceptions, and my abilities to analyze their responses. 
Subjectivity is the result of data gathering techniques that are too close and personal.   
 A qualitative method used in this study is grounded theory. Glazer and Strauss, the 
fathers of grounded theory, developed a path to a theory-building relying on data and skipping 
any a priori assumptions (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 3). They had also acknowledged the 
Achilles’ heel of grounded theory - theoretical saturation. The researcher is constantly 
confronted with ‘slices of data’ – different kinds of data that provide “different views or vantage 
points from which to understand a category and to develop its properties” (Ibid., p. 65). In a way, 
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theoretical saturation never ends. There is always one more additional point or an opinion. In 
case of immigrants’ political socialization, different vantage points can be provided by 
respondents’ friends and family, colleagues, fellow church-goers, etc. Their insights on 
respondents’ adaptation in the US could be invaluable to my theory. Unfortunately, getting these 
‘slices of data’ would mean to violate respondent’s privacy and deem my research unethical.   
In terms of my data, I have only one regret – I wish I asked my respondents about their 
living accommodations. Do they rent or own their homes? I think this aspect is important and 
relevant to this study because it can indicate the level of commitment to life in the US. With that 
said, I envision different avenues for future follow-up research. It could be interesting to broaden 
the study’s geography. For example, there is a large Russian-speaking community split between 
Columbus and Cincinnati in the state of Ohio. It would be very interesting to compare and 
contrast their experiences with those from Florida. Another interesting idea is to conduct the 
same study with Ukrainians, Belarusians, and immigrants from other former Soviet republics in 
Central and South Florida. Comparing their interviews with those of ethnic Russians could give 
some interesting insights not only on their socialization patterns but differences in post-Soviet 
adaptations in general.  
8.6. Summary  
In this chapter, the main findings were compared to initial assumptions to reveal that 
good English language skills do not determine the success of political socialization. Instead, a 
personal initiative can speed up the process. American political socialization agencies seem to be 
within arm’s reach, so to speak. There is an apparent disconnect between interviews and survey 
results indicating that respondents either lack political exposure or suffer from an inferiority 
complex (or both). The majority of respondents did not change their attitudes toward politics and 
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political participation despite being surrounded by a participant political culture. It means that 
you can get a person out of his/her political culture, but you cannot get a political culture out of 
the person. If this is correct, then people, like countries, carry their political cultures through 
their lives. In chapter 1 I argued that both the US and Russia display a continuity of political 
culture. If it applies to people as well as their countries, then there is a need to reconsider the use 
of political culture. I propose to use it as a catalog instead of a measuring tool.     
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Conclusion 
 “So tell me, what is civil society?” – Anna asked the minute our interview was over. I 
replied: “It is a complex social phenomenon, but first and foremost, it is a responsibility.” We 
talked about it for another hour.  
Anna was born and raised in St. Petersburg, Russia. She is still in love with her 
hometown. When I asked her if she misses it, she started crying: “of course I do, it is the most 
beautiful place in the world!” As someone who grew up in Russia in the 1990s, Anna is no 
stranger to the feeling of defeat.  
“In 1998, I remember I wanted to buy a nail polish, so I put some pocket money 
aside. I went to a store thinking I can buy five bottles of nail polish, but I could only 
afford one – prices went up overnight after Russia’s economy defaulted. I got used to 
things collapsing around me. The 1990s was a non-stop economic and social failure. 
Living in a constant downfall was the norm.”  
Anna got her first job in a company that later was charged with fraud and extortion. She 
worked at the front office and had no idea that her employers committed routine raids on small 
businesses. She moved on and accepted another job offer but only after she confirmed that her 
salary would be ‘white’28 and she knew how the company functioned. She became wary of 
corruption and fraud. After the 2011 Parliamentary elections, Anna became very distrustful of 
                                                          
28 A ‘white salary’ is a legal wage. Black salary is an unofficial earning given to an employee under the table to avoid 
paying taxes.  
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the Russian political system as well. In Chapter 7, subsection 7.1.3 (p. 153), I described Anna’s 
unpleasant confrontation at the polling station when she realized that, due to her name change, a 
polling station personnel intended to use her vote twice.   
Anna lives in the US since 2012. She is a stay-at-home mom and a homemaker. Anna’s 
husband is a former Russian compatriot who left Russia in 1992 when he was 22 years old. They 
met in St. Petersburg when he came to Russia to sell a property he inherited. Anna visited him in 
the US several times. On her last trip, she became pregnant and stayed for good.  
Anna was one of the first people who volunteered for my study. She called me the same 
day I posted my ad on Facebook. She likes discussing politics. Both Anna and her husband 
oppose Putin’s regime in Russia. They blame it for Russian economic stagnation and its 
continuous social backwardness. They pay a lot of attention to Russia’s opposition and American 
mainstream media. Anna would like to obtain American citizenship not only for unrestricted 
international travel (the most popular answer among my respondents) but also because she wants 
to participate in the political process. Anna believes that in the US your voice means something 
and you can influence your environment. In Russia, she witnessed corruption too many times to 
hope for any improvements in the economic and political order. Anna does not speak English 
very well and communicates mostly with her husband, his friends, and fellow Russian-speaking 
stay-at-home mothers.  
This study was an attempt to understand how first-generation ethnic Russian immigrants 
socialize in the American political environment. Anna was one of forty respondents who 
participated. The concept of political culture assumes that people are socially inclined to be 
politically active. Political participation suffocates under authoritarian regimes and thrives in 
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democracies. As follows, immigrants from Russia, an authoritarian state, should exhibit behavior 
similar to Anna’s. 
On the contrary, Anna is one of only six people – the Admirers – who became more 
enthusiastic about the US’s political process. The two largest groups – Skeptics and the Incurious 
– did not demonstrate any changes in their political behavior. The final group – the Recluses – 
reduced their interest in politics altogether.   
Russian immigrants do not come to the United States to escape misery, discrimination, or 
persecution. Like the rest of Eastern Europeans, Russians move to improve their standards of 
living. They did not have advantages available to some other immigrant groups: government 
assistance (early Cuban immigrants), resources of ethnic organizations (Russian-speaking Jews), 
or extensive social networks (immigrants from Latin America & Asia). Russians have to be more 
resourceful in their economic, social, and political adaptations in the United States.   
They appreciate America for its economic and political stability and concentrate on their 
personal and professional goals. For example, when it comes to voting, my research leads me to 
believe that the fundamental difference between Russian and American voters is the reasoning. 
Americans vote to elect someone to represent them and their domestic and foreign interests. 
Russians vote to elect a leader who could alleviate them from thinking about their domestic and 
foreign affairs. Russians seek stability so they can dedicate their time to personal interests.  
Anna had an interesting story to share about people in Russia. Her husband once tried to 
start an international business and sought partners in Russia. Very soon he became frustrated 
with Russians because no one was willing to invest in his business idea. In Anna’s words: “my 
husband still does not understand why clever and well-educated people in Russia refuse to 
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progress and move forward. None of his friends wanted to take advantage of his offer. It was 
risky, but, as you know, losers do not drink champagne29” Anna’s husband was disappointed in 
Russia. For him, Russia became the place of endless suffering. Partially it was due to a tragic 
family loss, but it was also because people were unwilling to change. Again, Russians seek 
stability and they are willing to pass on something potentially profitable but risky.    
In Chapter 1 I described American and Russian political cultures. Both exhibit a 
historical continuity: some elements in Russian and American political cultures can be traced 
several hundred years back. American political culture is individualistic and prone to civic 
initiatives. Russian political culture is paternalistic and tend to have a well-defined hierarchical 
structure.  
In Chapter 8, I concluded that people do not change easily and immigrants carry their 
native political culture with them wherever they go. The study findings confirm that immigrants 
do not embrace political culture of a host society. Stephen White’s transferability theory of 
political resocialization (Chapter 2) has some merit: immigrants retain their previous beliefs and 
patterns of political behavior after immigration (White et al., 2008, p. 269).   
There is an apparent disconnect between interviews and survey results: many respondents 
declared themselves apolitical during interviews. At the same time, their surveys indicated they 
had strong opinions. This disconnect may be due to the lack of understanding what is considered 
a political issue. The inferiority complex could be another explanation.    
Overall, the study shows that political socialization of first-generation ethnic Russians in 
the US can be successful. It does not depend on a good knowledge of the English language. 
                                                          
29 A loose translation from Russian idiom ‘кто не рискует тот не пьёт шампанское’ 
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Rather it happens at will – an immigrant must want to socialize politically. Those who speak 
good English, have an encouraging partner and little children, seem to want it more than others. 
The most common agencies of political socialization used by ethnic Russians are ESOL classes, 
a spouse, volunteering organizations, and the church.    
In this study, I developed an immigrants’ political attitudes classification based on 
opinions on political process, mass media, political participation and efficacy. The classification 
consists of four groups: the Admirers, the Skeptics, the Incurious, and the Recluses. This 
classification is generalizable and could be successfully used in other studies about immigrants.     
The main theoretical contribution consists of a proposal to treat political culture concept 
as a catalog instead of a classification tool that is used to sort political cultures around the world 
into three tight categories that tell little about different people and their political aspirations.   
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Verbal Informed Consent 
 
Researchers at the University of South Florida (USF) study many topics. To do this, we need the 
help of people who agree to take part in a research study. We are asking you to take part in a 
research study that is called: When faced with Democracy: the study of ethnic Russian 
immigrants and their political socialization in the U.S. 
 
The person who is in charge of this research study is Marina Mendez. This person is called the 
Principal Investigator.   
 
You are being asked to participate because you are a first generation ethnic Russian immigrant 
who either obtained/ is currently obtaining education from a US college or university, have an 
American partner and/or friends, work/worked for an American company, and is exposed to 
American culture and speaks English; or did not attend any American college or university, have 
your own business or work for/with other Russian-speaking people, is either single or married to 
a fellow Russian and speak little to no English.  
The purpose of this study is to test if the exposure to American society and its values influence 
any changes in political opinions among ethnic Russian immigrants.    
 
If you take part in this study, you will be asked to give an interview about some aspects of your 
life in Russia prior to immigration and after moving to the United States. In addition, prior to the 
interview you will receive a survey that would determine your political ideology. All the data 
will be collected anonymously and conducted in a place of your choosing.   
 
You have the alternative to choose not to participate in this research study.  
 
You should only take part in this study if you want to volunteer and should not feel that there is 
any pressure to take part in the study. You are free to participate in this research or withdraw at 
any time.  
This research is considered to be minimal risk.  
 
We will not pay you for the time you volunteer while being in this study.  
 
We must keep your study records as confidential as possible. We may publish what we learn 
from this study. If we do, we will not let anyone know your name. We will not publish anything 
else that would let people know who you are. However, certain people may need to see your 
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study records. By law, anyone who looks at your records must keep them completely 
confidential. The only people who will be allowed to see these records are: 
 
• The research team, including: 
Marina Mendez, principle investigator; 
Dr. Darrell Slider, the advising professor, dissertation committee chair; 
Dr. Elizabeth Aranda, dissertation committee member; 
Dr. Kees Boterbloem, dissertation committee member; 
Dr. Harry Vanden, dissertation committee member; 
 
• Certain government and university people who need to know more about the study. For 
example, individuals who provide oversight on this study may need to look at your records. This 
is done to make sure that we are doing the study in the right way. They also need to make sure 
that we are protecting your rights and your safety. These include: 
 
• The University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the staff that work 
for the IRB. Other individuals who work for USF that provide other kinds of oversight 
may also need to look at your records. 
• The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).   
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the USF IRB 
at (813) 974-5638 or contact by email at RSCH-IRB@usf.edu. If you have questions regarding 
the research, please contact the Principal Investigator by email at kulakova@usf.edu or by phone 
at (727) 417-1892  
 
Would you like to participate in this study? YES____________ 
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Форма для получения осознанного устного согласия: 
Исследователи из Университета Южной Флориды (USF) изучают разные темы. Для этого 
нам нужна помощь людей согласных принять участие в исследовании. Мы просим вас 
принять участие в исследовании под названием: «Лицом к лицу с демократией: 
политическая социализация этнических русских иммигрантов в США» 
Марина Мендез, главный исследователь, отвечает за данное научное исследование. 
Вас просят принять участие потому что вы считаетесь первым поколением этнических 
русских эмигрантов из России и ЛИБО  говорите по-английски, работаете в американской 
компании, имеете / получаете образование в американском колледже или университете, 
состоите в браке с американским гражданином и/или имеете американских друзей; ЛИБО 
плохо говорите по английски (или не говорите вообще) и в основном общаетесь, лично и 
профессионально, с другими русскими иммигрантами. 
Цель данного исследования: изучить воздействует ли американское общество и его 
ценности на политические взгляды и предпочтения этнических русских иммигрантов. 
Если вы примите участие в данном исследовании, вам будет предложено дать интервью о 
некоторых аспектах вашей жизни до и после переезда в США. Перед интервью вам надо 
будет пройти тест который определит вашу политическую идеологию. Все данные будут 
собираться анонимно. Интервью будет проводиться в любом удобном для вас месте.  
У вас есть выбор не участвовать в данном исследовании. 
Участие в исследовании только добровольное без оказания какого-либо давления в 
принятии решения об участии. Вы можете прирвать ваше участие в любое время. Какой-
либо риск от участия в данном исследовании минимален. 
Мы обязаны хранить все ваши сведения в секрете. Мы можем опубликовать результаты 
данного исследования. При этом, мы никому не позволим узнать ваше имя или детали 
которые помогут вас идентифицировать.Тем не менее, некоторым людям, возможно, 
будет необходимо ознакомиться со всеми материалами исследования. По закону, люди 
которые знакомятся с  вашими сведениями, должны держать их в секрете. 
Список людей у которых будет возможность ознакомиться с вашими сведениями и 
материалами: 
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Марина Мендэз – главный исследователь; 
Dr. Darrell Slider – косультирующий профессор, председатель диссертационной комиссии; 
Dr. Elizabeth Aranda – член диссертационной комиссии; 
Dr. Kees Boterbloem - член диссертационной комиссии; 
Dr. Harry Vanden - член диссертационной комиссии.  
Некоторым государственным служащим и работникам университета также необходим 
доступ к материалам исследования. Люди которые контролируют данное исследование, 
возможно просмотрят ваши материалы чтобы убедиться в том что мы проводим это 
исследование по всем правилам и защищаем ваши права и вашу безопасность. К этим 
людям относятся: 
• Сотрудники The University of South Florida Institutional Review Board. Сотрудники 
университета которые осуществляют другие виды контроля. 
• The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 
По вопросам о ваших правах как участника исследования можно связаться с IRB USF по 
телефону (813) 974-5638 или по электронной почте RSCH-IRB@usf.edu. Если у вас 
возникли вопросы, касающиеся самого исследования, пожалйста свяжитесь с главным 
исследователем по электронной почте kulakova@usf.edu или по телефону (727) 417-1892. 
 
Хотите ли вы принять участие в этом исследовании? ДА___________________  
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Interview Questions 
Background and country of origin 
1. What city in Russia are you from?  
2. What did your parents do for a living?  
3. How would you describe your family’s financial situation when you were growing 
up?  
4. What were your impressions of the Perestroika period and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union?  
5. What is your opinion about the economic and political reforms conducted by the 
Russian government throughout the 1990s?  
6. What effect did the 1998 Russian financial crisis have on you and your family?  
7. What was/is your attitude toward the First Chechen War (1994-1996) and the 
Second Chechen War (1999-2002)?  
8. What social class did you belong to in independent Russia?  
9. Did you belong to any political groups?  
10. Did you have an opinion about Russia’s politics while living there?  
11. Were you familiar with Russian political parties and their political platforms?   
12. Were your family and friends interested in politics?   
13. Did you participate in any on-going discussions about politics?   
14. What was your favorite TV channel in Russia?   
Favorite programs or type of programs?  
Did you regularly watch the news in Russia?  
15. What was your favorite newspaper/news website in Russia?  
16. What did you think of America while you were still in Russia?  
17. Did you have any opinion about the US political structure or the idea of democracy? 
What is it supposed to look like?  
Adaptation to the US 
1. Why did you decide to come to the US?  
2. When and at what age did you come to the US?  
3. What did you expect when you left Russia? What thought did you have while sitting 
on the plane?  
4. Did anything surprise you on your arrival in the USA?  
5. Did you experience any language barriers when you moved to the US?   
6. How long did it take you to become comfortable with the language?  
7. What do you think about Americans?  
8. What do you think about America?  
9. Have you ever felt isolated or lonely?    
10. Have you ever felt homesick?  
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11. Are there any particular problems associated with life in the US that you have 
encountered?  
12. How would you describe the American identity in one word? 
• a 
13. Do you have an opinion about American politics?   
14. Do you think the American system is more efficient than the Russian system?   
15. What is your citizenship status in the US? 
 
Identity 
1. Do you consider yourself a typical Russian?  
How would you describe a typical Russian?  
2. How would you describe Russia to someone who has never been there?  
3. Is there a particular group of people that you are comfortable with? (race, ethnicity, 
country of origin, educational/financial background)  
4. When people ask you where you are from, what do you tell them?  
5. Do you feel proud/ashamed/scared/indifferent telling them that?  
6. Do you consider yourself an American?   
7. How often do you speak English as opposed to Russian?  
 
Education and college experiences (optional) 
1. What is the highest level of education you obtained in Russia?  
What was your major?  
2. Did you acquire any or further education in the US?  
3. What was your major?  
4. Did you take classes on politics in college in the U.S.?   
5. Did you feel comfortable studying together with Americans?  
6. Were you afraid to express your opinion on some topics that you studied?  
7. Were you judged in any way because you are Russian?   
8. While going to school/university, did you make any American friends?  
9. Did you have roommates? What nationality (-ies) were they?  
10. While in school, did you belong to any clubs, organizations, etc.?   
11. Do you feel that your political perceptions changed after being educated in the US?   
12. After graduating, why did you stay in the US?  
13. Didn’t you want to go back to Russia?  
 
Job 
1. Where do you work?  
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2. Is it an American company?  
3. Do you have American co-workers?   
4. If so, how close are you to your co-workers?  
5. Do you talk about politics?  
6. If not, what do you talk about?  
7. Do you often agree with your co-workers’ opinions?  
8. Is your workplace more Republican or Democratic? 
What is the difference between the Republican and Democratic parties? 
Republican 
Democratic   
9. Do you feel comfortable working with Americans?  
10. Do you like the work atmosphere of your workplace?   
11. Are you afraid of losing your job?   
12. Do you like the benefits that come with your work?  
13. Do you think you would be more secure working in Russia?  
 
Relationships 
1. Are you married/engaged/in a relationship?   
2. If yes, is your partner American?  
3. If yes, do you understand each other perfectly?  
4. Do you ever feel that there is a cultural barrier?  
5. What are your partner’s political views (democrat, republican, etc.)?   
6. Do you have the same political views as your partner?   
7. Did you alter your political views after being in a relationship with your partner?  
8. What does your partner think about Russia?   
9. Do you discuss relations between the US and Russia?  
10. Do you agree with each other in your analysis?  
11. How close are you with your partner’s family?  
12. Did you have difficulty fitting in?   
13. Do you have American friends?  
14. Do you have Russian friends?  
15. With whom do you communicate the most?  
16. Do your American friends talk about politics?  
What about your Russian friends?  
Whom do you agree with the most? Why?   
17. Have you ever stopped communicating with anyone whose political opinions you 
disagree with?     
18. Do you communicate with people back in Russia?   
19. What do you think about their political views?    
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20. Do you feel they are different from yours?  
21. Do you go home? How often?  
22. How do you feel when you travel back to Russia?  
 
 
 
Participation (currently) 
 
1. Do you belong to any clubs?  
2. Do you go to church? Which one?   
3. Do you do volunteer work?   
4. Did you participate in any similar organizations in Russia?   
5. Do you follow American political news?   
Do you watch news/debates on the ongoing presidential elections?  
6. How engaged are you in the political process?  
7. Would you say you care more about politics in the US or Russia?  
8. Is there a particular political party you identify with (in Russia or the US or both 
countries)? Why or why not?  
9. Do you vote?  
10. Have you voted in Russia?  
11. In the US?  
If you voted in this country, what are the issues you consider the most important?  
12. How do you feel the US government treats the government of Russia?  
13. What is your opinion of Putin and his policies? 
14. Did you have a similar view when you lived in Russia?  
15. Do you follow Russian domestic politics? What do you think about them?  
 
Media 
1. Do you watch TV, listen to the radio, and browse the internet?  
2. Is your media of preference Russian or American?  
Do you have access to Russian TV channels? 
Which Russian channels do you watch?  
3. How would you compare television and newspapers here in the US with those of 
Russia?  
4. Do you think American media are more free and objective compared to Russian?  
5. What is your favorite movie?  
6. Do you prefer American movies or Russian ones?   
7. What do you think about the situation in Ukraine?  
8. Do you follow any news on the development in Ukraine? If yes, which ones? 
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9. Do you agree with American involvement in Ukraine? Why or why not? 
10. Do you agree with any Russian involvement in Ukraine? Why or why not?  
11. Are there any other new stories about Russia that you are following? 
 
Summary questions 
 
1. Do you feel that being in the US gives you an idea of what is the best and most 
efficient political system?  
2. Do you see the differences in political realities of Russia and the US? What are they?  
3. Do you think you saw this in the same manner before you came to the US?  
4. Do you think you became more critical in your political judgment?  
5. Would you ever go back to live in Russia? Why or why not?  
6. Name three things that you like in the US compared to Russia?  
7. Three things you like in Russia compared to the US? 
8. In your opinion, what is a civil society?  
Is there a civil society in Russia?  
In the US?  
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Вопросы для интервью 
 
О вашем прошлом и стране происхождения 
 
1. Из каковы вы города в России? 
2. Чем занимались ваши родители? 
3. Как бы вы описали финансовое положение вашей семьи, когда вы росли? 
4. Какие впечатления на вас произвела перестройка и развал Советского Союза? 
5 Какого ваше мнение об экономических и политических реформах в России в 90-е годы? 
6. Какое влияние на вас и ваше семью оказал финансовый кризис 1998 года? 
7. Какое у вас мнение о первой Чеченской войне (1994-96)? 
8. Какое у вас мнение о второй Чеченской войне (1999-2002)? 
9. К какому социальному классу вы принадлежали в независимой России? 
10. Были ли вы членом какой- либо политической группы? 
11. У вас было мнение о Российской политике? 
12. Вы знали о Российских политических партиях и их программах? 
13. Ваши семья и друзья интересовались политикой? 
14. Вы участвовали в каких-либо политических разговорах/спорах? 
15. У вас был любимый телевизионный канал? Какие программы и какого жанра? Новости 
смотрели регулярно? 
16. Любимая газета, журнал или сайт в интернете? 
17. Пока вы жили в России, что вы дyмали об Америке? 
18. У вас было какое-нибудь мнение о политическом устройстве США или о демократии  
в целом (что она должна из себя представлять) 
 
Первое время в США (адаптация) 
 
1. Почему вы решили переехать в США? 
2. Когда и в каком возрасте вы переехали в США? 
3. Что вы ожидали, когда покидали Россию? 
4. Вас что- нибудь удивило по прибытии в США? 
5. У вас были проблемы с языком, когда вы переехали? 
6. Сколько времени потребовалось, чтобы привыкнуть к языку? 
7. Что вы думаете об американцах? 
8. Что вы думаете об Америке? 
9. Вы когда-нибудь чувствовали себя здесь одиноко или изолированно? 
10. Вы когда-нибудь скучали по дому/родине? 
11. Есть ли в США какие-то определенные жизненные проблемы с которыми вы 
сталкивались? 
12. Одним словом опишите Американскую идентичность. 
13. У вас есть мнение о политике США? 
14. Как вы думаете, Американская политическая система более эффективна чем 
Российская? 
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15. В каком статусe вы находитесь в США? 
 
О себе 
 
1. Вы считаете себя типичным(ой) русским(ой)? Как бы вы описали типичного русского? 
2. Как бы вы описали Россию человеку, который там никогда не был? 
3. У вас есть какая-либо определенная группа/категория людей, с которыми вам особенно 
комфортно (раса, национальность, страна происхождения, образовательный или 
финансовый уровень)? 
4. Когда вас кто-то спрашивает откуда вы родом, что вы им отвечаете? Вы говорите что 
вы из России? 
5. Какие вы при этом испытываете эмоции (гордость, стыд, страх, спокойствие)? 
6. Вы себя считаете американцем/американкой? 
7. Как часто вы разговариваете на английском по сравнению с русским? 
 
Образование 
 
1. Какое образование вы получили в России? Кто вы по этому образованию? 
2. Вы получили какое-нибудь образование в США? 
3. Какая специальность? 
4. В США у вас были классы о политике? 
5. Вы себя свободно чувствовали в классе с американцами? 
6. Вы боялись высказывать свое мнение? 
7. Вас осуждали или критиковали за то что вы русский(ая)? 
8. Пока вы учились, у вас появились американские друзья? 
9. Вы снимали с кем-нибудь квартиру? Какой национальности были эти люди? 
10. Пока вы учились, являлись ли вы членами каких-нибудь клубов или организаций? 
11. По вашему мнению, после получения образования в США,  у вас изменилось 
представление о политике? 
12. Почему вы остались в США после получения диплома? 
13. А вы хотели вернуться в Россию? 
 
Работа 
 
1. Где вы работаете? 
2. Это aмериканская компания? 
3. У вас есть американские коллеги? 
4. Если да, вы с ними хорошо общаетесь? 
5. Вы с ними разговариваете о политике? Если нет, то о чем? 
6. Если разговариваете, то о чем именно? 
7. Вы часто соглашаетесь с мнениями своих американских коллег? 
8. Большинство ваших сотрудников Республиканцы или Демократы? Какая между ними 
разница? 
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9. Вы себя свободно чувствуете, работая с американцами? 
10. Вам импонирует рабочая атмосфера на вашем предприятии/месте работы? 
11. Вы боитесь потерять эту работу? 
12. Вам нравится соц. пакет который вам обеспечивает ваша компания? 
13. Как вам кажется, в России вы бы чувствовали себя более защищенными в плане 
трудоустройства? 
 
Отношения 
 
1. Вы женаты/замужем, обручены, в отношениях? 
2. Если да, ваша половинка американец(ка)? 
3. Если да, у вас хорошее взаимопонимание? 
4. Вы не чувствуете никаких различий в культуре или ментальности? 
5. Какие у вашего партнера политические взгляды (партийная принадлежность)? 
6. Вы разделяете политические взгляды вашего партнера? 
7. Вы поменяли свои политические взгляды из-за ваших отношений? 
8. Что ваша половина думает о России? 
9. Между собой вы обсуждаете отношения между США и Россией? 
10. Если да, совпадают ли ваши мнения? 
11. Вы в близких отношения с семьей своей половинки? 
12. Сложно было войти в эту семью? 
13. У вас есть американские друзья? 
14. У вас есть русские друзья? 
15. С кем вы чаще общаетесь? 
16. Ваши американские друзья обсуждают политику? А русские?  С кем вы больше 
соглашаетесь? Почему? 
17. Вы когда-нибудь переставали общаться с людьми из-за их политических взглядов? 
18. Вы общаетесь с кем-нибудь в России? 
19. Что вы думаете об их политических мнениях? 
20. Есть ли разница между вашими взглядами? 
21. Вы ездите в Россию? Как часто? 
22. Что вы ощущаете по возвращению на родину? 
 
Общественная деятельность 
 
1. Вы входите в кaкoй-нибудь клуб по интересам? 
2. Вы ходите в церковь? Какую? 
3. Вы работаете где-нибудь как волонтер? 
4. Если да (на все три вопроса или частично), чем-то подобным вы занимались, будучи 
еще в России? 
5. Вы следите за политическими новостями? А за новостями/дебатами президенстких 
выборов в Штатах? 
6. Как сильно вы интересуетесь (вовлечены) политическим процессом? 
232 
 
7. Вас больше интересует политика в США или в России? 
8. Есть ли определенная политическая сила (партия) которой вы импонируете (в США или 
России или в обеих странах)? Почему или почему нет? 
9. Вы ходите на выборы? 
10. Вы ходили на выборы в России? 
11. В США? Если бы вы имели право голосовать в США, какие проблемы/вопросы вас бы 
больше всего интересовали? 
12. Как по вашему мнению правительство США относиться к правительству России? 
13. Что вы думаете о В. В. Путине? 
14. Ваша оценка его деятельности совпадает с той, что у вас была до переезда в США? 
15. Вы обращаете внимание на внутреннюю политику России? Что вы о ней думаете? 
 
Средства массовой информации 
 
1. Вы смотрите телевизор, слушаете радио, пользуетесь интернетом? 
2. Вы предпочитаете pоссийские или американские новости? Если у вас есть доступ к 
Российским каналам, какие каналы предпочитаете? 
3. В чью пользу сравнение средств массовой информации в России и США? 
4. Как вы считаете, американские средства массовой информации более свободные и 
объективные, чем Российские? 
5. Какой ваш любимый фильм(ы)? 
6. Вам больше нравятся американские или русские фильмы? 
7. Что вы думаете о ситуации на Украине? Вы следите за новостями про Украину? Если 
да, то за какими именно? 
8. Вы согласны с тезисом, что США должны вмешаться на Украине? Почему? 
9. Вы согласны с тезисом, что Россия должна вмешаться на Украине? Почему? 
10. Следите ли вы ещё за какими-нибудь новостями о России? 
 
 
Заключительные (общие) вопросы 
 
1. Как вы думаете, живя в США, вы больше стали понимать какая политическая система 
наиболее эффективная? 
2. Вы видите разницу в политических реалиях России и США? В чем именно они 
различны? 
3. Ваши представления поменялись или они такими были еще в России? 
4. По вашему мнению, вы стали более критичны после переезда в США? 
5. Вы когда-нибудь переeдете жить обратно в Россию? Почему да или нет? 
6. Что вам нравиться в США по сравнению с Россией (три вещи)? 
7. Что вам нравиться в России по сравнению с США (три веши)? 
8. По вашему мнению, что такое гражданское общество? Есть оно в России? В США? 
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Survey questions 
Which of the following statements comes closest to your view? 
24. A. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest 
B. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good 
C. No opinion 
25. A. Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they are willing to work 
hard 
B. Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people 
C. No opinion 
26. A. This country should do whatever it takes to protect the environment 
B. This country has gone too far in its efforts to protect the environment 
C. No opinion 
27. A. Using overwhelming military force is the best way to defeat terrorism around 
the world 
B. Relying too much on military force to defeat terrorism creates hatred and leads to 
more terrorism 
C. No opinion 
28. A. Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can’t get 
ahead these days 
B. Blacks who can’t get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own 
condition 
C. No opinion 
29. A. Business corporations make too much profit 
B. Most corporations make fair and reasonable profits 
C. No opinion 
30. A. Poor people today have it easy because they can get government benefits 
without doing anything in return 
B. Poor people have hard lives because government benefits don’t go far enough to help 
them live decently 
C. No opinion 
31. A. It’s best for the future of our country to be active in world affairs 
B. We should pay less attention to problems overseas and concentrate on problems here 
at home 
C. No opinion 
32. A. It is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good 
values 
B. It is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values 
C. No opinion 
33. A. The growing number of newcomers from other countries threatens traditional 
American customs and values 
B. The growing number of newcomers from other countries strengthen s American 
society 
C. No opinion 
34. A. Government is always wasteful and inefficient 
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B. Government often does a better job than people give it credit for 
C. No opinion 
35. A. Society is better off if people make marriage and having children a priority 
B. Society is just as well off if people have priorities other than marriage and children 
C. No opinion 
36. A. Too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few large companies 
B. The largest companies do not have too much power 
C. No opinion 
37. A. The best way to ensure peace is through military strength 
B. Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace 
C. No opinion 
38. A. Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside of our control 
B. Everyone has it in their own power to succeed 
C. No opinion 
39. A. Homosexuality should be accepted by society 
B. Homosexuality should be discouraged by society 
C. No opinion 
40. A. Americans need to be willing to give up privacy and freedom in order to be 
safe from terrorism 
B. Americans shouldn’t have to give up privacy and freedom in order to be safe from 
terrorism 
C. No opinion 
41. A. Government aid to the poor does more harm than good, by making people too 
dependent on government assistance 
B. Government aid to the poor does more good than harm, because people can’t get out 
of poverty until their basic needs are met 
C. No opinion 
42. A. Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs and hurt the 
economy 
B. Stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost 
C. No opinion 
43. A. Our country has made the changes needed to give blacks equal rights with 
whites 
B. Our country needs to continue making changes to give blacks equal rights with whites 
C. No opinion 
44. A. U.S. efforts to solve problems around the world usually end up making things 
worse 
B. Problems in the world would be even worse without U.S. involvement 
C. No opinion 
45. A. The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means 
going deeper into debt 
B. The government today can’t afford to do much more to help the needy 
C. No opinion 
46. A. Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and 
talents 
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B. Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and 
health care 
C. No opinion  
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Опрос: 
 
Какие из следующих утверждений ближе к вашему мнению? 
1. A. Регулирование бизнеса государством необходимо для защиты интересов 
общества 
B. Регулирование бизнеса государством обычно приносит больше вреда чем 
пользы  
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
2. A. Большинство людей, которые хотят многого добиться, могут этого достигнуть 
если готовы много работать 
B. Для большинства людей тяжелый труд и целеустремленность не являются 
гарантами успеха 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
3. A. Страна должна сделать все возможное для защиты окружающей среды 
B. Страна уже сделала слишком много для защиты окружающей среды  
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
4. A. Превосходство военной силы – это лучший способ победить терроризм  
B. Эксклюзивное использование военной силы в борьбе с терроризмом создаёт 
предпосылки для ненависти и еще большего терроризма 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
5. A. Расовая дискриминация является главной причиной, по которой многие 
чернокожие не могут достичь успеха 
B. Те чернокожие, которые не продвинулись в этой стране, сами виноваты в своих 
провалах 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
6. A. У частных корпораций слишком много прибыли  
B. Большинство частных корпораций довольствуются разумной суммой прибыли 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
7. A. Сегодня бедным людям легко прожить, потому что они получают 
государственные пособия, ничего не делая взамен 
B. Бедным людям сегодня тяжело, потому что государственного пособия 
недостаточно для того, чтобы достойно жить 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
8. A. Для лучшего будущего нашей страны нужно активно участвовать в мировых 
делах 
B. Нам нужно уделять меньше внимания зарубежным проблемам и 
сосредоточиться на проблемах у себя дома  
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
9. A. Для того, чтобы быть хорошим человеком, не обязательно верить в Бога   
B. Чтобы быть хорошим человеком, необходимо верить в Бога 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
10. A. Традиционные Американские ценности под угрозой из-за увеличивающегося 
числа приезжих из других стран  
B. Большое число приезжих только укрепляет Американское общество 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
11. A. Правительство расточительно и неэффективно 
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B. Правительство часто более эффективно чем граждане о нем думают  
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
12. A. Общество улучшается, когда его граждане считают брак и семью самым важным  
B. Общество улучшается даже если у граждан есть другие приоритеты кроме брака 
и семьи 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
13. A. Слишком много власти сконцентрировано в руках нескольких крупных 
компаний 
B. Крупнейшие компании не имеют слишком много власти 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
14. A. Военная мощь – это лучший способ обеспечения мира  
B. Хорошая дипломатия это лучший способ обеспечения мира 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
15. A. Успех в жизни в значительной степени определяется силами, находящимися вне 
нашего контроля 
B. Каждый сам кузнец своего успеха 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
16. A. Гомосексуализм должен быть принят обществом 
B. Гомосексуализм должен быть отвергнут обществом 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
17. A. Американцы должны быть готовы отказаться от конфиденциальности и свободы 
для того, чтобы быть в безопасности от терроризма 
B. Американцы не должны отказываться от конфиденциальности и свободы для 
того, чтобы быть в безопасности от терроризма 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
18. A. Государственная помощь для бедных приносит больше вреда, чем пользы, делая 
людей слишком зависимыми от дотаций 
B. Государственная помощь для бедных приносит больше пользы чем вреда – люди 
не могут выбраться из нищеты, пока их базовые потребности не будут 
удовлетворены 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
19. A. Ужесточение экологических законов и нормативных актов вредит экономике и 
приводит к потере рабочих мест 
B. Ужесточение экологических законов и нормативных актов необходимо 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
20. A. Наша страна сделала все возможное для уравнения черных и белых в правах 
B. Нашей стране необходимо продолжать делать всё возможное для уравнения 
черных и белых в правах 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
21. A. Усилия США по решению проблем в мире в конечном счёте делают ситуацию 
ещё хуже 
B. Мировые проблемы были бы еще хуже без участия США 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
22. A. Правительство обязано помогать нуждающимся даже если это приведет к 
увеличению государственного долга 
B. Сегодня правительство не может себе позволить помощь нуждающимся 
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C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
23. A. Своим трудом и талантами, иммигранты делают нашу страну сильнее 
B. Иммигранты ослабляют нашу страну, забирая наши рабочие места, жильё, и 
медицинское обслуживание 
C. У меня нет мнения по этому поводу 
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Appendix B Raw study data  
Table 1. Exposure to American political socialization agencies30 
Name Educ
ation 
Employment Relationships Participation Mass 
media 
the 
US/Ru
ssia 
Talk to 
people 
in 
Russia 
Ameri
can 
compa
ny 
Am. Co-
workers 
marria
ge 
Friends 
America
n/Russia
n 
Club Church 
In the 
US/Ru
ssia 
Volunte
er in the 
US/Russ
ia 
  Group 1:1 – Males who speak English 
Timur + + + + +/+ + -/- +/- +/+ + 
Yuri + + + - +/- - +/+ +/- +/- + 
Nick + - + - +/+ + -/+ +/+ +/+ + 
John + + + + +/+ - -/+ -/- +/+ + 
Bill  + + + - +/+ + -/- -/- +/+ + 
Jason - + + - +/+ + -/- -/- -/- + 
Valentin  - + + - +/+ - -/- -/- -/+ + 
Group 1:2 – Males who do not speak English 
Ivan - + + - -/+ + +/+ -/- +/+ + 
Semion + + + - +/+ - -/- -/- -/+ + 
Aristarch - - - - -/+ - -/- -/- -/- + 
Alexey - - - - +/+ - -/+ +/+ -/+ + 
Aleksandr - + - - -/+ - -/+ -/- +/+ + 
Pavel - + + - +/+ - -/- -/- -/+ + 
Nikita - + + - -/+ - -/- -/- -/- + 
Andrei - - - - -/+ - -/+ -/- -/+ + 
Vladislav - - - - -/+ - -/- -/- -/+ + 
Group 2:1 – females who speak English 
Abigail - - - + +/+ - -/- +/- +/- + 
Alisa - - - + +/+ - -/- +/- -/- + 
Sessi - + + - +/- - -/- -/+ +/+ + 
Yaroslava  + + + - +/+ + -/- +/- -/- + 
Rina  + + + + -/+ - -/+ +/- +/+ + 
Katya + + + + +/+ + -/- -/- +/+ + 
Sveta - + - + -/- - +/+ +/- +/+ + 
Victoria - + + + -/+ + +/+ +/- +/+ + 
Stephanie - + + + +/+ - -/- -/- +/+ + 
Kristina - - + + +/+ + -/- +/+ +/+ + 
Elena - + + + +/+ + -/- +/- +/- + 
Yana - + + - +/+ - -/- -/- -/- + 
                                                          
30 Sign ‘+’ indicates an exposure to the US agency; sign ‘-’ indicates either the absence of an exposure or presence 
of a Russian agency (especially in marriage and friends category) 
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Group 2:2 – females who do not speak English 
Maria - - - + -/+ - -/- -/- -/+ + 
Margarita + - - + -/+ - -/- -/- +/+ + 
Anna - - - - +/+ + -/+ +/- +/- + 
Marina + - - - +/+ - +/- +/- +/+ + 
Chepe + + + - -/+ - -/+ -/- -/+ + 
Olga - + + + -/+ - -/- -/- +/+ + 
Marianna - + + - +/+ + -/- -/- -/- + 
Tapolina - - - - -/+ - -/+ -/- -/+ + 
Belka + - - - -/+ - -/+ +/- -/+ + 
Alevtina - - - - +/- - -/+ -/- +/+ + 
Korina - - - - +/+ - -/- -/+ +/+ + 
Lukeria - - - - -/+ - -/+ -/- -/+ + 
 
 
 
Table 2. Identity and opinions about the US compared to Russia 
 
Name Do you consider 
yourself? 
One word to 
describe America 
Three things I like 
about the US 
compared to Russia 
Three things I like about 
Russia compared to the US 
A typical 
Russian 
American 
Group 1:1 – Males who speak English 
Timur No, 
citizen of 
the world  
No, 
citizen of 
the world 
Law-abiding  • Economy  
• Convenience  
• Mobility   
• More freedom 
• Relationship 
• Simplicity    
Yuri No  Yes  Hardworking  • Driving/no traffic 
• Friendly people 
• Customer service 
• Food 
• Nature  
• People I know 
Nick No, 
citizen of 
the world 
No, 
citizen of 
the world 
Entrepreneurship  • Roads  
• Business ease 
• Financial/banking 
system 
• Food  
• Culture 
• Young people (compare to 
FL) 
John Yes  30% Yes Laid back • Politeness  
• Customer service 
• Ability to travel  
• Straightforwardness  
• Culture  
• Women  
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Bill  Not a 
typical 
Russian  
No  Emancipation  • Education  
• Freedom to move 
• Diversity  
• My parents 
• Nature/architecture 
• It is my homeland 
Jason Yes  No  NA • Opportunities  
• Weather   
• Retirement security 
• Education  
• NA 
• NA 
Valentin  Yes  No  Normal  • Lifestyle 
• Freedom  
• Education  
• Nature 
• Fashion 
• Food  
Group 1:2 – Males who do not speak English 
Ivan Yes, 
absolutely 
 
No, I will 
never be  
American 
Narrow 
specializations 
• Roads  
• Less bureaucracy 
• Environment policy  
• Social welfare 
• Nature  
• NA 
Semion Yes  No  Standardized  • Voluntary army 
• Support for science 
• Academia elevators 
• Movement freedom 
• People’s hospitality 
• Nature  
Aristarch Yes  No  Soap bubble • Roads  
• Parks 
• Cheap traveling 
• Straightforwardness 
• Nature 
• Food  
Alexey Yes  No  Serenity  
(specific to FL) 
• Less control of my 
work 
• Religious freedom  
• not much difference  
• I forget I am in the US  
Aleksandr Yes  No, I am 
an 
immigrant 
NA • Less bureaucracy 
and corruption 
• Attitude toward 
people 
• Products’ quality 
• Relaxed laws 
• Can negotiate with the law 
enforcement 
• NA 
Pavel Yes  No  Egocentric  • Customer service 
• Less bureaucracy 
• Banking system 
• People’s relations 
• Family relations 
• Upbringing  
Nikita Yes  No  NA  • Law enforcement • No denunciation 
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• Weather 
• Salary to wok input 
• Money solve all problems 
• Snow  
Andrei Yes  Yes  Good-natured 
Calm  
• Banking system 
• Calm 
• Business ease 
• Food  
• Culture 
• Family/friends 
Vladisalv Yes, 
absolutely 
 
No, I am 
Russian 
Hard-working  • Higher salaries 
• Social security and 
healthcare 
• Goods and services 
accessibility  
 
 
• Mentality  
• Nature 
• Society and the 
government 
Group 2:1 – females who speak English 
Abigail No  No  Survivalist  • Freedom of 
opportunity 
•  Weather 
• Friendly people 
• Family 
• Nature 
• History  
Alisa No  No  Similar (to us) • Comfortable living 
• Friendly attitude 
• More choices in 
everything 
• Deep, sensual attitude 
• Savvy people 
• Always ready to help 
Sessi Not 
anymore 
Maybe in 
15 years 
Zombie 
(indifference) 
• Polite people 
• Financial aid in 
college 
• Clean streets 
• Nature 
• History 
• Culture  
Yaroslava  Yes  No, I 
Americani
zed 
Positive  • Comfort 
• Customer service 
• Job availability 
• Paid vacations 
• Education and aesthetics 
• Food  
Rina  Yes  Yes, my 
future is 
here 
Friendly  • Government 
apparatus 
• Opportunities 
• NA 
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• My husband 
Katya Yes  No31 Opportunities  • Beach 
• Sense of security, 
low criminal activity 
• Friendly people 
• Food 
• My family 
• Music  
Sveta No, 
European   
No, 
European  
Stupid 
(Zadornov) 
• Customer service 
• Accessibility of 
everything 
• Banking system 
• Values 
• Food 
• Straightforwardness 
 
Victoria Yes  No  Law-abiding • Higher salaries 
• Tolerance 
• Respect for the law 
• Deep, sensual people 
• NA 
• NA 
Stephanie Yes  Yes  Calm  • Independent family 
relations 
• Weather 
• Privacy  
• History/architecture 
• Food 
• Togetherness 
 
Kristina No  Not yet Democracy  • Lifestyle 
• Stable economy 
• Cheaper traveling 
• It is my home 
• City life 
• Free health care 
Elena No, I am 
too happy 
for a 
Russian  
No, when 
I get 
citizenship 
Opinionated  • Religious freedom 
• Founding principles 
• My daughter was 
born here 
• Childhood memories 
• Food 
• Unexplainable feeling32 
Yana No, I am 
just a 
human 
No, I am 
just a 
human 
Happiness  • Standards of living 
• No corruption 
• People’s attitude 
• Food 
• Culture 
• Traditions/holydays 
Group 2:2 – females who do not speak English 
Maria Yes  No  Soap bubble  • Stability • More educated people 
                                                          
31 I know how to sew and cook – I am self-sufficient 
32 The feeling of getting out of a sauna in the winter; Умом Россию не понять… 
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• Social support 
• Safety  
• Healthcare 
• NA 
Margarita Yes  No, I feel 
integrated 
Consumption  • Opportunities 
• Affordable traveling 
• Low prices of 
clothes and shoes 
• People 
• Nature 
• The sense of homeland 
Anna Yes  I will 
gladly be 
one if it 
accepts 
me 
Non-stop 
progress 
• Accessibility of 
information 
• Active volunteering 
• Infrastructure  
• Nothing  
 
Marina No  Not yet Smiling  • The sense of security 
• Standards of living, 
can provide for 
children 
• Medical care 
• Accessible healthcare 
• Friends/relatives 
• Childhood memories 
Chepe Think so  Definitely 
not 
A commercial  • Customer service 
with the smile 
• Science 
infrastructure 
• Affordable travel 
• The sense of freedom 
• Daycare system 
• Food  
Olga Of course No, you 
need to be 
born here  
A labor camp 
(they work a lot) 
• Casual clothing 
• Low prices of 
clothes and shoes 
• Healthcare quality 
• Food 
• Accessible healthcare 
• Public transportation 
Marianna I have 
Russian 
mentality 
No  NA • Less bureaucracy 
• Care for people with 
disabilities 
• Low interest rates 
• Organic food 
• NA 
• NA 
 
Tapolina Yes  No  Order  • High education 
• Social security, 
human safety 
• Modern construction 
technologies 
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• More opportunities • More interaction among 
people 
• NA 
Belka No  Only by 
citizenship 
Comfort  • Roads quality 
• Medical service 
• Landscaping  
• It is my home 
• Culture 
• Food 
Alevtina No  No  Successful state 
order 
• Compassion 
politeness 
• Shopping comfort 
• Sense of stability 
• It is my home 
• Native language 
• Nature  
Korina No, 
consider 
myself 
Ukrainian 
No  Imagined 
paradise  
• Roads, infrastructure 
• Healthcare quality 
• Safety 
• Education 
• Free sport activities 
• Preventive medicine 
Lukeria Yes  No  Dimensionality  • Climate 
• Clean streets 
• Comfortable living  
• Food 
• Leisure possibilities 
• Public transportation 
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